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In my dissertation, “Towards an Improved Qasi-Realism,” I lay out, evaluate, 
and then improve upon existing varieties of quasi-realist expressivism in metaethics, in 
particular with regards to solving the problem of embedding. 
I outline two distinctions to classify quasi-realist theories: between fast-track 
and slow-track approaches, and between univocal and mimicking approaches. I argue 
that a successful theory will use the mimicking approach and a structure that 
combines fast-track and slow-track elements-- that is, it will work to justify the use of 
propositional form in expressing atitudes using concerns related to the wider 
institution that we identify as moral practice. 
Afer historical discussion of A. J. Ayer, I. A. Richards, and C. L. Stevenson, in 
which I atempt to bring out overlooked nuances of how the embedding problem 
relates to their theories, I turn my atention to Simon Blackburn’s notion of 
“propositional reflection”-- the idea that a structure of our atitudes can ground an 
expressivist’s explanation of why we use apparent propositions to express atitudes. I 
argue that none of Blackburn’s candidates for the relation is adequate. Theories that 
separate what is expressed from what is reflected (as in Allan Gibbard’s Thinking How 
to Live view) do beter, and I contribute a suggestion of my own according to which a 
commitment is a state of standing ready to take action, but, ultimately, the right view 
is one that adopts a pluralistic view of the atitudinal dynamics that underlie our 
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adoption of propositional form for the expressions of atitudes that constitute moral 
language. 
Finally, I consider the quasi-realist maneuver itself, the assimilation of 
paradigmatically realist metaethical claims by the expressivist via minimalist or 
expressivist analyses of those claims. I determine that the expressivist form of quasi-
realism is more promising than the minimalist, and that the quasi-realist can 
minimalize the burden he carries from denying intuitively plausible realist claims while 
at the same time keeping quasi-realist expressivism clearly distinct from realism. The 
harsher consequences of adopting a mimicking theory can be rendered harmless by 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Two Problems for Expressivism
1.1 Expressivism
On the face of it, the sentences that feature in moral discourse resemble those 
that feature in discourse about things. Structurally, “this is wrong” seems similar to 
“this is red” or “this is a chair”. And we work with it similarly as well; we embed it, and 
thereby construct sentences such as “if this is wrong, you will burn in Hell for all 
eternity,” without marking any particular diference in what we are doing from when 
we construct “if this is a chair, its owner must be very short.” We disagree about it; one 
person might claim “this is wrong” and another “this is not wrong”, and thereby enter 
into what seems like the same sort of relationship with one another as they enter into 
when one claims “this is a chair” and the other “this is not a chair.” And we argue about 
it; one might, for instance, construct the argument “if this is murder, then it is wrong; 
this is murder; therefore, it is wrong” with the same procedure that we use to come up 
with the argument “if this is a chair, it won't break when you sit on it; it is a chair; 
therefore, it won't break when you sit on it.” 
All of this evidence strongly suggests that “this is wrong” really is like “this is a 
chair”; they difer only in that the former atributes the property of being wrong, and 
the later, that of being a chair. A realist holds that moral sentences ascribe (moral) 
properties to objects, and that there are such properties. It is not the goal of this piece 
to dissertation that such a view is mistaken. Rather, suppose we find, somewhere else, 
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reason to doubt the view, or, more moderately, to think that this view does not tell the 
whole story.  Such a situation sometimes occurs when one's wider theory seems to 
conflict with moral realism-- see, for instance, A. J. Ayer's (1936 [1952]) positivism– or 
in the face of arguments directed against realism itself-- a choice few examples being J. 
L. Mackie's (1977) queerness argument1, Sharon Street's (2006) evolutionary argument2, 
or the problem of moral divergence3-- ofen called the problem of moral disagreement, 
but we must rename it in order to avoid confusion with a certain older problem that 
will serve as a central element of this work. 
If we find reason to reject realism, there are a number of views we might take 
up instead. A number of these carry the label of “expressivism”, a term which I will now
appropriate to capture the sort of theory that I am interested in examining. Let us use 
the term “expressivism” to denote the position that the nature of moral discourse is the 
expression of atitudes. This definition requires several points of clarification. 
First, the word “nature” above is not a fancy way of saying “meaning,” or indeed 
as an oblique atempt at highlighting any particular mechanism. Rather, the category 
of theory that I wish to highlight is one characterized not by any specific claim made 
by all and only such theories, but by a shared structural feature: theories in this class 
cite the expression of atitudes in moral discourse as the wellspring of explanatory 
power for dealing with meta-ethical questions: what moral discourse is for, what is at 
1 See also e.g. Brink (1984) pp. 111-125; Horgan and Timmons (1992), pp. 221-260; Garner (1990)
2 See also e.g.Kahane (2011);Shaver-Landau (2012); Wielenberg (2010)
3 That is, that different groups of people often appear to possess different moral beliefs. For an overview,
the introduction of Gowans (2000) is decent. Mackie (1977) is again an important resource. For more, 
see e.g. Harman and Thomson (1996); Enoch (2009); Sturgeon (1994)
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stake in moral dispute, whether we need to posit the existence of moral properties with
unusual motivational properties, etc. Admitedly, this sort of characterization gives us 
less to go on than one based on a mechanism, but I do not think that that is avoidable. 
Indeed, when, in later sections, we turn our atention to some of the existing theories 
that the definition is meant to capture, we will see that the prospects are dim for quick 
and dirty semantic approaches to defining expressivism; that, in fact, the most natural 
candidate for such a definition-- that expressivism constructs the meaning of moral 
sentences by appeal to the expression of atitudes-- is neither historically apt nor 
conducive to the proper understanding of the idea it purports to capture. So, although 
this style of definition may not be as satisfying as some of the alternatives, it will save 
us trouble in the long run. 4
Second, “expression” requires some discussion. Schroeder (2010) takes pains to 
give the expressivist a distinctive notion of expression, one where the term specifically 
refers to the sort of relationship found between an ordinary factual belief and the 
sentence that voices the content of that belief. I find myself unmotivated to follow suit.
Schroeder wants terminology that will separate “expressivism” from earlier “emotivist” 
theories5, while I find the label “emotivist” to be flawed6-- though, perhaps, useful for 
4 For definitions in the literature that share this feature, see e.g. Gibbard (2003); Gert (2011); Stoljar 
(1993) is particularly interesting (assuming we do not allow ourselves to be distracted by Stoljar's 
choice to use “Emotivism” rather than “expressivism”). Charlow (2014), which draws upon Rosen 
(1998) and Wedgwood (2007),  is related and has useful discussion on this issue, though not quite an 
example due to some differences in detail. All of this said, I would define expressivism in this way, for 
practical and historical reasons, even if there were far less precedent for so doing. 
5 “Emotivists” get the ordinary sense of “express”, while “expressivists” get the technical sense. 
6 The problems being that, firstly, the theories most closely associated with the term-- Ayer's and 
Stevenson's-- are both far more sophisticated in terms of what they take to be expressed in moral 
discourse than is suggested by the “emotivist” label; secondly, when understood in full and in their 
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leading the uninitiated into the general vicinity of the ideas-- and therefore desire a 
general term that can capture both those theories and their descendants (once again, 
the historical discussions to come should bring out why this is the case). At any rate, it 
is also unclear if Schroeder's definition actually succeeds at capturing the theories to 
which the “expressivist” label is supposed to apply.7 If needs be, we can include specific 
notions of “expression” into particular theories;  so long as they are near enough to the 
ordinary notion to justify the label, we are unlikely to cause confusion by lumping 
them in with one another and with theories that use the folk concept straight.8 
most developed forms, these theories share quite a lot with their descendants, decreasing the motivation
for separating them. 
7 Blackburn, for instance, sometimes moves quite freely between “emotivist” and “expressivist” when 
speaking (see his interview with Darlei Dall'Agnol, 2002), and in writing cites emotivism as a classic 
example of an expressive theory (see e.g. Blackburn (1984), p. 167). Anyway, Schroeder himself, in his
(2008b) notes that expressivists tend to do very little to define “expression”, though they should; for 
our purposes, though, we should not rule out bad expressivism from being expressivism. 
8 A side-note on the idea of “expression”: traditionally, the idea of expressing a mental state has been 
drawn in contrast to that of attributing the idea to oneself (as in “subjectivism”). Now there is some 
debate as to whether the distinction is tenable; if not, there can be no expressivism. In the literature, the
dispute about this point grew from a 1998 piece by Jackson and Petit; the point is reiterated in Jackson 
and Pettit (2003). The central thrust of their argument is that the process for learning to use a sentence 
to express a mental state will be sufficient to give that sentence the meaning of a report of that mental 
state, thus collapsing expressivism into subjectivism. Various replies ensued; for instance, Dreier 
(2004) tries to pull apart the results of the learning considerations that Pettit and Jackson are concerned 
about from the primary truth conditions of moral language, while Smith and Stoljar (2003) distinguish 
agreeing to use a word for something as opposed to agreeing to use it when something is the case to 
block the unappealing for claim that leads to subjectivism. Schroeder's own view, in his (2008b) is that 
the problem is solved by his preferred form of expressivism, wherein the notion of expression 
discussed earlier aligns the attitude with the belief in factual cases (and so there is no more danger of 
moral sentences collapsing into an attribution of an attitude to the speaker as there is of factual 
sentences collapsing into sentences about the speaker's beliefs). Personally, I find the Smith-Stoljar 
solution compelling, especially when it is combined with a certain observation: in social interactions, 
there are times when it is and when it is not appropriate for a speaker to make statements about himself 
or herself. Speakers who talk about themselves excessively may be regarded as self-centered or even 
neurotic. There sometimes emerge apparently expressivised versions of self-attributions-- for instance, 
the ungrammatical ”hopefully” or “thankfully” at the beginning of the sentence, which differ from “I 
hope that” or “I feel thankful for the fact that” in having explicit reference to the speaker removed-- 
which appear to be usable without violating such conventions in situations where the grammatical 
versions would do so. A theory that allows purely expressive constructions to form, either directly by 
learning use-when, or indirectly by subtraction, has the advantage of generating a convenient 
explanation for the emergence of “hopefully” and the like. 
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Third, I find it necessary to remark on the use of “atitude” within the definition.
Afer all, without further specification, the definition does not say terribly much; there 
are few mental states that the term “atitude” could not be conceivably stretched to 
cover. And yet the prospects seem very dim indeed for any one definition of atitude to 
capture the entire category. Perhaps the best option will be to repeat the maneuver 
used for “expression”: any notion of “atitude”, technical or otherwise, will do, so long as
it falls within the intuitively-delineated family resemblance cluster surrounding the 
ordinary concept. Also, including “atitude” at all has the odd efect that hyphenated 
expressivisms (“norm-expressivism”, “plan-expressivism”, etc.) aren't properly 
expressivist unless they mean for their distinctive feature to be interchangeable with 
some construct of atitudes. Although this aspect is peculiar, it is not a big deal; afer 
all, we already have the hyphenated terms to refer to such theories. 
1.2 The Frege-Geach problem
If we choose expressivism as our form of anti-realism,  we face the dificulty 
known as the Frege-Geach Problem. Core references for the problem are Geach's (1958), 
(1960), and (1965), though it was also raised by Searle (1962), and perhaps even earlier 
by others.9 As mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, moral language 
behaves like non-moral language. For one, it can embed, entering into contexts where 
the moral sentence is not asserted. Either side of a conditional, for instance, can 
9 For instance, Schroeder (2010) attributes prefigurings of the problem to Ross (1939), ~pp.30-41; to 
H.B. Acton (1936); and to Hare (in his (1952 [1964]), ch. 2). The arguments are not quite the same as 
in Geach, but close enough to be interesting.
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contain a moral term:
1.2e1 If Arnold killed Bob, he acted wrongly. 
1.2e2 If murder is wrong, Arnold will burn in Hell. 
Such sentences can combine with factual sentences or with ones that contain moral 
terms in asserted contexts to create apparently valid arguments with either a non-
moral or a moral conclusion:
1.2e1 If Arnold killed Bob, he acted wrongly. 
1.2e3 Arnold killed Bob. 
1.2e4 Therefore, he acted wrongly. 
1.2e2 If murder is wrong, Arnold will burn in Hell. 
1.2e5 Murder is wrong. 
1.2e6 Therefore, Arnold will burn in Hell. 10
Expressivism draws upon the expression of atitudes as its key explanatory mechanism.
10   If running the inference in this direction seems particularly odd, it may be because of a related 
difficulty, the “wishful thinking problem”, from Dorr (2000). It seems like an agent who accepts 1.2e2-
1.2e5 thereby comes to have reason to accept 1.2e6, but if 1.2e5 is described only as an expression of an 
attitude, how could it function in that way? For discussion of this issue, see e.g. Budolfson (2011); Mabrito 
(2013); Schroeder (2011). Observe that this problem only arises for versions of expressivism in which the 
account of moral disputes in general is subsequent to the account given to such apparently deductive 
arguments in the order of explanation.
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But expressing a mental state is an action, and claiming that it occurs in unasserted 
contexts as well would collapse the distinction between the two and lead to absurdity. 
And so the expressivist has more work to do if he is to explain:
a) The meaning of sentences such as 1.2e1 and 1.2e2.
b) The role that “Arnold killed Bob” plays in determining the meaning of 1.2e1, and 
analogous cases.
c) The close relationship between “Arnold killed Bob” as it appears in 1.2e1 and as it 
appears in 1.2e3, and analogous cases.
d) The validity of 1.2e1-1.2e4, 1.2e2-1.2e6, and analogous cases.
Taken together, these dificulties comprise the Frege-Geach Problem, also known as the 
Embedding Problem. Some authors might prefer to divide the problem into a number of 
sub-problems11, but, for our purposes, we will lump all of the issue's aspects together 
into a single challenge. 
To see how this problem works, let us consider a simple version of expressivism, 
one on which “murder is wrong” is taken to be interchangeable with “Boo, murder!” 
Now consider the sentence, “If murder is wrong, then paying someone to commit 
murder is also wrong.” If the expression of the Boo!-atitude gives the meaning of 
“murder is wrong”, then “murder is wrong” cannot mean the same thing when it is 
embedded in sentences like our example, because asserting such a sentence does not 
involve expressing that atitude. Such is undesirable for multiple reasons. It is an 
afront to our intuitions about compositionality; it fails to explain the meaning of the 
11 For example, Sinnott-Armstrong (2000), divides the problem into four sub-problems.
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complex sentence; it makes arguments that we think ought to be straightforwardly 
valid appear to be instances of a fallacy of equivocation. In order to be plausible, an 
expressivist theory will have to do beter. 
Although the dificulty is ofen called the “embedding problem,” it would be too 
simple to consider a) to represent the entirety of the problem. For the dificulty, if it is 
to get anywhere, ought to apply to expressivist theories with a wide range of possible 
accounts as to the degree of interconnectedness between metaethics and semantics. It 
is not only a problem for those theorists who approach metaethics as an exercise in 
determining the meaning of moral sentences; it is also supposed to work against 
theories that concern themselves entirely with making comments about moral practice,
while leaving it up to the philosophers of language to determine which of the moving 
parts in each theory should count as “meaning” and which not. It should even work 
against theories that are explicitly anti-semantic, where for one reason or another the 
theorist thinks that ethical statements lie entirely outside the boundaries of meaning, 
though they nonetheless have some use. 
Rather, it would seem that the center of the issue must be defined by a more 
general concern: not that of describing the meaning of those sentences where moral 
terms occur in embedded contexts, but of describing the sentences themselves-- their 
role and their logic. It is not that this question eliminates the meaning question, but 
rather that any answer to this question will also answer the meaning question, either 
by solving it or by showing why we needn't worry about it. And it is a question that 
8
can be aimed even at those theories that do not use semantics as the delivery 
mechanism for their expressivist explanations. 
In order that we might proceed in an organized and methodical manner, we will
leave this problem here for now. We will pick it up again later, afer we have seen 
enough of the lay of the land to discuss strategies for dealing with the issue at a high 
level of abstraction. 
1.3 Dispute and practice
Another dificulty for the anti-realist that expressivists, historically, have 
wanted to address is the problem of moral dispute12. By this I mean the problem that 
Moore raised13 for subjectivism14: if we take the statements of moral discourse to be 
claims about the atitudes of the speaker, then it follows that a moral claim and its 
negation, in the mouths of diferent speakers, do not contradict one another. For 
instance, A might disapprove of the recreational immolation of squirrels, while B might
condone it; A can describe his atitude by saying, “I disapprove of squirrel-burning,” 
while B can describe his by saying, “I do not disapprove of squirrel-burning.” In such a 
case, the statements of the two do not contradict one another; they may both be true, 
both be false, or one be true and the other false. And yet “Squirrel-burning is wrong” 
12 Perhaps better known as the problem of moral disagreement-- not to be confused with what I called the 
problem of moral divergence, which is sometimes also called the problem of moral disagreement, 
though the two are entirely different. To avoid creating confusion, I have chosen to discontinue the 
ambiguous “moral disagreement” for both problems. 
13 See Moore (1922)
14 The view that moral utterances report the attitudes of the speaker-- so “murder is wrong” translates to 
“I disapprove of murder,” and so forth. 
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and “Squirrel-burning is not wrong” are incompatible even coming from diferent 
speakers. Thus, it seems that “I disapprove of squirrel-burning” is not an acceptable 
analysis of “Squirrel-burning is wrong,” and more generally, that statements of moral 
language cannot be analyzed as statements about the atitudes of the speaker. 
While negations of moral sentences is itself an issue for expressivism15, the 
problem of moral dispute is not confined to negation. Where the embedding problem 
was about moral sentences, their meaning (perhaps), and their underlying logic, the 
dispute problem is about moral practice, by which I mean the set of customs and social
habits involving and surrounding the discussion of moral maters. There are facts about
what we do that any meta-ethical theory must be prepared to explain. The subjectivist 
position16, by holding that there is no contradiction between “murder is wrong” in the 
mouth of one speaker and “murder is not wrong” in the mouth of another, becomes 
subject to the challenge of explaining the forms of conflict that typically atend such a 
case: that the situation is regarded as one of disagreement, that the participants might 
try to resolve that disagreement through what appears to be rational argument, and 
that one might even be called irrational for failing to heed the consequences of such an
argument. 
Ayer (1936 [1952]), whose theory we will investigate in more detail in Chapter 3,
recognizes that the problem of dispute raises questions for the expressivist just as it 
15 Indeed, the literature currently features quite a bit of material about the “problem of negation,” 
attributed to Unwin (1999), (2001) and much discussed by and in connection with Schroeder (2008a), 
(2008b), (2008c), (2008d), (2010).
16 At least in the simple form we are considering. 
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does for the subjectivist. The expressivist must be able to explain, firstly, what sort of 
conflicts can arise between opposed expressions of atitudes, and secondly, how such 
conflicts can stand at the center of the discursive practices that atend moral dispute. If
the expressivist seeks to appeal-- as it seems he must-- to some notion of disagreement
in atitude, the second aspect of the problem becomes dificult. For disagreements in 
atitude typically call for a diferent sort of debate from debates about facts; when we 
take issue with someone's expressed atitude, we may atempt to change it, using a 
wide variety of persuasive methods, but we do not-- and cannot-- refute it. “Ick, 
broccoli!” can be reacted to in a variety of ways; it can be rewarded with a disapproving
stare, met with the question, “Why don't you like broccoli?”, or alternatively with “Have
you even tried it?”; it can be fought against with claims that “it's not that bad,” “it's 
good for you,” or “I like it”. But it cannot be disproved, shown unintelligible, or even 
deemed unlikely. And yet we do-- or seem to do-- all of the above in moral discourse.
The expressivist, if he is to remain in a viable position, has two strategies that 
he might pursue. He might atempt to explain the evidence-- that is, he might provide 
some sort of story to inform us as to why disputes about moral maters proceed as if 
we were disputing maters of fact-- or he might challenge that observation of moral 
discourse really does yield the datum that such discourse proceeds in the manner 
expected of a mater of fact. These strategies are not mutually exclusive; it is open to 
the expressivist to make as many observations as possible to support his position, and 
then cover the remainder with explanations. 
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Independently of the consideration of any particular expressivist theory-- which
we'll leave of for now, so that we can do justice to our case studies later and not lose 
track of our current topic-- we can consider the strategies themselves. In particular, we 
should consider the extent to which the second strategy might be taken. Ayer argued-- 
and he would be followed in this by Stevenson17– that moral debate was doomed to 
collapse into non-rational argument, and that, in fact, it would do so as soon as it 
became genuinely moral (rather than about non-moral facts of the issue at hand). 
Ayer's position in 1936 is an example of the second strategy; the idea is to show that if 
we really think about when rational debate proceeds and when it breaks down, we see 
a patern that is exactly as we would expect for straightforward expressivism. Success 
in this mater, though, will hinge not on any detail of Ayer's own theory, but on 
dedicated arguments concerning the breakdowns (or absence of breakdowns) in moral 
debate.
This problem is closely tied to the Frege-Geach problem; indeed, some authors18 
consider these to be the same problem. But dividing them is useful for the purpose of 
exploring solutions. An Ayer-style all-in second-type solution addresses the dispute 
worry without having to concern itself with Frege-Geach issues (at least within the 
bounds of the solution to the dispute problem), because such a theory labels all of the 
fact-like discursive practices as actually being discourse about fact. Alternatively, there 
seems to be room in logical space for a theory to pursue first-type strategy that is not a
17 e. g. Stevenson (1944)
18 See e.g. Björnsson (2001); Van Roojen (1996).
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straightforward solution to Frege-Geach; for instance, we might have one that treats 
moral practice in a holistic manner, about which we will say more later. 
The issue of moral dispute is part of the question of moral practice-- that is, of 
providing a satisfying general description of what we are doing when we think, talk, 
and argue about morality. We take ourselves to be engaged in a practice that involves 
real disagreements, ones where the participants are not merely talking past each other.
An expressivist theory can atempt to show how it is that this is so, or it can deny that 
it is so. Either way, it will need something to say about what is going on when two 
people seem to disagree about a moral mater. 
Here are two ways that an expressivist might answer that demand. On one 
hand, he might start with an answer to the embedding problem, and thereby come to 
understand complex moral sentences. Having done so, he will understand what is being
said in moral discourse, including in cases where people appear to be arguing. And if he
can explain how we can engage in rational argument using expressions of emotions, it 
is unclear what more we would need to satisfy the question of dispute. Afer all, if we 
can engage in rational argument about something, that seems as good a justification as
any for calling the dispute genuine. On the other hand, he might start with some 
thoughts about the dispute problem-- that is, with an idea of what kind of practice 
moral dispute is part of-- and then atempt to give meanings for sentences with moral 
terms in embedded contexts based on the role of those sentences within the practice. 
These two ways are not exhaustive; hybrids are possible. 
13
In order to make these ideas explicit, let us now turn our atention to some 
examples, courtesy of Simon Blackburn. 
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Chapter 2. Slow and Fast Tracks; Mimicking and Univocal Approaches
Solving the embedding problem requires describing19 sentences featuring moral 
terms in embedded contexts. The most obvious way to approach this task is 
compositionally: account for how atomic moral sentences can be combined to form 
complex moral sentences and an account of any complex moral sentence is in the 
ofing. A less obvious way to approach the task is functionally: describe what moral 
language, in general, is for, and then describe the role that complex moral sentences 
play in the practices of reasoning that we adopt in pursuit of that goal. Each of these 
approaches corresponds to a diferent structure that an expressivist theory might 
adopt; the approach chosen will dictate the overall order of explanation that the theory
must pursue. This chapter aims to explain these two structures and their implications 
for the prospects of theories that follow them. 
2.1 The Slow Track
Blackburn's Spreading the Word (1984) view will serve as our example of the first
structure. Before going into any detail, though, it is important to note that we will be 
greatly simplifying the views in question. In particular, we will be leaving of all quasi-
realism, where by “quasi-realism” I mean the practice of using analysis, typically either 
minimalist or expressivist, on meta-ethical claims that are usually associated with 
19 Those interested in developing a typical contemporary expressivist theory, that is, one that understands 
expressivism as a semantic thesis, should substitute “giving the meaning of” for “describing” here. 
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realism in order to render them compatible with expressivism. This omission is 
temporary-- we will return to quasi-realism in Chapter 6, at which point we should be 
beter equipped to examine it properly-- and is not philosophical, but merely 
explanatory, in nature. The topics of this chapter are simply easier to discuss with 
quasi-realism excluded, even though doing so means that many of the claims here will 
ultimately need to be revised or even reversed. The purpose of this section is not to 
create a reconstruction that would be acceptable to a proponent of the original view, 
but to look at particular central components of the view on their own.
In Spreading the Word, Blackburn asks us to consider an explicitly expressive 
language, Eex, possessed of operators B!(x) and H!(x), for “Boo!” and “Hooray!”, 
respectively20. The B!(x) and H!(x) operators are expressive; B!(x) and H!(x) express 
disapproval and approval, respectively, towards x. As users of Eex will want to express 
atitudes towards other atitudes, and combinations of atitudes, and belief-atitude 
combinations, Blackburn sees fit to introduce bars (||) as a way of referring to the 
enclosed atitude or belief rather than expressing it; thus |B!(x)| and |H!(x)| refer to 
disapproval and approval towards x, respectively. He also introduces the semicolon (;) 
as a coupling operator; judging from his examples, it seems to mean something like 
“having the later upon having the former.” Blackburn calls the resulting compound a 
sensibility, and suggests that we might helpfully think of it as a function from an input 
mental state to an output mental state. 
20 See Blackburn (1984) pp. 193-196. Note that as of his (1988 [1993]), Blackburn includes a third basic 
attitude-expression, “T!(x)”, for “Tolerate!”. 
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Eex provides us with a way of constructing expressivist analyses of moral 
language. For each sentence of ordinary moral language, there is (or at least, there is 
supposed to be) a corresponding Eex sentence to show us what atitude(s) the moral 
sentence expresses. Per Blackburn's translations21, “Lying is wrong” becomes B!(lying). 
Moral conditionals are identified as expressions of higher-order atitudes: that is, 
atitudes towards sensibilities. Thus “If lying is wrong, then geting your litle brother to
lie is wrong” expresses the same atitude as H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to 
lie)|). By deploying higher-order atitudes, the Spreading the Word view can give an 
account both of the moral conditional itself and the role that simple moral sentences 
play when embedded in complex moral sentences.  
Note that H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to lie)|) does not appear to be of 
the form A → B. In general, expressivist theories take one of two approaches, which we
will call “univocal” and “mimicking.” Univocal expressivism seeks an account of complex
moral sentences that gives those sentences the logical forms suggested by their surface
forms. Mimicking expressivism does not, instead atempting to find an alternative 
explanation for our use of our chosen surface forms.22 Thus, a view that uses higher-
21 Ibid p. 195
22 My distinction between mimicking and univocal expressivism is similar but not identical to the 
distinction between “modest quasi-realism” and “ambitious quasi-realism” drawn by Hale (1993). 
Modest quasi-realism seems similar to mimicking expressivism; Hale defines the modest quasi-realist 
as one for whom it is the case that
he will have accomplished all he set out to do, if he manages to explain how we can 
respectably and intelligibly talk and think as if there were moral truths and falsehoods-- 
presenting our attitudinal commitments in propositional style, with all that that entails, by 
way of propositional embeddings-- although there are in reality (as he conceives it) no 
such things. (Hale 19993 p. 340)
Ambitious quasi-realism, on the other hand, claims that there really is moral truth and falsity, not just an 
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order atitudes to explain complex moral sentences has two choices: it can ofer an 
account of logical connectives in general that renders H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle 
brother to lie)|) an instance of A → B (and Eex sentences, in general, instances of the 
forms suggested by their English expressions), in this case it will be a univocal theory. 
Or it can grant that H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to lie)|) is not an instance of A
→ B (and other complex moral sentences may not have the forms that they appear to 
have-- at least that is what the kind of mimicking theory that we are currently 
considering, one without any quasi-realism, would say. A theory with quasi-realism, 
such as Blackburn's own, would be highly reluctant to make such a claim-- a situation 
that we will not investigate more closely until Chapter 6), and seek an explanation for 
why we nonetheless use “if lying is wrong, then geting your brother to lie is wrong” to 
express |H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to lie)|)|. In that case it would be a 
mimicking theory. 
Spreading the Word presents a mimicking theory. It is worth pointing out that 
trying to classify existing theories as univocal or mimicking is not as straightforward of
a process as it might seem. As I specified, we have been examining the mimicking 
approach as it might appear without any quasi-realist elements. Blackburn's views, 
imitation thereof. But although the modest/ambitious distinction seems similar to the mimicking/univocal 
distinction, there is a significant difference due to the fact that, per the provisos earlier in this chapter, the 
mimicking/univocal distinction is to be reckoned before any quasi-realist elements of the theory are factored
in, while the modest/ambitious distinction is not. Hence, for example, Blackburn's position is, as I am about 
to argue, a mimicking theory, but is ambitiously rather than modestly quasi-realist (at least by Hale's 
reckoning. I think Hale may be oversimplifying matters. In fact, Blackburn repeatedly demonstrates apathy 
[e.g. Blackburn (1984) p. 257, Blackburn (1993c) p. 367] towards the question of whether he wishes to 
endorse modest or ambitious quasi-realism. But this stance is enough, I think, to demonstrate the difference 
between the mimicking/univocal and modest/ambitious distinctions).
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however, are quasi-realist, and so we cannot expect them to look like the mimicking 
theory that we have just introduced. What we see in Blackburn, though, are 
explanations of the type that we would expect from a mimicking theory: explanations 
that center on the practical utility of the use of propositional form. He writes:
Eex needs to become an instrument of serious, reflective, evaluative 
practice, able to express concern for improvements, clashes, implications, 
and coherence of atitudes. Now one way of doing this is to become like 
ordinary English. That is, it would invent a predicate answering to the 
atitude, and treat commitments as if they were judgements, and then use
all the natural devices for debating truth.23 
Blackburn's hope is that we might “come to appreciate why it should be natural to 
treat expressions of atitude as if they were similar to ordinary judgements.”24 The view 
is not, as in a theory of the univocal type, atempting to show that expressions of 
atitudes are similar to ordinary judgments, but rather that it might be profitable for us
to use propositional form for the expression of atitudes despite those expressions not 
having the underlying logic of propositions. This focus suggests that we should read 
Blackburn as providing what I have called a mimicking view. 
One aspect of the view that we will return to later is the account of what, 
exactly, we stand to gain from the adoption of propositional form. All mimicking 
theories require an account of this type.     For now, we will sketch the idea; we will 
return to it for an in-depth treatment in Chapter 5. 
According to the Spreading the Word version of Blackburn's mimicking 
23 ibid
24 Ibid p. 196
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expressivism, the purpose of using propositional form is to allow us to make use of the 
ordinary tools of reasoning for a purpose other than that of keeping track of actual 
logical relationships. Consider:
2.1e1 B!(lying)
2.1e2 H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to lie)|)
2.1e3 B!(geting litle brother to lie)
One who accepts 2.1e1-e2 seems compelled to accept 2.1e3: not because there would be
any logical contradiction involved in his failure to do so, but because his own 
sensibility instructs him thusly. Should he choose instead to reject 2.1e3, he will have 
failed to choose atitudes in accordance with his own sensibilities, which would be an 
unhappy state for him (as he would lack self-approval, or in other cases even have self-
disapproval) and a confusing one for anyone who must interact with him (as we would 
doubtless find it more dificult to understand the actions of one who acted in 
opposition to his own motivations). We can keep track of the fact that there is a 
problem with someone who accepts 2.1e1-e2 but not 2.1e3 by using propositions rather 
than straightforward Eex to express the same atitudes. If we express the same atitudes 
as:
2.1e4 Lying is wrong. 
2.1e5 If lying is wrong, then geting your litle brother to lie is wrong. 
2.1e6 Geting your litle brother to lie is wrong.












a problem with the reasoning of someone who accepts the first two atitudes and yet 
rejects the third. Using Eex, Blackburn can show us that when a combination of 
atitudes is happy or unhappy is tracked by the apparent logical relations between the 
propositions used to express those atitudes. 
The overall order of explanation in the Spreading the Word theory is:
Fig. 2.1
The account starts with expressivism, giving us an account of simple sentences. The 
idea of higher-order atitudes following the procedures of construction that are made 
explicit in Eex then gives us a way of understanding complex moral sentences. The 
relationships between those sentences and between them and the simple sentences 
(once again, made clear by their Eex analyses) govern the mechanism of moral 
arguments, in the way that we have just discussed. Understanding the goals and 
interests involved in the practice of moral discourse is simply a mater of generalizing 
on the previous, and the explanation both of our choice of surface form comes from the
account of how the surface form serves that practice, which we have also just outlined 







once we add quasi-realism to the theory, we also gain the ability to understand the role
played by our (apparently realist) intuitions about the nature of moral argument. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I described two overall approaches that an 
expressivist theory might take to solving the Frege-Geach problem; at the beginning of 
the section, I claimed that the Spreading the Word view was an example of the first of 
those approaches. Let us, afer Blackburn (1988 [1993]), call the approach we have just 
outlined, where the theory builds upwards from simple sentences to complex sentences
to arguments and then to practice, slow-track expressivism. We now have two 
dimensions which we can use to categorize the view: it is slow-track and it is mimicking.
Not all slow-track theories need take the mimicking approach. Taking the 
univocal approach would, afer all, simplify the overall order of explanation to:
Fig 2.2
On a univocal account, moral sentences really do have the logic that they appear to 
have25. The overall structure of any univocal slow-track theory is to start out with 
25 Although I will be focusing on mimicking forms of expressivism, it is worth noting that the univocal 
approach is not without its popularity. Indeed, Schroeder, in his (2010) and (2008a, b, c, d) seems to 
consider the univocal approach to be the single characteristic that distinguishes contemporary 
expressivism from early emotivist views, and as a result, the literature responding to Schroeder's 
treatment of Unwin (1999)'s problem of negation (see, e.g. Horgan and Timmons (2009), Sinclair 
(2011), Silk (2014), Skorupski (2012), Schwartz and Hom (2014)) seems to be proceeding under the 
assumption that the goal is to create a univocal expressivism. Mimicking expressivism, meanwhile, is 






expressivism for simple sentences, and then to come up with an account of complex 
sentences in general (not just in the moral case). Once that has been accomplished, 
moral arguments need no further explanation, since they will simply be instances of 
their observed logical form; likewise, moral practice is just another normal part of our 
ordinary discursive habits. We may find ourselves concerned with moral maters in a 
way that is peculiar to morality, but no explanatory power needs to be drawn from that
concern. Thus, the overall order of explanation is somewhat diferent for slow-track 
univocal and slow-track mimicking expressivisms. Nonetheless, the two have enough in
common that they can be placed within the shared category of the slow track. 
2.2 The Fast Track
Still following Blackburn (1988 [1993]), we will call the second of our two overall
approaches the fast-track approach. The overall order of explanation for fast-track 
expressivism is:
Fig. 2.3
Fast-track expressivism, like the slow track, starts with a basic expressivist account of 
simple moral sentences as expressions of atitudes. Rather than trying to construct 
against the Frege-Geach problem will, if successful, answer the negation case as well. At the very least,
it seems worthwhile to be aware of both alternatives. 
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complex moral sentences out of these simple sentences, however, the fast track moves 
directly into talk about the practice of moral discourse as a whole-- its origins, its 
importance, etc. Included in the story will be some talk about moral disagreement and 
argument. The story, and in particular the account of disagreement, is then used as the 
explanation for the surface form. Complex sentences are said to be explained by their 
role in the larger practice, with special mention of their place in moral arguments. In 
fast-track theories, that each complex moral sentence behaves the way that it does 
within our practice of moral discourse is built into the analysis of that sentence. 
Like the slow track, the fast track permits both univocal and mimicking 
approaches. I take the inferentialism of Chrisman (2008), (2010) to be an atempt at the 
former: if meaning in general is a mater of inferential role, and the expressive and 
descriptive (likewise the moral and nonmoral) are distinguished by the kind of roles 
they play, both expressive and descriptive statements will have their function within 
the practice of argument built in. On the other hand, a fast-track mimicking theory26 
embraces the more humble aim of showing that “the adoption of propositional form 
and style meets our need to share and discuss and dissent from atitudes or other 
stances”27; where the slow-track form of the mimicking theory approached that aim 
from the ground up, atempting to form constructions out of atitudes as its way of 
demonstrating the suitability of propositional form, the fast-track form of the 
mimicking theory approaches it from the top down, atempting to show that the 
26 As briefly outlined by Blackburn in the (1988 [1993]) paper where he outlines the slow-track/fast-track
distinction. 
27 Blackburn (1988[1993]) p. 185
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practice of moral discourse, as a whole, could benefit from the use of propositional 
forms. It can then proceed to ofer us an account of moral arguments told in terms of 
the function of those arguments within the wider realm of moral discourse, and of 
complex moral sentences in terms of their roles within moral arguments. 
Although Blackburn introduces the idea of the fast-track approach, he actually 
favors a hybrid approach, combining elements of the slow and fast tracks. He claims 
that “the fast track can benefit from some of the security achieved on the slow, and the 
slow track can make use of some of the short cuts of the fast.”28 By “security,” what 
Blackburn actually means is explanatory abundance. The slow-track, when used on its 
own, proceeds by developing an overtly expressive language, and then using it as an 
analysis of moral language. If this approach proves inadequate, we needn't necessarily 
discard the first step. There are other options for the second step that we might 
consider instead; that is, we might find some use for the expressive language other 
than as an analysis. Blackburn suggest that we might treat it as a “model showing why 
what we do is legitimate”29. If we want a hybrid theory that is close to the fast-track 
but with additional explanatory resources, we could use the constructions of the slow 
track not as actual analyses of moral sentences, but rather as  a way of demonstrating 
that atitudes can relate to one another in ways that might be worth tracking through 
the use of propositional form. Adding such a demonstration to what would otherwise 
be a fast-track theory can help make the theory's claims about practice more plausible. 
28 Ibid p. 186
29  Ibid p. 197
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Hybrid theories needn't follow the above model. It is also possible to build a 
hybrid theory that is primarily slow-track, but incorporates a fast-track element into its
account of complex sentences or the atitudes that they express. Such a view might 
hold that the Spreading the Word theory, or something like it, is almost right, but that it 
omits some element which we can only characterize in terms of our expectations for 
arguments featuring moral sentences. It would claim that the constructions of the slow
track tell us most of what we want to know about complex moral sentences, but that 
Eex (or some counterpart thereto) and actual moral language are not quite expressing 
the same atitudes; the ones we express in moral language are like those in Eex, but with
an extra atribute that is to be understood, either in part or in whole, in terms of the 
inferential roles of their expressions. I think that Blackburn's view in his Ruling 
Passions (1998), which we will discuss in the next section, is most productively 
interpreted as a view of this type. 
A third possibility for a hybrid theory would occupy a position in between these
two alternatives, and thus by extension one somewhere near the middle of the slow-
track/fast-track continuum. We might think that the slow track's search for a single 
compositional analysis that will be right across the board is futile, but that one or more
slow track explanations might be right on a case by case level. That is to say, we might 
use slow track explanations to help us get a handle on some moral sentences in some 
contexts, but there is no one slow track explanation that is right all of the time. Rather, 
what justifies the similarity in surface form between compositionally diferent 
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expressions of atitudes is exactly the kind of functional consideration to which the fast
track appeals. If the hybrid theory of this type is also a mimicking theory, it will hold 
that the binding consideration is practical in nature. It is a theory of this type that I 
ultimately hope to develop and defend, though it will take me the remainder of this 
piece to do so. 
2.3 Hybrids
The view from Blackburn's Ruling Passions will serve as our example of a hybrid 
mimicking view. 
As with our treatment of the Spreading the Word view, our presentation here will
leave certain aspects for later. Propositional reflection-- the heart of the explanation 
that makes every Blackburnian mimicking view work-- will be covered in Chapter 5. 
Qasi-realism will be covered in Chapter 6. For now, here is an outline aimed at 
illustrating the overall structure of the theory.
Once again, the foundation of the theory is expressivism, but with a diference 
in what is expressed. On this view “for a subject S to think that X is good...is for S to 
value it”30, and “when we assert values, we...voice our states of mind”31, where “Valuing 
something...is not to be understood as describing it”32. The “values” of the ruling 
passions view, though, are not any old atitudes; rather:
to hold a value is to have a relatively fixed atitude to some aspect of 
30 Blackburn (1998) p. 50
31 ibid
32 Ibid p. 49
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things, an atitude with which one identifies in the sense of being set to 
resist change, or set to feel pain when concerns are not met.33
On the Ruling Passions view, we still express our atitudes in moral discourse, but the 
atitudes in question are part of a special category34, rather than being the simple 
approvals and disapprovals expressed by the “hooray!” and “boo!” operators of 
Spreading the Word''s Eex. 
At first, the view of complex sentences in Ruling Passions seems similar to that of 
the older work. Blackburn claims that “By advancing disjunctions and conditionals, we 
avow...complex dispositional states”35, where the dispositional states in question are 
ones to accept or reject certain combinations of beliefs and atitudes; this sounds very 
similar to the Spreading the Word view, only with “avow” substituted for “approve”. 
Once again, the idea is that an atitude “can be avowed, or...can be put forward without
avowal, as a topic for discussion, or as an alternative”36, which Eex captured through the 
use of the vertical bar (|). I suppose one might read the Ruling Passions view as holding 
that complex sentences express something like the combinations that were the objects 
of Spreading the Word's higher-order atitudes, only without these being embedded in a
higher order atitude, but as I cannot see any way of rendering this proposal 
intelligible, I will ignore it.37 
33 Ibid p. 68
34 When we return to the Ruling Passions view in Chapter 5, we will examine Blackburn's ideas about the
distinctive nature of the attitudes expressed in moral discourse in greater detail, and will investigate 
exactly how the special attributes of such attitudes encourage us to express them in propositional form 
and work with them, in interpersonal coordination and intrapersonal thought, as if they were beliefs.  
35 Ibid p. 71
36 ibid
37 A complicating factor here is Blackburn's own definition of “avowal”, per ibid p. 68, according to 
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Seeing the diference between Spreading the Word and Ruling Passions requires us 
to try and make sense out of an apparent non sequitur. Blackburn writes:
To avow anything of the form 'If p then q' is to commit oneself to the 
combination 'Either not-p, or q' and to be tied to that combination is to 
disavow the combination of p with not-q. Holding both together is 
therefore unintelligible. Logic is our way of codifying and keeping track 
of intelligible combinations of commitment.38 
At first glance, the reasoning here seems faulty. Why should it be unintelligible to hold 
a combination of atitudes that one disavows? Afer all, it is hardly uncommon, let 
alone unintelligible, to have atitudes that one does not want to have, or that one does 
not think one has, or that one does not wish to present oneself as having. There does 
not seem to be anything unintelligible or even unfamiliar about disavowing one's own 
combination of atitudes. 
At the same time, it would be too hasty to see the claim here as a simple mistake. 
Afer all, Blackburn clearly does understand the idea of self-disapproval; indeed, he 
describes in detail (pp. 59-68) various kinds of inner conflict. He even accepts (p. 68) 
that one might genuinely hold a value, and yet act in ways that are at odds with that 
value. And yet, by extension, we ought to be able to, as Blackburn describes it, see 
ourselves as 'tied to a tree' (e.g. p. 71), and yet form other beliefs and atitudes in 
defiance of our bonds rather than in conformity to them. These ideas beg for 
reconciliation. 
which “'Avowal'...means that we express this state, make it public, or communicate it.” It is something 
which we do with “practical states” (ibid). Unless “practical states” are themselves attitudes, though, it 
is not at all clear what it would be to express, make public, or communicate one. 
38 Ibid p. 72
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We can enact this reconciliation by starting with a smaller reconciliation. 
Blackburn writes:
If we want to know...what is going on when we...put forward an atitude, 
we must look to the function of the indirect contexts in question. The key 
idea here is one of a functional structure of commitments that is 
isomorphic with or mirrored by the propositional structure that we use to 
express them.39
He also says that, with regards to names for his position, “A full-dress title might be 
'non-descriptive functionalism' or 'practical functionalism.'”40 If we are to understand 
his position, we must find a way of incorporating a functionalist element into the 
account of embedding without lapsing into incoherence. 
One way of accomplishing this goal is to build upon the fact that the Ruling 
Passions distinguishes between atitudes in ways that are independent from their 
intensity. Ruling Passions also contains the idea of “emotional ascent”, which we will 
return to in Chapter 5, but will sketch now. Atitudes, the view claims, can be 
distinguished not only by their intensity, but also functionally. Some atitudes are 
defined in part by such aspects as how unwilling we are to give them up, how we insist 
on others sharing them, or how we allow them to influence our actions. It is, on this 
view, possible to have two atitudes that are the same in valence and intensity, but 
which are nonetheless diferent atitudes, since they difer in what one has to do, or be 
disposed to do, in order to count as having them. 
39 Ibid p. 71
40 Ibid p. 77
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If some atitudes have subsequent actions built into their atribution conditions, 
then some combinations of practical states cannot constitute a coherent description of 
an agent, since their atribution conditions are incompatible. If, for instance, the 
atribution conditions of a certain atitude include that the atitude be held with a 
certain steadfastness, then an agent who had an atitude of that valence and severity 
but only for a short time would not have that atitude, but a diferent one-- one that, 
perhaps, is similar, but not a value, as Blackburn conceives of them. By the same token,
an atitude, if we are to see it as a commitment and not a simple feeling, might have 
among its atribution conditions that we follow through with its endorsements and 
recommendations as to our combinations of atitudes. The Eex sentence H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!
(geting litle brother to lie)|), on this view, and the English “If lying is wrong, then 
geting your litle brother to lie is wrong” do not express the same atitudes. The 
atitudes they express have the same object, valence, and intensity, but the later 
imposes a functional demand that the former does not, namely, that one who accepts 
that lying is wrong also accept that geting your litle brother to lie is wrong. We can 
describe, coherently, an agent as avowing H!(|B!(lying)|;|B!(geting litle brother to lie)|) 
and B!(lying) while disavowing B!(geting litle brother to lie); such an agent would 
have an unhappy combination of atitudes, having failed to configure himself properly 
by the lights of his own sensibility, and this form of unhappiness is not only possible 
but all too frequent. Yet Blackburn seems to commit to the idea that we cannot say the 
same about someone who earnestly believes that lying is wrong and that if lying is 
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wrong, geting your litle brother to lie is wrong, yet also earnestly denies that geting 
your litle brother to lie is wrong. Such a person must have been mis-described; we 
must have been wrong in our understanding of his atitudes, 
In integrating functional elements into its account of the atitudes expressed in 
moral discourse, the Ruling Passions view incorporates an element of the fast-track 
approach. Complex sentences cannot, on this view, be understood without 
understanding what those sentences require of us during moral argument. We can have
diferent atitudes with the same composition in terms of simpler atitudes, but 
diferent functional roles. The diference in functional role is not captured by the 
composition of the atitudes in terms of simpler atitudes, but can only be understood 
by reading the atitude's place in practice of of the logic of the surface form of its 
expression. Drawing the role of complex moral sentences in arguments into the 
account of those sentences is a hallmark of the fast track. 
2.4 Need for fast-track elements
The slow-track approach has much to recommend it. Because slow-track forms of
expressivism employ a constructive procedure to understand complex moral sentences, 
they have a relatively easy time coming up with a satisfying account of such sentences,
and of the role that the simple sentences making up the complex sentences play in 
determining the content of the later. Having something to say about both simple and 
complex moral sentences, in turn, gives a theory a potential basis to appeal to in its 
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account of argument and practice. Adopting the slow-track order of explanation seems 
like it might give an expressivist the chance to answer the Frege-Geach problem in a 
direct and compelling way. 
That said, there is also some reason to believe that a successful form of 
expressivism must include fast-track elements. Even in Spreading the Word, Blackburn 
sees reason for concern about the slow-track approach. He writes:
What I have done here is to explain how conditionals can be regarded as 
ways of following out implications, although it is not imperative that the 
commitments whose implications they trace have  'truth-conditions'. Now
you might say: even if this can be done, hasn't the quasi-realist a very 
dreary task in front of him? For remember that the Frege point was 
entirely general: it could cite any unasserted context. So mightn't other 
arise which require separate and ingenious explanations, and the quasi-
realist faced with an endless task?41
The worry that Blackburn perceives for the slow track is that the slow track only ever 
has accounts for those complex sentences for which it has specifically identified a 
construction procedure. When it comes to embeddings for which the slow-track has 
not identified a construction procedure, it has nothing to say about them; nor do we 
have any reason to assume that any such account is even possible, prior to it actually 
being found42. 
By 1988 (“Atitudes and Contents”), Blackburn had found another reason to be 
skeptical about the slow-track approach: 
I should admit not only that it threatens to look Ptolemaic but also that it
seems not to correspond to any obvious cognitive processes we go 
through. It is not as though constructing (say) conditionals with 
evaluative components comes harder to us than constructing them with 
41 Blackburn (1984) p. 195
42 An objection that would be repeated by Brighouse (1990)
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ordinary components, and this will need explanation.43 
Blackburn's worry seems to be that we, as language users, can use and work with any 
ordinary construction using evaluative language, without having to do any work to 
figure out how it translates into an expressive language. We use evaluative language in 
a way that is seamless with our use of non-evaluative language, and gladly accept that 
evaluative language will follow non-evaluative language in its logic. Yet no theory built 
on the slow track order of explanation can tell us what, if anything, could guarantee 
that any evaluative embedding will have the logic, or a parallel of the logic, of its 
surface form. We seem to act as if we do have such a guarantee, and the slow track 
cannot explain this, save perhaps by ofering an exhaustive catalogue of expressive 
constructions, one that covers every possible form of embedding. No slow-track theory 
has done this, and, for the same reasons as gave rise to the problem, we have no 
guarantee that any such theory could do so. 
 Fast-track and hybrid theories need not sufer fro m these concerns. A fast-track 
theory explains the appropriateness of propositional form in general. For example, on 
the Ruling Passions view, the functional characterization of the atitudes involved in 
moral discourse is given by the propositional forms of their expressions, so the relevant
atitudes will have the fact that they relate to one another and to beliefs in ways that 
parallel the apparent logic of their expressions in all contexts built into and thus 
guaranteed by their atribution conditions. On a view with this structure, we do not 
need to worry about whether we can come up with a construction from simple 
43 Blackburn (1988 [1993]) p. 185
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atitudes to serve as an adequate analysis of a given sentence where moral terms occur
in an embedded context; rather, the surface grammar of the embedded context tells us 
what the sentence does within our practice of expressing and sharing atitudes, and we
need only investigate why we would want a sentence with such a function. 
On the other hand, creating a successful fast-track theory has its own 
challenges. Blackburn writes of the fast track that it “might seem like thef”44: because 
of the fast track's order of explanation, it may seem to fall more naturally into the 
category of “vague gesturing” rather than an actual theory. And indeed, such a 
criticism could be well-founded, if the particular theory in question lacks development. 
The fast-track expressivist cannot be quite so quick as to claim that, as Blackburn (1988
[1993]) puts it, “[t]he adoption of propositional form and style needs our need to share 
and discuss and dissent from atitudes or other stances. It involves only philosophers in
error, and litle more need be said.”45 Rather, a fast-track theory must devote itself to 
coming up with an account of moral dispute that satisfies explanatory demands from 
above and below: it must tell a story about an expressive practice that is independently
plausible, and at the same time show why the sort of practice that it describes should 
be expected to incorporate or co-opt propositional form. Even once it has done so, 
though, it might still seem to be a bit of a cheat, insofar as it does not have neat 
formulae to supply as answers when asked about the meaning of complex moral 
sentences or the inner workings of moral arguments. 
44 Ibid p. 185
45 ibid
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It is hard to know how much to make of this worry. There is something 
emotionally appealing about the formulae of the slow track; seeing the expressivist 
account told in symbols rather than words, even if the meaning is the same, feels 
comforting (even though, in actuality, only notational work has been done). The fast-
track account cannot do this, and that can create an uneasy feeling that the account 
has somehow been less specific or incomplete. But we should careful to judge theories 
on their merits rather than their aesthetics; insofar as the feeling that a fast-track 
account is vague is traceable to the style with which such a theory must be described 
rather than its substance, it is not to be heeded. 
There are, however, real dificulties in the vicinity. Schroeder (2010) gets it 
almost right when he criticizes inferential-commitment accounts46, which are a species 
of fast-track theory, as follows:
since these theories are non-constructive, there is a natural sense in 
which they don't explain the semantic properties of complex sentences, as
we originally set out to do, in the face of the Frege-Geach problem. To see
why, compare the [cognitivist and fast-track] explanations of which 
someone who thinks that P and who also thinks that ~P is undergoing 
the kind of clash of atitudes that we have been calling 'intrapersonal 
disagreement'...It is clear that the inferential-commitment theorist's 
explanation is no explanation at all. It merely helps itself to what it 
46 See section 2.2. Now it is worth pointing out that it would be possible to create something that looks an
awful lot like an inferential-commitment account without it being a fast-track theory. Failure in 
nuancing can cause an inferential-commitment expressivist account to degenerate into a slow-track 
approach. If “commitment” is, as per one of Schueler's (1988) worries, to be understood as a moral 
notion-- you ought to fulfill your commitments, or you do wrong if you fail to fulfill your 
commitments-- then defining a conditional as a commitment to believe the consequent upon believing 
the antecedent is just a roundabout way of defining it as a higher-order attitude towards combining or 
failing to combine the two attitudes when one has the antecedent attitude. This will not be the case for 
all expressivist inferential-commitment theories, though, as it depends on a particular notion of 
commitment which is not built into the definition of the theory-type. As for the question of what 
alternatives exist for “commitment”, we will return to it later/ 
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should be trying to explain. Is there really such a mental state as [~P]? 
Why does it disagree with [P]?47
There are some issues with the details of the argument. When a fast-track theorist with
any sophistication characterizes P and ~P as expressions of disagreeing states, it is not, 
as Schroeder seems to think, a specification drawn in a vacuum, but rather one that 
draws upon whatever account of disagreement is contained within the theory's 
description of the practice of moral discourse. Schroeder is looking for the explanation 
in the wrong place. For a fast-track theory, the explanation of the disagreement 
between P and ~P does not lie within anything that the theory has to say about the 
mental states expressed by P and ~P; rather, a fast-track theory must have already 
provided an account of moral disagreement prior to ofering any characterization of 
specific constructions like ~P. If it has not done so, then it isn't a good fast-track theory
in the first place; Schroeder's point would, indeed, work against it, but such a theory 
would fail anyway. True, the functional definitions used by the fast-track approach add 
far less to the explanatory story than the formulae of the slow-track approach, but one 
look at their respective order of operations should be suficient to show that that is 
exactly as it should be. 
The real trouble here, rather, is that the fast-track theory does not exist within a
dialectic void; not only must its explanations succeed, but they must compete for 
plausibility with those of rival theories. Taking the fast track approach as a way of 
solving the Frege-Geach problem is of litle use if doing so gives away the game to the 
47 Schroeder (2010) p. 141
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realist. And in this vital regard, the fast-track theorist starts at a disadvantage, since he
hasn't the realist's luxury of taking the position that the moral case works like the non-
moral case, and nothing more needs to be said48. If the fast-track theory is also 
univocal, it will need to motivate its general semantics with suficient force as to render
them independently plausible. Although we will return to the question of mimicking 
and univocal expressivism in the next section, for now, let us simply note that one must
be incredibly ambitious to pursue univocal fast-track expressivism; mimicking fast-
track expressivism is more humble, and thus opens itself to potential objections drawn 
from far fewer philosophical sub-disciplines. As for achieving mimicking expressivism 
via the fast track, it is not enough for the fast-track approach to have a mimicking 
story to tell; what it needs is a really good mimicking story. Thus, it is worth our 
atention to consider what kind of story would lend the most explanatory power to a 
mimicking account. 
The central idea of a mimicking account, remember, is that the expressivist 
needn't achieve the surface form of moral uterances, only justify it.49 It must, in other 
words, be prepared to explain why it is that, in Blackburn's words, “the adoption of 
propositional form and style meets our need to share and discuss and dissent from 
atitudes or other stances.”50 In this context, an objection from Schueler (1988) takes on 
the role of a constraint:  if the kind of conflict or disagreement that is tracked in moral 
48 A univocal theory could achieve the first half of the realist's luxury, though not the second-- it must say 
more if it is to justify its claim of univocality. But the univocal approach also carries a significant 
additional burden insofar as it has claims that it must justify well outside the moral sphere. 
49 “Notice that, whichever track we favor, the point is to earn our right to propositional forms”: 
Blackburn (1988 [1993]) p. 186
50 Ibid p. 185
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argument is too far removed at the practical level from inconsistency, the explanation 
will fail. If there is too much diference between how we work with moral sentences 
when engaged in rational argument and how we would expect expressive practice to go
according to the mechanics set out by a particular theory, then it becomes implausible 
to suggest that such an expressive practice could be expected to co-opt propositional 
form and the accompanying logic. Thus if, for instance, a theory says that we are just 
expressing atitudes and more atitudes (albeit higher-order ones), and that the logic 
that we apply to those expressions of atitudes is actually tracking whether 
combinations of atitudes are happy or unhappy (that is, self-approving or self-
disapproving), it faces a tough question in whether such an ill-fiting expression could 
really be explained away by some purported practical benefit. 
Observe that the (slow-track) Spreading the Word view, Schueler's original 
target, indeed seems to struggle on this front. Some further atitude completing or 
failing to complete a combination of atitudes of which you approve or disapprove 
might be an important relationship to keep track of, but the strategy of keeping track 
of it by expressing atitudes with propositions and higher-order atitudes with 
conditionals seems to be overkill. Schueler writes:
[W]ithout some account of how there is something untoward or mistaken
in a mere clash of atitudes..Blackburn cannot claim even to have shown 
that, on the antirealism theory he is advocating, a person who asserts the 
premises and denies the conclusion of the argument...has made any 
mistake at all, let alone any sort of logical mistake in the usual sense.51 
The problem at hand with tracking unhappy combinations of atitudes using 
51 Schueler (1988) p. 500
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propositional forms is not that one cannot do so-- not that there is reason to doubt 
that there can be an isomorphism between the two (though, as we will see in Chapter 
5, there is reason to suppose that the two do come apart, as well as, as argued earlier, 
no reason to suppose that the isomorphism can be maintained across all possible 
embeddings). Rather, the issue is that the propositional form leads us to thinking in 
certain ways about moral argument: for instance, that one who accepts the premises 
and yet denies the conclusion of a moral argument that we typically consider valid has 
thereby made a mistake in his reasoning; that such a person is to be condemned as 
irrational; or that, having been led to accept the premises of such an argument, it is 
incumbent upon us to accept the conclusion (or reverse our acceptance of one of the 
premises) regardless of how we might feel about that particular moral belief. Of course,
a defender of Blackburn's 1984 position would claim that we are not misled by any of 
these intuitions; he might claim that we ought to regard one with an unhappy 
combination of atitudes as mistaken in his reasoning and irrational, and that 
regarding such people in that way is part of an important practice of interpersonal and
intrapersonal coordination. But this reply is not convincing; while having a 
combination of atitudes of which you yourself disapprove might indeed cause you 
some grief, it hardly seems worth thinking of as a logical mistake. Indeed, Schueler 
points out that this particular form of inner conflict is neither uncommon nor 
particularly “untoward or fishy”52. To track such a thing with apparent logical 




For a mimicking theory to be viable, it must do beter than this; it must point to 
some conflict worth tracking with logical contradictions. When it comes to 
determining what would make a conflict worth tracking with logical contradictions, it 
seems unlikely that there is anything like a concrete rule to which we might appeal. 
Theories of the sort under discussion live or die based on the plausibility of their 
explanations, and while there are some ways that a theory could easily lose its 
plausibility (contradicting itself, for instance), if a theory is at least reasonable, 
plausibility or implausibility is harder to make definite than proof or disproof. 
Nonetheless, we do, at least, tend to have some inkling of when an expressivist theory 
gains or loses out on the basis of its account of the foundation of moral “inconsistency.”
If a conflict strikes us as the sort of thing that one could be in without a serious flaw in
one's thinking, then it is unsuitable as the foundation of a fast-track theory, because it 
would not be worth tracking with logical contradictions. On the other hand, a conflict 
that is a serious flaw in thinking-- and it will be up to individual theories to find a 
conflict and explain how it is a serious flaw in thinking, without collapsing into 
cognitivism-- could play the part. Only if a suitable conflict can be found will a 
mimicking theory be able to succeed. 
In Chapter 5, when we turn our atention to the subject of propositional 
reflection, we will return to the issue of making our use of propositional forms to 
express atitudes make sense. For now, however, let us setle for noting that the fast 
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track seems to have an advantage over the slow track in answering Schueler's 
objection53. A slow track mimimcking theory must start by constructing complex 
atitudes, and then find a relationship between its complex and simple atitudes that is 
worth tracking with apparent logical disagreement. A fast track mimicking theory, on 
the other hand, can atempt to incorporate a more appropriate relationship into its 
account of the relevant atitudes or of the practice of moral discourse more generally. 
The Ruling Passions theory, for instance, cites conflicting atribution conditions of 
atitudes, which would indeed seem to involve a mistake in thinking if not kept 
straight. While we cannot rule out the slow-track approach for this reason alone, in the
absence of any slow-track theory that can show us how such a theory might come up 
with a satisfactory relationship, it seems reasonable to be pessimistic about the slow 
track's chances for success in this regard. 
The arguments of this section atempted to motivate adopting the fast track 
approach, or a hybrid theory with fast-track elements, over the slow track. One of the 
arguments was that the fast track permited the development of beter mimicking 
theories than the slow track, since the fast track is able to appeal to relationships that 
it makes more sense to track with propositional form than any of the compositional 
relationships available to the slow track. For this advantage to mater, there must be 
some reason to think that mimicking theories are correct. The next section atempts to 
demonstrate that this is so. 
53 Historically, this stands to reason, since Blackburn (1988 [1993]) introduces the fast track in large part 
as an answer to Schueler's critique of his earlier view. 
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2.5 Preferring mimicking expressivism
Mimicking theories, compared to univocal theories, have more work to do. They
must answer the question of how the mimickry they propose is occurring is 
appropriate, and defend against the challenge that their account amounts to an 
(untenable) error theory. Nonetheless, we have reasons to think that mimicking 
theories are more promising. First, as we have already mentioned, univocal theories are
incredibly ambitious; they make remarkable claims in the philosophy of language 
which they will have to be prepared to defend. Mimicking theories are far more 
humble; they can, if so desired, let our general theory of language go whichever way it 
pleases, and then, later in the order of explanation, provide their account of why it is 
nonetheless useful for us to express our atitudes as we do. Second, mimicking theories
can use quasi-realism to adopt many of the advantages of univocal quasi-realism. 
Third, when equipped with the kind of quasi-realism that I will seek to defend in 
Chapter 6, mimicking expressivism can retain the ability to resort to outright denials of
realist meta-ethical claims, which might be convenient for solving various problems. 
We have already covered the first of these three points, so let us move directly 
into the second. This is the idea that the costs of mimicking expressivism can be 
mitigated through the use of quasi-realism. For example, several authors, including Van
Roojen (1996), Schroeder (2010), Miller (2003), and Zangwill (1992) criticize the 
Spreading the Word view for conflating pragmatic (or “Moorean”) inconsistency with 
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actual inconsistency54. Such a criticism represents a failure to distinguish between 
mimicking expressivism, which Blackburn is pursuing, and univocal expressivism, 
which is Schroeder’s own favored strategy. Nonetheless, one might think that this 
weakness in the foundation of the objection does not wholly collapse it. For a 
mimicking theory makes sense insofar as the mechanisms that it proposes would be 
practical; if those mechanisms would lead us into error, given that we generally regard 
being in error as bad, we would expect ourselves to resist them. Likewise, we might 
wonder about the persistence of the mechanisms. There might very well be good 
reason for us to adopt a mimicking practice, but we must marvel at the duration of our
pre-Blackburnian innocence-- that is, that we have managed to mislead ourselves for 
so long in order to achieve practical benefits.
While I find myself with litle inclination to give weight to these concerns (I see 
no reason to suppose that the human capacity for self-deception has such meager 
54 Schueler (1988)’s objection follows similar lines, but, as we have already discussed, Schueler raises the
problem in a way that demonstrates awareness of the actual nature of Blackburn’s theory. Hale (1986) 
is sometimes read as a member of this group, but also seems to understand that what Blackburn needs 
for “inconsistency” is far less demanding than is thought by those who misunderstand the univocal-
mimicking distinction.
Wright (1988b) also maintains an atypical understanding of the problem, according to which 
the higher-order attitudes view fails to keep proper count of the number of mistakes made by someone 
who does not follow a moral modus ponens: there is the moral mistake, that is, of not following 
through with the principle expressed by the conditional, and at the same time a second, distinct logical 
mistake. Like Hale and Schueler, Wright recognizes that Blackburn’s aim (as it would be understood in 
a hypothetical version of his theory sans quasi-realism) is not to satisfy our logical intuitions, but 
merely to vindicate them; if, however, the higher-order attitudes account mis-counts problems, we will 
be left wondering how to incorporate our idea of the proper number of problems into the mimicking 
story. There is, thus, a real problem for mimicking expressivism in Wright’s objection. I am not sure 
how severe a problem it is, because I do not find the idea of a second mistake terribly compelling 
(would it not be more plausible to say that there is one mistake, that of reasoning badly, regardless of 
whether the maltreated argument descriptive or expressive in nature?), but, just in case there is a 
genuine problem here (or in the vicinity), note that the arguments to come in this section about the 
usefulness of quasi-realism to a mimicking theory should solve it. 
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bounds, or indeed any bounds whatsoever), I suppose others55 could be forgiven for 
finding them more troubling. Although the mimicking expressivist will do his best to 
find strong reasons for our use of propositional form, our intuitions about the forms of 
complex moral sentences and the arguments into which they enter weigh heavily for 
the other side. The mimicking theory does try to incorporate those intuitions; our 
seamless treatment of language is, for the mimicking expressivist, an important part of 
our practice of coordinating atitudes. But the mimicking explanation is far more 
complex, and thus less desirable as a piece of theory, than the explanation that those 
intuitions are simply correct. 
Qasi-realism is a tool by which the expressivist comes to adopt meta-ethical 
claims from realism. It can be of use to the mimicking expressivist in that it allows 
mimicking expressivism to bring itself into conformity with our linguistic intuitions 
while both a) maintaining its account of the practicality of adopting propositional form
for the expression of atitudes, and b) remaining harmless to our overall theory of 
language. The quasi-realist mimicking expressivist thus keeps the advantages of 
mimicking expressivism while also gaining the right, otherwise only available to 
univocal expressivism, to claim to have actually solved the Frege-Geach problem rather
than merely finding a less-unpleasant-than-usual way of biting the bullet. 
A mimicking expressivist who is also quasi-realist would, in all likelihood, no 
longer call himself a mimicking expressivist56. This is so because, once equipped with 
55 Harcourt (2005) is an example. 
56 Blackburn, who holds a position of this type, seems to find it difficult to know what to call himself; he 
seems to like the term “projectivist” in his earlier works, only to reject it in Ruling Passions. 
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quasi-realism, the mimicking expressivist will no longer claim that complex moral 
sentence or moral arguments fail to have the logical form that they appear to have.57 
Rather, he will claim that they do in fact have such forms-- only, this further claim is 
itself to be understood in some way that an actual realist, or, for that mater, a univocal
expressivist, might find surprising.58 Exactly what that way is will require sustained 
examination, which will occur in Chapter 6. For the time being, let us assume that a 
successful method for the assimilation of realist claims will be found. Given that 
assumption, a mimicking expressivist would not have a theory on which any 
mimicking occurred. The practical account of our assumption of propositional form for 
expressing atitudes would remain the same, but the outcome of the account would not
be a reason for expressing atitudes with a surface form that does not reflect their 
logical form. The mimicking story tells us how our expressions came about, but does 
not, according to the quasi-realist, disqualify those expressions from being genuine 
instances of their surface forms. Rather, it would be a reason for the surface form, one 
which might be combined with further reasons (generated by quasi-realism) to justify 
“Mimicking expressivism” suffers from the same problem that Blackburn points out for 
“projectivism”-- it suggests that there is some kind of fakery going on, which is not what the quasi-
realist holds (Blackburn 1998 p. 77). I am not sure whether appropriateness or consistency should take 
priority in naming, but, for now, let us go with consistency (and thus continue to use “mimicking 
expressivism”-- if a jellyfish can be called “jellyfish” without being a fish, then mimicking 
expressivism can be called “mimicking expressivism” even when it no longer counts its mechanism as 
mere mimicking. 
57 In Hale’s (1993) terminology, such an expressivist ceases to be “modest” and instead becomes 
“ambitious.”
58 Assuming only a single application of quasi-realism. The quasi-realist procedure is, in fact, recursive; 
the quasi-realist might wish to claim that not only do complex moral sentences and moral arguments 
have their apparent logical forms, but that they have those forms in the usual way-- where what it takes 
to have those forms in the usual way is then to be subjected to analysis, assuming the quasi-realist does 
not wish to add yet another layer of quasi-realism.
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the claim that those expressions really do have their apparent forms. 
Since mimicking expressivism with quasi-realism says that we are not in error 
about the forms of complex moral sentences or arguments, it is not inherently subject 
to the objection from error. It may be subject to a lesser version of the objection 
targeting the quasi-realism itself-- that is, that quasi-realism claims that we are 
surprisingly in error about the content of many philosophical statements. But such an 
error would be far less ofensive, as it deals with a more exotic species of sentence, 
which lessens the error, since the error is both less surprising and less ofen made. 
Additional applications of quasi-realism59 can further lessen the error, until it is 
completely inofensive. 
This defense is, for the time being, largely speculative; it depends on what is (for
now) an assumption that a quasi-realist maneuver capable of delivering the stated 
advantages can be found. I say “largely” because there is a way that the defense can 
help the mimicking expressivist, albeit only slightly, even without the arguments of 
Chapter 6. This is simply to note that the mimicking expressivist need not be nearly so 
brutal in the formulation of his view as I have been. Even without quasi-realism, he 
needn’t pursue contrast with univocal expressivism through outright denials. Rather, 
the mimicking expressivist can simply provide his account of the usefulness of 
propositional form and leave it at that. It is up to the objector to show that that 
account puts us in error, and that “us” is more than just a few philosophers. This 
atitude towards the issue is exactly that taken by Blackburn when he originally (1988) 
59 See previous footnote. 
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introduces the fast-track approach. We do not need a slow-track analysis, Blackburn’s 
argument goes, to show that what we do is legitimate, because what error there is 
involved in adopting a mimicking-type theory is minimal and in the main confined to 
philosophers. We could invoke slow-track-style explanations to try and bolster the 
legitimacy of the practice-- hence hybrid theories-- but these need be no more than 
secondary explanations, that is, models, or perhaps speculative analyses specific to a 
particular instance (towards the end of Chapter 5, we will have a chance to investigate 
this kind of theory in more detail). There need not be anything more because the 
overall claims of the fast-track mimicking theory are undemanding (except, perhaps, 
for philosophers). Ordinary folk do not, need not, and perhaps even should not 
distinguish between the kind of mimicking the mimicking expressivist posits and 
actuality. 
Let us turn now to the third point in favor of mimicking expressivism. Equipped 
with the proper kind of quasi-realism-- such as the kind that I atempt to develop in 
Chapter 6-- mimicking expressivism possesses the ability to let us look behind the 
mimickry if necessary. That is to say, mimicking expressivism is free to acknowledge 
diferences between moral and non-moral language, so long as those diferences are 
apparent to us; such diferences can only reinforce the impression that moral language 
is a creature of a diferent sort that is merely imitating descriptive language. As 
Blackburn puts it in his (1993c):
We can earn our right to use the logic and the propositional forms that 
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we do, from the anti-realist starting point. Seen like this, a quasi-realist 
may or may not regard the forms in question as perfectly propositional. 
He could be receptive to signs, embedded in normal discourse, that we do
not always think and speak as if the sentences in question were just like 
others.60
A univocal expressivist61, on the other hand, has no such freedom. If the univocal 
expressivist shows that moral language has the forms that it seems to have, any cases 
that suggest moral language is actually something diferent will then require an 
explanation, one other than expressivism itself. The mimicking theory retains the 
ability to appeal to expressivism in explaining cases that are awkward for realism. The 
univocal theory cannot appeal to expressivism to explain any such diferences because 
it argues that expressions of atitudes are no diferent from any other proposition; they 
have the same forms, and thus should be expected to behave in the same ways. The 
mimicking theory can do so, simply because a mimickry needn’t be perfect62. 
Are there any such cases? Blackburn does not provide an example in his (1993c),
and we cannot dwell too long on this topic without going well outside of the intended 
scope of this piece. For now, let us content ourselves with a mere suspicion. One might 
suspect, especially if one takes an interest in the so-called “moral twin earth” problem 
60 Blackburn (1993c) p. 366
61 Or, for that matter, a mimicking expressivist with a different kind of quasi-realism from the one I 
endorse. 
62 I should point out that this statement is not in conflict with my earlier remarks about needing a very 
compelling mimicking story. Mimicking expressivism is about explaining why we do what we do; 
insofar as a purported mimicking practice would lead us into confusion, we should be skeptical about 
such a practice. In the kind of case that I am now discussing, we are not led into error, but see the 
difference between the moral and the non-moral. 
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of Horgan and Timmons (1992)63 (itself an elaboration on an idea from Hare64) that 
what it takes to disagree with a moral statement is not quite the same as what it takes 
to disagree with a descriptive statement. Simple expressivism, such as that of Ayer 
(1936) and especially Stevenson (1944), can explain this diference as a result of the fact
that moral disagreement itself is something diferent from ordinary descriptive 
disagreement; mimicking expressivism can do likewise. But, for the univocal 
expressivist, moral disagreement is “genuine” disagreement of the type observed in 
descriptive discourse65, so he will need to carry out additional theorizing if he is to 
explain the diference66. 
Whether or not there is a genuine reason to favor mimicking expressivism in this 
63 See also Blackburn (1991 [1993]). For discussion see e.g. Merli (2002), (2008); Sayre-McCord (1997);
Gert (2006).
64 e.g. Hare (1952 [1964])
65 In fact, this is regarded as a desideratum by Schroeder (2008a, b, c, d), (2010). 
66 I should point out that the univocal theorist struggles with explaining disagreement in general. 
Schroeder, our example of a univocal expressivist, argues in his (2008b) that genuine disagreement 
requires one and the same inconsistency-transmitting attitude being present towards inconsistent 
contents: for example, “there is a cat in the room” and “there is not a cat in the room” express the same 
attitude (belief) towards inconsistent contents (cat in room, not cat in room). In the moral case, the 
attitude is one of “being for”, which seems identical with Blackburn’s H!(x). Yet, to handle the full 
range of moral attitudes, Schroeder must introduce substantive proposals for one to be for when saying 
that something is good or bad, or right or wrong (he suggests “blaming for” in the negative case; 
presumably, some other substantive proposal is necessary in the positive case, to explain what one is 
for when one denies that something is good-- perhaps such a person would be for not praising for the 
act in question); this move is problematic because it seems that I can be for or against something 
without thereby being for one particular proposal for what to do about it. 
If we were to flesh out the argument for mimicking expressivism being developed here, the 
dialectic would start with the Moral Twin Earth problem to motivate the search for an alternative to 
descriptive inconsistency for the account of moral disagreement. The obvious alternative is a clash of 
different attitudes, which is how the emotivists explained moral disagreement. The univocal 
expressivist closes this option off to himself because it is dissimilar to descriptive disagreement (even 
though this was why one might have considered it as a solution to the problem in the first place), which
renders it incompatible with his overall strategy. Yet, he lacks a compelling alternative; furthermore, 
even if a viable alternative could be found, it would lack the elegant simplicity of the emotivist 
solution. The solution is to reject univocal expressivism in favor of mimicking expressivism, which can
and will use the same solution as the emotivist. 
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vicinity, the fact remains that mimicking expressivism, since it has the ability to drop 
the act, has a tool in its toolkit which univocal expressivism lacks. I suspect that this 
tool will prove useful. If it does not, then the mimicking theory loses nothing for 
having it, and is still preferable for other reasons, in particular its modesty with regards
to our theory of language. 
One interesting consequence of the mimicking theory’s approach to 
disagreement is that it brings the mimicking theory closer to the old emotivists than 
we might have suspected. Although the theories of Ayer and Stevenson are now quite 
out of date, they might nonetheless be of use to us because of this similarity, while 
post-Geach work that atempts a univocal answer to Geach’s problem is less likely to 
be useful. Naturally, Ayer and Stevenson’s theories will not do on their own, but they 
can be helpful in a diferent way. 
Earlier, I introduced the idea of a hybrid theory, one which follows Blackburn’s 
preference for a combination of slow-track and fast-track elements. Such a theory, 
unlike a pure fast-track theory, has things to say about complex moral sentences and 
their relations to their parts besides what it determines from their relative places in our
practice of reasoning. Unlike a Spreading the Word-style, slow-track theory, the hybrid 
theory stops well short of trying to build an entire analysis from simple atitudes and 
rules for assembling them into more complex ones. Instead, it builds on a smaller scale.
It uses constructions to illustrate the ways that atitudes can relate to one another, and
to give us at least some insight (though not necessarily a complete understanding) into
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the nature of at least some (not necessarily all) of the complex atitudes involved in 
morality. These insights are to be completed and bound together by fast-track 
elements. By understanding our overall aims in using propositional form for expressing
at least certain kinds of atitudes, and then understanding the role of complex moral 
sentences in our pursuit of those aims, we can more precisely and universally account 
for the behavior of those sentences. If we use dashed arrows to represent the 
secondary explanations provided by the slow-track elements, a hybrid theory’s order of
explanation can be pictured as:
Fig. 2.4
The theories of old emotivism, despite their incompleteness, can contribute to a 
theory with the above structure. We know that atitudes can relate to one another in a 
number of diferent ways; in fact, we have already seen multiple options simply by 
looking at diferent iterations of Blackburn’s view. It would be tempting, especially, I 
think, for philosophers, to base our understanding of the interactions relevant to the 
practice of moral argument on a single relationship that atitudes can bear towards one
another. Towards the end of Chapter 5, I will argue that doing so is a mistake. Rather, it







between atitudes, a variety that we use propositional form to help us manage. A 
theory that did not work on its own, but which makes use of accurate observations 
about our atitudes, can add to our list of interactions. At the same time, it can 
contribute to our list of secondary explanations; it can serve as a model, and as an 
occasional source of insight into particular cases.




I would like to begin my discussion of Ayer with an examination of a historical 
oddity. Looking back upon his view of ethics in his 1983 Whidden lectures, A. J. Ayer 
took a moment to consider the problem of embedding-- also known as the “Frege-
Geach problem”. We know that Ayer was not unwilling to modify or even reject the 
views that he expounded in Language, Truth, and Logic; indeed, in a mid-1970s interview
with Bryan Magee,  he commented of the LTL view that its “most important defect was
that nearly all of it was false,”67 and in a 1989 interview with Ted Honderich, he goes as 
far as to call LTL's philosophy of mind “incoherent”68. But the Ayer of 1983 was largely 
unrepentant on the mater of ethics, a position that he would continue to hold; for that
mater, in the 1989 interview, Ayer declares outright: “As for morals, I hold my old 
view”69 As Ayer died two months afer that interview, we can say without too much 
reservation that he kept his view on ethics (though perhaps, as we will see, with certain
refinements upon the original formulation) to the end. On the subject of embedding, 
Ayer had this to say:
I think that this objection is less formidable than it may appear at first 
sight. Once it is admited, as in the case of 'this is good', that an emotive 
expression can be put into an assertoric form, there seems no suficient 
reason why the disguise should not be adapted to cover one's emotive 
67 Magee 1979 p. 131
68 Honderich 1989, in Griffiths (ed.) 1991 p. 216 
69 Honderich 1989,  in Griffiths (ed.) 1991 p. 215
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reaction to hypothetical instances. As for the deductive inference, it has, 
indeed, to be assumed that our atitudes are consistent, but thereafer the
inference is simply secured by the transitivity of the comparative form.70
We will, in due time, atempt to draw out the nature of the reply being given here. For 
now, though, let us focus not on the substance of the reply, but on the overall atitude 
to the problem expressed therein. We might take as some further indication of Ayer's 
appraisal of the problem the comment directly following his discussion, where he labels
the objection that he fails to capture ordinary usage as “more serious” than the worry 
from embedding.71 
We might wonder at Ayer's atitude here. For Geach's statements of the 
problem-- especially in Geach (1960) and Geach (1965); Geach (1958) takes Hare's 
prescriptivism as its direct target-- seems like it is aimed directly at him. Yet it seems 
uncharitable, or at least overly hasty given Ayer's willingness to discard his earlier 
views, to write of his reaction to the embedding problem as nothing more than a 
display of stubbornness. So we might wonder: is there something in Ayer's view that 
might give it some resistance to the atacks of the embedding problem? Or is there 
some atempt at such that fails, but might nonetheless underlie Ayer's confidence? 
3.1 Ayer’s emotivism, version 1
LTL gives us a starting point for developing Ayer's theory. Ayer explains the 
function of ethical statements as follows:
70 Ayer 1984 pp. 29-30
71 Ayer 1984 p. 30
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Moral judgements do not say anything. They are pure expressions of 
feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and 
falsehood.72
More specifically:
If now I...say, 'Stealing money is wrong,' I produce a sentence which has 
no factual meaning-- that is, expresses no proposition which can be either
true or false. It is as if I had writen 'Stealing Money!'-- where the shape 
and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, 
that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being 
expressed.73
We might wonder what to make of this “special sort of disapproval.” Indeed, an 
uncharitable reading of the idea could easily predestine our reconstruction to commit 
suicide by circularity, as would be the case if we identified the moral atitudes by their 
role in moral discourse while simultaneously defining the function of such discourse as
the expression of just those atitudes.74 Even if we avoid circularity, it is hard to see 
how to pick out the appropriate feelings75. 
But I am not sure that this notion of a distinctive moral atitude need be 
anything more than a descriptive shortcut on Ayer's part. He does say that the notion 
he is afer is (in part) “the diferent feelings [that ethical terms] are ordinarily taken to 
express”76, and that we are talking about the expression of “certain feelings in the 
speaker”77 in a particular situation. Seeing as Ayer's view posits the expression of a 
variety of diferent atitudes, the objection above seems to have a problem with 
72 Ayer 1936 [1952] p.. 108
73 Ibid p. 107
74 See Miller 2003 p. 44
75 See Wright 1988 pp. 11-12, and ibid p. 45. Alston 1968 also considers these issues. 
76 Ayer 1936 [1952] p. 108
77 Ibid p. 107
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number; it would be odd to think that Ayer would not only posit distinct moral 
feelings, but atribute to each occurrence of them an arbitrary and unspecific 
multiplicity. And the role of these emotions in moral discourse is not meant to be our 
only handle on them; Ayer's reference to “a peculiar tone of horror”78 tells us that these 
are, at least to some degree, familiar.79
A more charitable interpretation would go as follows. In moral discourse, we 
express only ordinary feelings, but not one at a time; rather, we give voice to bundles 
consisting of many diferent feelings, the co-occurrences of which in certain 
combinations and ratios is associated with morality. And so a “moral disapproval” is 
not some unanalysable, fundamentally distinctive feeling, but something like ordinary 
disapproval tinged with outrage and flavored with horror, with an undercurrent of 
discomfort (to give one of a great many possibilities, no one of which need be the 
whole story). Of course, we are still lef wondering how to define these emotions, but 
78 ibid
79 I should also point out that, whatever conclusion we may come to about the nature of emotions in 
Ayer's emotivism, the theory is not so simple as to rely entirely on them. Here we should take a 
moment to address the criticism of Ayer by Hare mentioned in Chapter 1. Hare alleges that Ayer 
disrespects the difference in logic between telling someone to perform an action and merely getting 
him to do it (see Hare (1952) p. 13, and for support his “Freedom of the Will”, in Hampshire et al. 
(1951)). This criticism would be well-founded if Ayer claimed that the prescriptive function of moral 
terms was derived from the emotive function: that is, if we read Ayer's claim (LTL p. 108) of moral 
sentences having “the effect of commands” with the emphasis on effect, and do not read much into the 
structure of the following sentence-- which claims that a moral sentence “may be regarded as both the 
expression of...feeling...and as the expression of the command” (ibid, bold added). But in light of 
Ayer's remarks immediately following, that does not seem like the right reading. Rather, Ayer holds that
the emotive and prescriptive are separate dimensions in the determination of the so-called “meaning” 
of ethical terms (more on that issue in a moment). He claims that, for instance, “it is your duty to tell 
the truth” and “you ought to tell the truth”, sentences both of which one might categorize (following 
Ayer, ibid) as expressing a pro-attitude towards truthfulness, are to be differentiated from one another 
insofar as they issue commands with a different degree of forcefulness. And so, in Ayer's theory, the 
commanding effect of moral sentences is not to be described in terms of getting people to do things by 
expressing your emotions or attitudes, but as a dedicated function of moral language in addition to the 
expression of attitudes. 
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at least they have the advantage of familiarity. 
Now that we have at least commented on the emotional component of the 
emotive theory, we must turn our atention to the question of what, exactly, the theory
is meant to be. We must resolve the appearance of tension between, on one hand, the 
passage quoted above claiming that “moral judgements do not say anything” (and its 
allies, e.g. that the use of such terms “adds nothing to the literal meaning of [a] 
sentence.”80, that “ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts and therefore unanalysable”81, 
that “sentences which simply express moral judgements do not say anything”82), and 
on the other hand, such comments as:
In fact we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms
both of the diferent feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and 
also the diferent responses which they are calculated to provoke.83
(Though note Ayer's scare quotes in the sentence immediately preceding:
And thus the “meaning” of the word “good,” in its ethical usage, is 
diferentiated from that of the word “duty” or the word “ought”.84
Though they are dropped in the next sentence, it is interesting that they occur here.)
In other words, we must answer the question of whether or not Ayer's 
emotivism is meant as a semantic theory-- if he is proposing an analysis whereby 
ethical terms are to be treated as having an “emotive meaning”, separate from yet 
equal to descriptive meaning, or if the proposals of emotivism are to be understood in 
80 ibid
81 Ibid p. 112
82 Ibid p. 108
83 Ibid p. 108
84 ibid
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some other way. Fortunately, LTL provides us with the necessary resources to answer 
this issue. The first consideration to bear in mind is the role of the emotive theory 
within the greater project of LTL; it exists to answer a certain challenge to Ayer's 
verificationism:
There is still one objection to be met before we can claim to have justified our 
view that all synthetic propositions are empirical hypotheses. This objection is
based on the common supposition that our speculative knowledge is of two 
distinct kinds-- that which relates to questions of empirical fact, and that 
which relates to questions of value. It will be said that “statements of value” 
are genuine synthetic propositions, but that they cannot with any show of 
justice be represented as hypotheses, which are used to predict the course of 
our sensations; and, accordingly, that the existence of ethics and aesthetics as 
branches of speculative knowledge presents an insuperable objection to our 
radical empiricist thesis.85
Ayer's tactic for responding to this challenge is to atempt to provide a theory of 
ethics-- the emotive theory-- that is compatible with the meaninglessness of ethical 
statements, as is suggested by the criterion of verification, without thereby being 
eliminativist. Any such theory would benefit from the ability to explain ordinary 
atributions of meaningfulness. Ayer thus clarifies in his introduction to the second 
edition:
In puting forward the principle of verification as a criterion of meaning, I 
do not overlook the fact that the word “meaning” is commonly used in a 
variety of senses, and I do not wish to deny that in some of these sense a 
statement may properly be said to be meaningful even though it is 
neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. I should, however, claim that 
there was at least one proper use of the word “meaning” in which it would
be incorrect to say that a statement was meaningful unless it satisfied the
principle of verification; and I have, perhaps tendentiously, used the 
expression “literal meaning” to distinguish this use from the others...It is 
85 Ibid p. 102
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indeed open to anyone to adopt a diferent criterion of meaning and so to
produce an alternate definition which may very well correspond to one of 
the ways in which the word “meaning” is commonly used...Nevertheless, I
think that, unless it satisfied the principle of verification, [a statement] 
would not be capable of being understood in the sense in which either 
scientific hypotheses or common-sense statements are habitually 
understood.86
I have reproduced the rather significant block of text above in order that we might 
examine Ayer's ideas as to what counts as a “meaning”. For a number of positions are 
available as to whether or not we take Ayer's emotivism to be a theory of meaning. We 
could choose to divide the theory into a negative semantic component and positive 
pragmatic component87, or we could see the project as atempting to highlight a certain
special kind of meaning88; we could even view Ayer's statements on the results of his 
positivism as essentially disposable, and thereby open the way to subsuming his view 
to that of Stevenson89. In light of the passage above, though, I find it most reasonable 
to take the first of these as substantially correct. Resolving the apparent tension in 
Ayer's claims requires taking Ayer's terminology of “literal meaning” at face value, and 
then writing of the “meaning” we atribute to moral claims as something else-- not 
86 Ibid pp. 15-16
87 e. g. Stoljar 1993. For period (pre-Geach) responses that treat Ayer as following Stoljar's model, see 
e.g.McGill (1954), p. 70; Schuster (1953), p. 655. In fact, according to Harrison (1950), there existed 
an entire category of objection to emotivism based on the idea that, if emotivism held ethical 
propositions to be meaningless, it could not respect the commonsense differentiation between those 
that are gibberish and those that are not. Harrison's solution to the problem on behalf of emotivism is to
allow for other forms of meaning besides the communication of beliefs, or, in other words, to take the 
alternative reading of Ayer's theory to the one I am advocating. The solution, though, seems to me to be
a bit of an overreaction. All that we really need to defuse the worry is some factor to sort out the likes 
of “it is wrong to dissolve babies in acid” from “it is wrong to tuna”; there is then a further question 
about whether whatever difference in use we might pick out deserves the status of meaning, with all the
attendant rights and responsibilities. 
88 e. g. Schroeder 2010
89 e. g. Wilks 2002
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something illegitimate, perhaps, but something that can be safely pushed to the 
pragmatics90.
What we see in the earliest version of Ayer's theory, then, is expressivism in a 
fairly straightforward form, drawing on a simple but not wholly un-nuanced notion of 
an atitude, and deploying that notion to form a theory about ethics that avoids 
entanglement in semantics91. To bolster this frame, Ayer adds an account of moral 
dispute, which I alluded to in section 1.3 but now have the liberty to explain more fully.
In its original form, it is an example of the approach to moral dispute that argues that 
the data, properly viewed, does not show anything that ought to make even a very 
simple expressivist theory worried. Ayer claims92 that we never really engage in rational
debate about morality, but only about the facts of contested cases; debate always 
breaks down at the moral level. Where there exists a genuine diference in atitudes, 
rather than a disagreement about the facts of a case, argument gives way to 
condemnation and conflict. These claims are meant to be borne out by observation; 
reflection on actual moral disputes, rather than on the kind of inference that is used to 
90 Perhaps we can better understand the idea of non-literal attributions of “meaning” if we look at some 
ordinary examples, for instance, instances where we give a “meaning” of a term in order to explain a 
particular example of its usage, or to help someone else use the term, but do so in a way that does not 
constitute a definition of a term. For example, consider the following dialogue: 
A: “Let’s go to the movies!”
B: “Meh.”
A: “What does ‘meh’ mean?”
B: “It means, ‘I’ve been sitting in front of a computer screen working for the last forty hours straight, 
and spending even more hours sat staring at screens really isn’t my idea of fun at the moment.”
In this dialogue, B’s second line is not a definition of ‘meh’. Most likely, it is not even what he meant 
by ‘meh’; rather, his first line merely expressed his unenthusiasm, and the second provides an 
explanation for that lack of interest. So his second line does not provide, in any literal sense, the 
meaning of his first. This example, then, shows a non-literal use of “meaning”. 
91 And thus also any version of the Frege-Geach problem that is wholly semantic in nature. 
92 See Ayer (1936 [1952]) pp. 116-117
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demonstrate the supposed logic of moral language, is supposed to convince us that 
Ayer has it right when it comes to moral dispute. 
Ayer's strategy is an “all-in”  approach. What I meant by that is that it relies 
entirely on the claim that we are always arguing about maters of fact when we apply 
the method of rational debate in moral disputes. Such an approach has its advantages; 
with no account for why we would use fact-like practices in an emotive realm, Ayer's 
theory gains in parsimony, and does not sufer any plausibility penalties from an 
account that is less than fully comfortable. But dealing in absolutes leads to a worst-
case scenario vis-a-vis counterexamples; one case of what Ayer claims to be impossible 
would sink the entire account of dispute. Given that Ayer's theory is supposed to be 
backed up by observation, with all theorizing further along in the order of explanation 
than the claim about the nonexistence of moral dispute (and thus no possibility of 
recourse to principles to rule out the possibility of counterexamples), this weakness is 
quite dangerous. 
3.2 Ayer’s emotivism improved
Accordingly, in his introduction to the second edition of LTL, Ayer modifies his 
approach to the problem of dispute. One modification, made without explanation93,is 
to allow that once debate has “broken down”, it needn't degenerate into abuse, but can 
continue through emotive persuasion. Ayer says very litle about this change, and I will
follow suit, since there seems to be no reason to exclude the possibility in question. 
93 Ibid p. 22
62
Another change is to allow that arguments about the facts of moral cases needn't 
presuppose a common moral (emotive) position94; it might also be possible to persuade 
one's interlocutor into a change in atitude through discourse about facts95.
By far the largest change, though, is Ayer's addition of a mechanism whereby 
moral language can participate in disputes about the relevant facts for moral issues. 
The way this idea is supposed to work is that we have a certain body of sentences, 
which are literally meaningless, that use moral language. Sometimes, these 
meaningless sentences are used simply to express feelings. “Lying is wrong”, for 
instance, is a meaningless sentence that may be used to express disapproval of lying-- 
as if one had said the word “lying”, as Ayer puts it, “in a peculiar tone of horror, or 
writen it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.”96 But there are other 
cases where
what seems to be an ethical judgement is very ofen a factual 
classification of an action as belonging to some class of actions by which 
a certain moral atitude on the part of the speaker is habitually aroused.97
In his discussion in the introduction to the second edition of Language, Truth, and Logic,
Ayer gives the examples of one commited to utilitarianism using moral language as a 
vessel for talk of happiness, or a religious person using it for talk of rules laid down by 
authority, but the factual uses needn’t be ones that refer to a theory. Rather, the idea is 
that our actual atitudes are not so great in number or fine in grain as we may assume, 
94 Ibid. Contrast with ibid p. 111
95 ibid
96 Ibid p. 107
97 Ibid p. 21
63
or as Ayer puts it:
the common objects of moral approval or disapproval are not particular 
actions so much as classes of actions; by which I mean that if an action is 
labeled right or wrong, or good or bad, as the case may be, it is because it 
is thought to be an action of a certain type.98
We might, I suppose, see these wider-ranging atitudes endorsed by Ayer as filling the 
role of “moral principles”, though Ayer does not give us enough to go on to know just 
how wide-ranging the atitudes are meant to be (and thus how fiting the label of 
“principles”). It is these that we voice when we use ethical language to express 
atitudes. When we argue about ethics, if we are proceeding rationally, we are not 
arguing over the principles themselves, but rather about whether or not a shared 
principle is relevant to a certain case or cases, or in other words, whether or not some 
pre-existing atitude shared by the debaters applies applies to the case(s). Ayer's theory
already included the idea of winning a moral debate through debate about facts that 
determine whether one's wide-ranging atitudes apply in a particular case:
In short, we find that argument is possible on moral questions only if 
some system of values is presupposed. If our opponent concurs with us in
expressing moral disapproval of all actions of a given type t, then we may 
get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments
to show that A is of type t.99
It is this kind of debate that we are actually engaged in when we form logical 
arguments using what looks like moral language. The idea that is new in the second 
edition of LTL is that, when we do so, we use the same meaningless sentences as we do
98 ibid
99 Ibid p. 111
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to express certain atitudes-- that is, as we use when we express our moral principles. 
Although the words are the same, what they are used for is quite diferent100.
The efect of this change on Ayer's theory is to add another reply to the dispute 
problem. If much of moral discourse is actually factual rather than emotive in nature, 
then we would expect such discourse to proceed in the manner expected of discussion 
about facts, even if morality itself is essentially emotive. According to this account, you
can have what almost anyone would call a genuine moral dispute, with moral 
principles being applied and normative conclusions generated. Basing the expressivism 
on wide-ranging atitudes gives the theory the ability to explain arguments with 
normative conclusions: if we express atitudes101 that speak to more than just the 
individual object at which they are immediately directed, and then argue that a certain
case falls within the category over which the atitude ranges, we thereby apply the 
expression of the atitude to case. 
Does Ayer have the basic ingredients for a solution to the dispute argument?  
Here we might gain some understanding by examining, and contrasting, a diferent 
expressivist theory-- the earliest version of Simon Blackburn's theory, that of his 1973 
[1993] paper “Moral Realism”. Blackburn starts with a component that should be 
familiar to us from our examination of Ayer: the idea that, when using moral language,
100 We should beware not to think of the difference in terms of a rigid separation of uses. There is, after all,
nothing to stop us from expressing emotions during a moral argument, as that is something that a great 
deal of language, whatever it else it might be for, can do. Likewise, we might sometimes use ethical 
terms in their factual capacity even when not making an argument. Rather, the difference is between 
the typical uses outside of and within arguments. 
101 The use of “attitudes” here is indicative of another change in Ayer's theory over time. In interview 
(Honderich 1989, in Griffiths (ed.) 1991 p. 215), Ayer admits to moving away from the use of emotions
in his theory, and to “attitudes”.
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we sometimes express atitudes, and other times discuss those atitudes:
The question, for the anti-realist, is that of how his account of the 
hypothetical is to cohere with his account of straightforward assertion in 
such a way that 'P, and if P, then Q' entails Q, where P is a moral 
proposition. The theory tells us that anybody asserting 'P, and if P, then 
Q' where P atributes worth to a thing expresses his atitude to that thing, 
and asserts that that atitude involves a further atitude or belief. There is, 
when that has been done, a logical inconsistency in not holding the 
further atitude or belief.102
Blackburn's objective here is to try and reclaim ordinary argumentative 
practices for the expressivist. The idea is that an expressive premise can be stretched to
include a conclusion by a second premise that makes a statement about the first; if the 
expressive premise does include or involve the conclusion, then it would indeed be a 
contradiction to fail to accept that conclusion. And so Blackburn hopes to give 
deductive arguments the force that we expect. 
Unfortunately, as Blackburn realizes, there's no way that the expressivist is 
going to get away with this notion of involvement:
It may be thought at this point that too much weight is put upon the 
word 'involves.' For can an atitude involve a belief (or a belief an atitude 
in such a way? We recognize that people can hold the moral atitude 
without the belief and visa versa: what other involvement is there?103
The first problem for the maneuver is that the view of involvement needed for this 
maneuver is untenable on a straightforward notion of the atitudes expressed in moral 
discourse. Even without considering arguments that combine the normative and the 
102 Ibid p. 127
103 Ibid. Naturally, the fact that Blackburn does not endorse the attitude-involvement account has not 
stopped critics from seeing his (1973) as endorsing it; see, e. g. Schroeder (2010), whose criticisms (pp.
112-115) of the involvement account mirror Blackburn's own.
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descriptive, the account has trouble. For example, consider the following argument:
3.2e1 If pushing people of of bridges in New York is wrong, then pushing people
of of clifs in Canada is wrong. 
3.2e2 Pushing people of of bridges in New York is wrong. 
3.2e3 Therefore, pushing people of of clifs in Canada is wrong.
The account that we are currently considering holds that 3.2e1 says that the atitude 
expressed in 3.2e2 (disapproval of pushing people of of bridges in New York) includes 
the atitude expressed in 3.2e3 (disapproval of pushing people of of clifs in Canada). 
But clearly that is not the meaning of 3.2e1; it seems uterly absurd to think, for 
instance, that one could not believe in 3.2e1 without commiting to the idea that one's 
feelings about the use of Canadian geographic features as gravitic murder instruments 
are nothing more than a subset of one's feelings about the use of New York 
transportation conduits for the same purpose. 
Things get even worse for the involvement account when we start to consider 
arguments that mix the descriptive with the normative. For example:
3.2e4 If Bob is allergic to fish, I should not give him a bagel with lox.
3.2e5 Bob is allergic to fish
3.2e6 Therefore, I should not give him a bagel with lox.
Now the problem is that I can accept 3.2e4 and yet deny exactly what the involvement 
account would translate it into, namely, that my belief in Bob's fish allergy includes 
disapproval of giving him a bagel. I might, while accepting the entire argument, think 
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that there are some situations under which I would come to reject 3.2e4 and 3.2e6 
without rejecting 3.2e5. I realize, for instance, that I might come to believe that Bob 
deserves death by anaphylaxis, which could then combine with the idea that Bob is 
allergic to fish to yield the conclusion that I ought to give him lox. Yet, if my belief in 
Bob's allergy involves the disapproval of giving him lox, then I could not cease to 
disapprove of giving him lox while at the same time maintaining my belief in his 
allergy. If I really thought, in accepting 3.2e4, that 3.2e5 involves 3.2e6, then I should 
not think it possible that I could come to deny 3.2e6 but not 3.2e5. It seems impossible, 
on the involvement view, to in fact accept the argument 3.2e4-6, while at the same time
acknowledging the possibility of coming to deny 3.2e6 without denying 3.2e5. And this 
seems wrong, because cases where one who accepts the argument might come to deny
3.2e6 without denying 3.2e5 are not dificult to imagine. 
Blackburn's own response to this problem is to move away from the idea that 
complex moral sentences make statements about atitudes, and to the position that 
such sentences are expressions of atitudes towards involvement relationships between 
beliefs and atitudes:
To say that the atitude of approval to courage involves the belief that 
courage is a quality by which a man must act to achieve happiness is, as I 
said, to express a moral standard, to make a moral claim. The subtle thing 
is that the subject of the claim is now the atitude of approval to courage, 
and it is said that this ought to involve the belief that courage involves 
happiness.104
The idea of higher-order atitudes-- atitudes about atitudes and combinations 
thereof-- has already been touched upon in Chapter 2, and we'll hear more about the 
104 ibid
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theories that Blackburn bases on them in Chapter 5. For now, though, a quick note 
about this specific version of the idea: “ought to involve” seems unnecessarily strong. 
The notion of involvement might seem useful if you want a way to make a statement 
about atitudes and their relations to beliefs and one another, but if you are merely 
judging the states that you have expressed, and not making any claim about them, 
having the judgement be about involvement relations inherits potential pitfalls from 
the involvement account for no apparent benefit over simply judging combinations of 
atitudes. 
Ayer's position difers from Blackburn's in that Ayer has the idea of wide-
ranging atitudes. As a result, he needn't (and doesn't) claim that we make statements 
that are directly about our own mental states in the process of moral debate. 
Application of wide-ranging atitudes is not an analogue to the inclusion of one 
atitude in another, because demonstrating that a case falls within the set of situations 
towards which an atitude holds can be done entirely with arguments about the facts 
of the case. 
Ayer does not give us enough text to even atempt a more specific 
reconstruction. Nonetheless, it is possible to comment about the position at a very 
general level, and this is enough to formulate a problem. We can either reconstruct 
Ayer as ofering a slow-track theory and try and build an account of dispute out of a 
translation procedure for moral sentences, or we can reconstruct him as ofering a fast-
track theory. The former approach runs into dificulties that feels reminiscent of the 
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problems with Blackburn's involvement theory. First, if we believe that there is more 
than one moral principle-- more than one fundamental atitude involved in morality-- 
we run into the problem of drawing conditionals across atitudes. For example:
3.2e7 If telling a harmless lie is wrong, then dynamiting a hamster is wrong. 
If our disapproval of harmless lies and our disapproval of dynamiting hamsters are 
manifestations of diferent atitudes, then it is not at all apparent how we could explain
3.2e7 in terms of the application of a wider atitude. Second, it seems that we ought to 
handle the likes of 3.2e4 by making them general statements-- that is, statements 
about how, if a certain condition holds, some atitude or other applies (without 
specification of which, beyond the valence specified by the conditional itself). Yet, if 
there is no specification of the particular atitude involved, there is nothing to say 
whether it is or is not the same atitude expressed in the expressive premise.  
A fast-track theory built out of the components that Ayer leaves us fares no 
beter. One dificulty with this tactic is that Ayer's theory draws upon ordinary factual 
dispute as its explanation of moral dispute. Yet, we know how to form sentences to 
express the moving parts in a factual dispute in a direct and explicit manner, in such a 
way as to render unsatisfying the approach of defining complex moral sentences by 
their role in moral practice. In other words, if Ayer is right about the complex sentences
in moral dispute being disguised statements of facts, they should be translateable into 
undisguised statements of facts. But if we could do that, we would not be using the 
fast-track approach in the first place. In other words, our reconstructed-Ayer seems to 
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have commited himself to the slow-track approach. But even if that approach works, 
he hasn't given us enough pieces to reconstruct a theory that succeeds in executing the
approach. 
Perhaps reconstructed-Ayer can get around this problem. He might, if he has 
abandoned many of the commitments of the actual Ayer, claim that we engage in a 
practice wherein we exchange facts in order to adjust our application of wide-ranging 
atitudes, but that this practice sometimes involves sentences that do not permit of 
further analysis beyond their role in it. Of course, this is not something that the actual 
Ayer claimed or would claim, but it is an interesting variation of the theory, so we will 
consider it anyway. The move here would be to say that a conditional, for instance, isn't
necessarily voicing a specific relationship of derivation or manifestation between 
atitudes, but rather constitutes a kind of generic move with a wide variety of possible 
underliers drawn from all of the possible factual relationships that might make it so 
that in a case, an atitude applies, if that or another atitude applies in that or another 
case. Such a view would be a genuinely fast-track position, but one that ultimately 
leaves us searching for a beter alternative. The kind of relations that it is based on-- 
factual relations governing the application of atitudes-- is not adequate to the dialectic
needs of the fast-track. Due to the fast-track's order of explanation, it relies on the 
inherent plausibility of whatever account of dispute it provides. Now the real Ayer does
argue for the position that there are no reasoned moral disputes that are not actually 
factual disputes, but it is only a “look and see” kind of argument-- upon reflection, we 
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are supposed to realize that the point at which moral dispute breaks down to become 
nothing more than name-calling is exactly the point at which we finish arguing about 
non-moral facts105. There is certainly something to Ayer's observation; careful reflection 
does reveal that it is surprisingly dificult to find realistic examples of moral disputes 
that on the one hand have the potential for rational argument to be fruitful and yet on 
the other hand cannot be explained as disputes about facts. But that is insuficient for 
present purposes. We would need far more than that the radical idea that there are no 
genuine rational moral disputes seems less crazy upon reflection than it does at first; 
we would need more even than that  the idea is not a stretch at all, which goes beyond 
what the kind of argument Ayer ofers can achieve. We would need Ayer's theory about
what is really going on in moral dispute to seem so plausible, so right upon reflection 
that it becomes a net source rather than a net recipient of explanatory power. But the 
kind of argument that Ayer gives us, while interesting, is not capable of going that far. 
Ayer's theory, then, serves to illustrate a point about the kind of solution to the 
dispute problem that one needs in order to take the fast track. I think, though, that 
there is a deeper lesson that we can learn from Ayer. Ayer's theory is very simple, even 
when we account for the fact that Ayer writes in such a condensed style that 
explanations of his theory tend to be longer than the original statement. It is also 
modular; because of the simplicity of the theory, the account of dispute is separable 
from the rest of the theory, and indeed most of the account was not even present in the
original version of LTL. But, of course, this raises questions. If the theory is 
105 Ayer (1936 [1952]) p. 111
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fundamentally modular, what if we put on a diferent account of dispute? What other 
modules might the theory acquire to help its overall plausibility?
3.3 Ayer and quasi-realism
 The thesis of this section is that Ayer's theory, in the form to which it had evolved by 
the end of Ayer's life in June 1989, deserves the label of “quasi-realist” (strictly 
speaking, I should say that I aim to find some subtle foreshadowing of the quasi-realist
view in the complete Ayer, but the insane version of the thesis is more interesting, and 
thus more likely to lead to good results, so we'll go with that). “Qasi-realism” is 
sometimes used as a blanket term for the sort of view expounded by Simon Blackburn 
and Alan Gibbard, which distinguishes itself from other forms of expression by a kind 
of mimicry of the realist. As Blackburn (1993) writes:
I dramatized the question of whether a non-descriptive story can indeed 
understand the use we make of [embedded] contexts by inventing the 
figure of the quasi-realist, or someone who 'starting from an anti-realist 
position finds himself progressively able to mimic the thoughts and 
practices of realism.' Qasi-realism is not really another 'ism' in the sense 
of a position or an ideology in the same space as realism or anti-realism; 
it represents more of an atitude of exploration of the reality of the 
boundaries that those 'isms' demand.106
In chapter 2, though, I used “quasi-realism” not in the general sense wherein it serves 
as a synonym for expressivism, but in reference to a certain kind of theoretical 
maneuver, namely that such theories take the basic expressivist strategy of analyzing 
moral sentences as expressing atitudes, and then apply to apparently meta-ethical 
106 Blackburn (1993) p. 4. 
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statements about things like the “existence of objective values” or “moral properties” an
analysis that places them within the same practice. Using this component in a theory 
embodies an “atitude of exploration”, per Blackburn's quote, insofar as it allows 
expressivist theories to incorporate apparently realist claims into themselves without 
(hopefully; we'll come back to this in a minute) thereby becoming realist. Here, and 
when we return to quasi-realism in Chapter 6, I will continue to use quasi-realism in 
the more specific sense, the one in which it refers to the specific theoretical maneuver 
described. 
We can find passages in Ayer which seem to employ a maneuver of this type:
To say that anything is right if someone thinks so is unobjectionable if it 
means no more than that anyone is entitled to use the word 'right' to 
refer to something of which he morally approves. But this is not the way 
in which it is ordinarily taken. It is ordinarily taken as the enunciation of 
a moral principle...it may appeal to some; it does not, in fact, to me.107 
For a subjectivist, egoism would be a coherent theory. There would be no 
inconsistency in advocating as a principle of conduct that each man 
should aim at the realization of his own interest. But this argument could
be countered by our simply equating the belief in so-called objective 
goodness with the principle that, in default of special reasons, no one 
person's interests should count for more than anyone else's. It would then
be lef for us to decide whether this principle was acceptable.108
This strategy is used to help the expressivist in preserving, rather than having to 
107 Ayer (1954) p. 248. Compare this to Blackburn's response to the objection from unacceptable mind-
dependence (Blackburn 1984, p. 218)
Suppose someone said 'if we had different sentiments, it would be right to kick dogs', what 
could he be up to? Apparently, he endorses a certain sensibility: one which lets information
about what people feel dictate its attitude to kicking dogs. But nice people do not endorse 
such a sensibility. What makes it wrong to kick dogs is the cruelty or pain to the animal. 
108 Ayer 1984 p. 34
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challenge, much of ordinary practice, e.g.: 
it is by no means improper to refer to ethical uterances as statements; 
when someone characterizes an action by the use of an ethical 
predicate, it is quite good usage to say that he is thereby describing it; 
when someone wishes to assent to an ethical verdict, it is perfectly 
legitimate for him to say that it is true, or that it is a fact109
Such a strategy raises the question of just how far the expressivist wants to take it. For 
in each instance he has a few options: 1) he can analyze a claim and thereby render it 
harmless; 2) he can deny the claim; or 3) he can say that the claim accepts multiple 
readings, ones internal and external to the practice. There are dangers lurking on all 
sides here, especially for (3), but I doubt we'll have time to get into them in any depth. 
For now, let's pretend, contrary to fact, that we're confident that, one way or another, 
we can keep all three options alive. Then we might ask how ofen we ought to apply 
each of them. 
Let's introduce a litle bit of terminology: call boldness the frequency with 
which a theory chooses option (2) (we might have to weight this by significance, but 
let's let that concern rest for now). 
Boldness might be important. Why? Because, without any boldness, the 
quasi-realist gains burden with regards to distinguishing his position from realism. If 
he sticks to (1) at all times, his theory will consist of the same claims as realism, and in 
addition, a number of further claims about the analysis of the first claims. If the quasi-
realist prefers to utilize (3), he will have all of the same claims as if he had only used 
109 Ayer 1954 pp. 231-232
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(1), plus further claims as to the additional readings of the first set of claims, and yet 
more claims about the infelicity of whatever those additional readings claim is being 
said. Both of these cases have the quasi-realist saying everything that the realist says, 
so it is unclear how the two are in disagreement. Worse still, any argument that gives 
us reason to think the shared claims are false could trouble the quasi-realist as well. 
The jury is still out on this issue (it's called the “problem of creeping 
minimalism”, courtesy of Dreier (2004b)).110 For our part, we will return to the question 
in Chapter 6. For now, let us simply note that some strategic application of boldness 
would stop us from having to worry about it in the first place. And if simplicity is 
regarded as a theoretical virtue, boldness can help us achieve it. 
Ayer, as one might suspect, is heavy on boldness. Examples include the 
straightforward denial of objective values, e.g. Ayer 1967 p. 217, Ayer 1984 p. 33, and 
the denial of genuine logical debate of basic values: e.g. Ayer 1936[1952] p. 112. To 
increase his boldness, he takes the position that, while he might be forced into (3) in 
order to make the quasi-realist maneuver, he does so only out of a kind of compassion 
for ordinary use, while holding that we really ought to be stricter and then apply (2). 
For example:
Very ofen, what [a philosopher] is doing, although he may not know it,
is to recommend a new way of speaking, not just for amusement, but 
because he thinks that the old, the socially correct, way of speaking is 
logically misleading, or that his own proposal brings out certain points 
more clearly. Thus, in the present instance, it is no doubt correct to say 
that the moralist does make statements, and, what is more, statements 
110 See also e.g.  Asay (2013), Dunaway (2010),  and Chrisman (2008).
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of fact...But when one considers how these ethical statements are 
actually used, it may be found that they function so diferently from 
other types of statement that it is advisable to put them into a separate
category altogether111
If we consider Ayer's reply to the embedding problem, he seems to be taking a slow-
track approach-- indeed, the idea of “emotive reactions to hypothetical instances”, if 
we take the more plausible reading (atitudes towards hypotheticals) sounds a lot like 
Blackburn's higher order atitudes approach. But the interesting thing is that Ayer's 
boldness means that he can only take the slow track. Why? Consult the above quote. 
According to Ayer, many of our ordinary linguistic practices with regards to morality 
are misleading. We don't have to take his word for it, either; his boldness speaks for 
itself on this count. Yet, at the same time, Ayer's theory is of the mimicking sort; his 
comment, quoted earlier, about propositional form being a “disguise” atests to that. 
Since this claim is itself a part of his boldness, we cannot allow our reconstruction to 
diverge on that mater, at least not while the result of his boldness level is exactly 
what we are considering. On the mimicking approach, explanatory force is generated 
from the fitingness of the surface forms. Ayer denies that there is any such fit; in fact, 
much of his writing on the mater stresses the diference between moral and non-
moral cases. so he loses his technique for explaining the presence of the surface form.  
He also doesn't believe in genuine moral arguments. But without moral arguments, he 
loses the main tool for constructing a functional account of complex moral sentences. 
So it seems like the fast-track order of explanation is closed of to Ayer; at  Ayer's level 
111 Ayer 1954 pp. 232-233
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of boldness, any advantages to the use of propositional form in general would be more
than outweighed by the massive error into which it has (apparently) led us. 
As a fast-tracker, then, Ayer would get nowhere. But we've already realized that
we have reason to worry about the slow-track approach in general, and about Ayer's 
atempts at following it in particular. We can resolve the historical puzzle from the 
beginning of this chapter by saying that Ayer's confidence was at least partially 
justified-- his expression of it coming before the problems with the slow track were 
known-- but his theory cannot stand as it is, nor even with our atempts at highly 
charitable reconstruction. 
For our purposes, there is a further mater of interest. In the previous section, 
we discussed the modularity of Ayer's theory. We see that once again with the 
question of his boldness. Some boldness is important, but an excess of it is fatal. If 
we look at the selections above, we see that his boldness is determined piecemeal; he 
decreases boldness by adding quasi-realist aspects to his theory, and increases it 
again with aggressive clarification of those aspects. Since Ayer's theory allows for the 
easy adoption of instances of the quasi-realist maneuver, there seems to be no reason 
why the theory could not be modified to have whatever boldness level was necessary. 
In theory, the possibility exists for an Ayer-type theory, armed with a diferent theory 
of disagreement and a proper level of boldness, to atempt the fast-track approach. 
Whether that theory succeeds or fails will depend on its details, and we have no 
particular reason to suspect that it will succeed, or, for that mater, that it will even 
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maintain enough of the original theory over the course of its modifications to be seen 
as any more closely related to Ayer's view than to any other expressivist theory.  But, 
in the interests of precision, we must point out that the concerns that we have 
considered do not conclusively rule out any possible variant on Ayer's theory. 
3.4 Using Ayer’s ideas within a hybrid theory
While the involvement and application accounts do not work as overall pictures
of moral dispute, none of the arguments directed against them are so extreme as to say
that the phenomena referred to cannot happen. Nowhere have we, or the opponents of
Ayer or Blackburn, claimed that it is impossible for an atitude to involve another 
atitude, or for people to have wide-ranging atitudes that manifest as a number of 
simpler atitudes. And so, while these phenomena cannot occupy the central position 
in whatever theory we come up with, there is nothing to stop them from playing a 
secondary role. We cannot use them to ground a general explanation of moral dispute, 
but they may, nonetheless, be useful in explaining specific cases. Since our plan is to 
try and construct a hybridized fast-track theory, supplemental explanations for 
individual cases can be useful. Besides, if Ayer's theory is meant to be based, first and 
foremost, on observations about moral discourse, it would be nice if whatever we came
up with could do justice to the same observations. 
In our discussion of hybrid theories in Chapter 2, we touched upon the idea of 
rescuing slow-track elements for use as a “model”, and discussed some of the ways that
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parts of a slow-track theory could contribute to a fast-track theory. Blackburn's theory 
of higher-order atitudes and their place in reasoning, for instance, may have seemed 
inadequate as a core account of moral reasoning, but it was able to make itself useful 
to a fast-track as a possibility proof and supplemental explanation. We can deal with 
Ayer's insights into the surprising abundance of questions of fact in moral dispute and 
the relatively small number of atitudes necessary to cover a wide variety of cases by 
giving these insights the same status. The kind of dynamic that Ayer gestures at to 
reinforce his claim that there are no genuine reasoned moral disputes might not 
succeed at that job, and might not be capable of playing the lead role in a more 
sophisticated expressivism, but it can be of use in several lesser capacities. It can help 
us understand how some moral debates are likely to go, and what sort of 
considerations might be productive; it can show that an emotive practice needn't be 
devoid of factual reasoning. None of these functions require the theory to generalize to
the extent that we would require for an overall account of morality. It sufices that the 
dynamic occurs sometimes, that the interplay of general atitudes and facts is somehow
involved in morality-- denying that seems implausible. 
We can find many examples of this dynamic in everyday life, afer all. One 
might, for instance, have a general atitude of being for the underdog in sporting 
competitions112. But it can be surprisingly dificult to work out which team is the 
underdog, especially if one has only a small degree of familiarity with the sport in 
question. What are we to make of such a case? It seems false that one would not favor 
112 Where, incidentally, the “Hooray!” and “Boo!” model is quite apt. 
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either team; one favors the underdog, which implies that one favors a team. The basic 
atitude of favoring the underdog is not dispelled by one's ignorance in the case at 
hand, because we have other handles on it; the atitude can still be brought to mind by
associations that do not concern the particular case. Nor is it merely that one wishes to
support the underdog, although that atitude may hold as well113, since not all ways of 
manifesting support for the underdog require knowing which team is which. For 
example, in motor racing, inclement weather might increase the chance of an upset; 
thus, one who favored the underdog might hope for rain.114 
More generally, it is clearly possible to have an atitude without realizing all of 
its potential manifestations. Now it is important to realize that unknown 
manifestations are not reducible to predictions of future atitudes. For example, 
suppose that I like pizza. We can then distinguish two separate claims about a 
particular pizza that I have not yet tried: that I do like it, because it is pizza and 
therefore subject to my general atitude towards pizza, and that I will like it when I try 
it. One might argue that an atitude cannot apply in unrecognized cases by claiming 
113 That is, deploying higher-order attitudes seems unlikely to lead to a superior explanation of this case. 
114 Some other examples in the mold of the underdog case: I might disapprove of plans that will place me 
in a dangerous situation, but not know which of several alternatives will do so; I might dislike rabid 
animals, and wonder if a certain squirrel is rabid; I might like Tuesdays, but not know what day of the 
week it is. Here, for simplicity's sake, I am focusing on one type of case, where there is a general 
attitude and uncertainty as to its applicability. I have chosen this kind of case because it is the sort of 
case where thought and argument are likely to become involved; the uncertainty demands a resolution, 
and the resolution will reveal the extension of the attitude. That said, this is not the only kind of case 
that we might look at to investigate the interplay between general attitudes and cases. Simple subsets 
are another; for instance, if I dislike dust, it follows that I dislike the 154th dust-mote to be swept up in a
particular cleaning session, even though I do not have any thoughts about, or take particular notice of, 
that specific mote. These are perhaps clearer at making the point that our attitudes are coarse-grained 
rather than fine-grained, but present fewer interesting details by which possible alternatives may be 
drawn out. 
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that all apparent cases of an existing atitude applying in an unrecognized case are 
actually cases of predicting that one will come to have a new atitude towards the case,
of the same valence as the general atitude, when the case is encountered. The position
is motivated by the apparent oddness of Ayer's dynamic; is it actually possible to prove
to someone not that they will have an atitude towards something that they have yet 
to encounter or realize, but that they do already have an atitude towards it? 
This argument does not work. The apparent plausibility of the story it tells 
comes from failing to recognize the true implications of the view. For instance, we 
might not feel terribly troubled by the idea that I can't actually like a brand of pizza 
that I have not tried, even if I like pizza in general. But as the scale drops, our troubles 
increase. Am I unable to like a brand of pizza, but only to like the pizzas of that brand 
that I have had, and predict that I will like the ones I have not? Am I unable to like a 
whole pizza, but only to like the slices that I have eaten, and predict that I will like the 
ones I have not? Am I unable to like a whole slice of pizza, but only the bites of the 
slice that I have already eaten, and predict that I will like the ones I have not? As the 
regress continues, the argument comes to demand that our atitudes are finer and 
finer-grained, until it comes into direct conflict with how our atitudes seem to be. 
We can also, with a bit of reflection, explain the feeling of discomfort that 
motivated the argument. Atitudes are closely tied to feelings; indeed, as mentioned 
earlier, Ayer's own theory employed feelings in its early version, and later moved away 
from them in favor of atitudes. When we imagine a case of the sort that we have been 
82
talking about, we picture ourselves confronting the unknown thing, and not having 
any particular feelings about it (yet). But, although the two are closely related, 
atitudes are not feelings. At this point, we do not have an account of what atitudes 
are; we will return to this issue in the next chapter, though even then, the range of 
possibilities is such that it would be very premature to claim finality for what we come 
up with. That said, since atitudes are familiar to us, we can say a bit about them 
without the need for an overarching account. For one, atitudes are something that one
has, even when one is not experiencing them. My atitude towards pizza is my atitude 
towards pizza, even on days when I have not even considered consuming anything 
other than cofee. Furthermore, it is possible to be mistaken about one's own atitudes. 
I might, for instance, tell myself that I am okay with letuce as a pizza topping; afer 
all, letuce itself is fine, and most foods can work on pizza-- but, every time I have 
actually encountered such a pizza, it has not been to my preference. Sooner or later, I 
will just have to admit to myself that I do not like salad pizza, but in the meantime, it 
seems quite possible for me to possess the atitude B!(salad pizza) without being aware
of the fact. This potential for ignorance works both ways; it could well turn out to be 
that what I dislike is not, in fact, salad pizza, but some subset of salad pizzas, ones 
sharing a common feature in their composition, that happens to include the salad 
pizzas I have thus far experienced.115 
115 In this regard, the theory does quite well at tracking our intuitions. It seems natural to say that I might 
think that I dislike salad pizza, but be proven wrong; a future experience might demonstrate that what I 
dislike is not, in fact, salad pizza, but only a certain kind of salad pizza. Getting the right answer here 
without attributing massive error to anyone requires the possibility of general attitudes that could 
include a future case, so that it can be proved that one does not have the attitude by its failure to 
manifest in that case. 
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If we can have atitudes even when we are not experiencing them, and we can 
be wrong about our atitudes, then the absence of a feeling, leading to a belief in the 
absence of an atitude, cannot be relied upon to tell us that the atitude really is 
absent. And so I might have the general atitude H!(underdog), and this atitude might 
apply to one of the teams at the event, without me feeling compelled to actually 
“hooray” for one team or the other (in the case where I do not know which team is the 
underdog). The absence of the feeling is not indicative of the absence of the atitude, 
especially if the inability of the atitude to manifest itself in feeling is easily explained 
by the absence of the information required to direct it. Rather, the best explanation of 
such cases is that the atitude is present even though we do not know which object(s) 
it encompasses. 
What these considerations show us is that the simple idea of coarse-grained 
atitudes seems able to stand on its own. As such, it can serve as a source of 
explanatory power. Now, we know from our earlier examinations that this power is 
limited, at least insofar as it applies to the moral case; we cannot use coarse-grained 
atitudes as the foundation of an expressivist theory. The dynamic, in short, exists. If 
atitudes ofen work in this sort of way, then an expressivist would do well to recognize
the possibility of the atitudes-- or at least some of the atitudes-- involved in morality 
working in this way. In fact, we can strengthen this claim; there seems to be absolutely
nothing to stop an atitude, just because it is of whatever kind is involved in moral 
judgments, from taking a scope that allows for question on specific cases. It would, 
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given all of this, be quite awkward to claim that moral atitudes do not follow the 
patern; at worst, it could even jeopardize the familiarity of the claimant's notion of 
atitudes. For our purposes-- that is, for the sake of using this part of reconstructed-
Ayer's theory as a secondary component in a fast-track expressivism-- this degree of 
resolution is suficient.
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Chapter 4. Richards and Stevenson
In Ethics and Language (1944), C. L. Stevenson presents us with a view that bears
both close similarities and striking diferences to Ayer’s emotivism. Both views place a 
heavy explanatory emphasis on the role of moral sentences as expressions of our 
atitudes. Moreover, like Ayer, Stevenson believes that rationality applies only to 
maters of fact, writing:
If any ethical dispute is rooted in disagreement in belief, it may be setled
by reasoning and inquiry to whatever extent the beliefs may be so setled.
But if any ethical dispute is -not rooted in disagreement in belief, then no
reasoned solution of any sort is possible.116
On the other hand, where Ayer ascribes no meaning to ethical sentences, Stevenson 
gives them multiple kinds of meanings, including “emotive meaning” and “descriptive 
meaning”117. And he has rather diferent ideas about moral disputes (at least, those that
are not merely persuasive or rhetorical, a category that both he and Ayer take to 
encompass a significant proportion of moral arguments). It is to Stevenson’s theory 
that we will now turn our atention. 
4.1 Richards
Before we discuss Stevenson’s ideas about the meaning of moral sentences, we 
116 Stevenson (1944) p. 138
117 See ibid p. 37 and thereafter. I should like to flag that I find the phrase “emotive meaning” useful and 
will continue to use it even after our discussion of Stevenson concludes. If calling it “meaning” outside 
of the historical context in which it was named offends your semantic sensibilities, feel free to 
substitute “impact” or “effect”. In particular, though, I happen to prefer the emotive meaning of 
“emotive meaning”, and in particular that it resists the superstition-driven urge, discussed later in this 
chapter, to demote its subject to second-class function status.  
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should setle the question of what he means to be talking about when he talks of 
“meaning”. For he is not working within the popular model of words having a single 
meaning (even in a particular context) that we can use to come up with the analysis of 
a sentence in which they occur. In fact, he cautious us, using a phrase from I. A. 
Richards, to beware the “One And Only One True Meaning Superstition”118. For the 
interpretation of this phrase, we turn to Richards himself119, where the phrase occurs in
a discussion of a “context theorem of meaning”120. From the name of the theory, it 
would be easy to interpret it as a claim only about variations in meaning across 
diferent contexts, but that interpretation would miss the point. To understand the 
theory, we must first understand what is meant by a “context.” Ogden and Richards 
118 Stevenson (1944) p. 84, after Richards (1936) p. 39. Stevenson takes much from Richards, utilizing not
only the latter’s collaboration with C. K. Ogden, The Meaning of Meaning (1923), which is noteworthy
for containing an early form of emotivism, but also many of Richards’ solo works, including Principles
of Literary Criticism (1924), The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), Interpretation in Teaching (1938), and
Mencius on the Mind (1932). Stevenson also published on Richards, contributing to Brower (1973)'s 
collection I. A. Richards: Essays in His Honor. Note that, in Richards, the “One and Only One True 
Meaning Superstition” is also sometimes called the “Proper Meaning Superstition” (e.g. Richards 
(1936) p. 11) or the “Proper Usage Superstition” (e.g. ibid p.75). 
119 I should like to flag that in the discussion to follow, I will be moving between Richards' various works 
fairly freely. Some who have studied Richards (for example, Max Black, as represented in his (1948)) 
would instead prefer to divide Richards into “early” and “later” periods, with the line somewhere 
around 1934-1935. To some extent this is no doubt justified. In a later footnote, for instance, I remark 
upon the gradual erasure of the fourfold division of Total Meaning, which seems to have largely gone 
by the board by about 1933, though the individual parts of the division recur, though with a somewhat 
different status, in 1934's Coleridge on Imagination. And Black is quite right to consider the 
problematic idea of a “referent” as belonging primarily to the early Richards; for evidence of this, one 
need do no more than compare the theory of definition on p. 113 of The Meaning of Meaning, wherein 
the important thing in the process of definition is “to find the referent”, to the theory of multiple 
definition described below. I think, though, Black underestimates the cohesiveness of Richards' corpus,
and in particular, the degree to which the theory of The Meaning of Meaning remains in the 
background of Richards' later works. In particular, the idea of context (in a technical sense) and its 
relation to meaning persists though The Philosophy of Rhetoric (see Lecture II of the same), and even 
to 1938's Interpretation in Teaching, which goes so far as to refer the reader back to The Meaning of 
Meaning for further details (Richards 1938 p. vii). We will note other recurring themes as well. And so 
I consider it no great crime to reconstruct Richards from bits drawn from works of different ages, so 
long as we are also careful to note changes where they occur. 
120 The phrase is from Richards (1936) p. 38; Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) lays out the theory. 
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start with the idea of “recurrent clumps of events”121: occurrences that regularly present
together122. These Ogden and Richards divide into external contexts-- clumps of events 
out in the world-- and psychological contexts-- clumps of mental events.123 
The next component is the claim that “what a word means is the missing part of
the contexts from which it draws its delegated eficacy.”124 “Delegated eficacy” is 
Richards’ shorthand for the idea that a word acquires a meaning by taking the place of
some of the items that constitute a particular context. A context can thus come to 
obtain through the use of a word, even if some or all of its members are absent. Here, 
too, we must be careful not to oversimplify. It would be easy to confuse this idea with a
theory where a word’s meaning is a particular referent, which it then supplies to the 
situation to complete a context. But a look at the Ogden-Richards triangle of 
reference125 shows us that this reading would be a misunderstanding; according to that 
diagram, there exists no direct relationship between a symbol and its referent. The two 
are only related through the mediation of “thought or reference”126, which must 
therefore be prior to the symbol-referent relation (“stands for”127). Understanding the 
idea properly requires making sense of Richards’ position that “metaphor is the 
omnipresent principle of language”128, which he explains thusly:
121 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 56. 
122 The official definition, from ibid p. 58: “A context is a set of entities (things or events) related in a 
certain way; these entities have each a character such that other sets of entities occur having the same 
character and related by the same relation; and these occur uniformly.”
123 ibid
124 Richards (1936) p. 35
125 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 11
126 ibid
127 ibid
128 Richards (1936) p. 92
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The view that metaphor is omnipresent in speech can be recommended 
theoretically. If you recall what I tried to say in my Second Lecture about 
the context theorem of meaning; about meaning as the delegated eficacy
of signs by which they bring together into new unities the abstracts, or 
aspects, which are the missing parts of their various contexts, you will 
recollect some insistence that a word is normally a substitute for (or 
means) not one discrete past impression but a combination of general 
aspects. Now that is itself a summary account of the principle of 
metaphor. In its simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have 
two thoughts of diferent things active together and supported by a single
word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.129
This passage gives us a beter idea of what Richards is geting at, especially if we stay 
true to the triangle of reference’s assertion that the relation between a symbol and a 
thought is causal in nature.130 If, for instance, a thought of a dog is a thought caused by
a dog, and a thought caused by a dog is a thought caused by certain recurring bundles 
of external and internal sources, and the word “dog” functions to complete those 
bundles, then the word “dog” can bring about the thought of a dog. The word “dog” 
refers to a dog insofar as it brings about the same thought as a dog, which it does by 
substituting for the missing parts of those contexts that constitute the experience of a 
dog. Observe that “dog” supplies what is necessary to complete the appropriate 
contexts-- not the dog itself. 
We can make sense of the comments about metaphor by positing that 
meanings are over-generated in this view. The completion of some contexts may 
involve the completion of others in turn. In cases of metaphor, a word or phrase 
simultaneously completes multiple contexts, including some which may be relatively 
129 Ibid p. 93
130 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 11. In fact, they go so far as to say that “to say ‘I am thinking of 
A’ is the same thing as to say ‘My thought is being caused by A’” (ibid, p. 55). 
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rare to see completed by the word; in such a circumstance, the word would have 
multiple meanings. Richards claims that this phenomenon is ubiquitous. 
The frequency of multiple meanings is increased by various dynamics. For one, 
there is nothing in the idea of a context to prevent words from participating in contexts
in the same way as anything else-- that is, not as a substitute, but as a regular part of a
bundle of recurring stimuli. Words might also complete contexts in this capacity, and 
thereby fulfill the criteria for possessing additional meanings. In fact, Ogden and 
Richards suggest that a word could even enter into its own contexts, such that 
substituting any other word would change the contexts and thus the meaning-- thus 
does their theory explain why some people become quite resistant to change in their 
verbiage131. In addition, words can contribute to contexts in indirect ways, an idea that 
Richards terms the “interanimation of words”132. For example, when multiple words 
sound alike, and have similar meanings-- an occurrence called a “morpheme”133-- the 
existence of the cluster can influence the efect of similar-sounding words.134 
Occasionally, words can influence the efect of similar-sounding words even when 
there is no morpheme135. Sound is not the only factor, either; Richards claims that 
words can also influence those that are related to them in meaning136. When these 
factors are combined, the result is a theory in which, as Richards says, “As the 
movement of my hand uses nearly the whole skeletal system of the muscles and is 
131 Ibid p. 216
132 Ibid pp. 47-66
133 Ibid p. 59
134 See Ibid pp. 59-62
135 See ibid p. 63
136 See ibid p. 64
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supported by them, so a phrase may take its power from an immense system of 
supporting uses of other words in other contexts.”137
Richards is not merely aiming to point out variation in the efects of words. 
Rather, he intends to make a point on the subject of meaning itself. One premise of his 
argument is that interanimation dynamics, and the other factors that influence the 
efect of words, are not constant-- the efect is not a fixed sum of the various factors-- 
but that, rather, any of the various factors can be brought out to varying degrees in 
individual instances. Indeed, the ability to control these variations, Richards claims, 
and to derive great efectiveness from the interanimation of words, is a hallmark of a 
skilled writer138. Another is that the magnitude of interanimation efects is at least the 
equal of any other mode of language-operation.139 The first claim functions to remove 
one possibility for identifying a single meaning with a word, and to bolster the 
interanimation account by demonstration of its explanatory power. The second claim 
functions to remove a possible reason for discounting interanimation efects from the 
theory of meaning.  
To these claims, we should add a pair of error theories intended to help explain 
away the “one and only one true meaning superstition.” First of is “the magical theory 
of names”140-- the idea that a study of customs from around the world reveals the 
frequent atribution of magical powers to language,  accompanied superstitions about 
137 Ibid p. 65. For more on Richards’ theory of interanimation, see also his Interpretation in Teaching 
(1938), chapter 14. 
138 Ibid p. 75
139 Ibid p. 69
140 Ibid p. 71; the idea is the subject of Chapter II, “The Power of Words”, of Ogden and Richards (1923 
[1948]).
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the power of names to confer a supernatural dominance over the object, person, or 
even deity named. Ogden and Richards think that the impressive utility of language 
invariably gives rise to superstitions about words141; those who engage in the study of 
language-- whether they be philosophers, rhetoricians, linguists, psychologists, 
logicians, or what have you-- are not immune to the temptation. They diagnose the 
desire to create, in theorizing, a direct connection between words and things (that is, to
fill in the leg of the Triangle of Reference that is, in their own diagram, conspicuous by 
its absence) as a result of a lingering atraction to word magic142. 
The other error theory employed by Richards in Philosophy of Rhetoric concerns
the “Rule of Club Spirit”143: the idea that we are ofen driven to separate meanings into 
correct and incorrect, proper and improper-- we might as well add strict and loose, literal
and nonliteral-- by nothing more than factors wherein the making of such distinctions 
is tied to participation in, and motivated by the desire for inclusion in, social groups. In 
short, the Rule of Club Spirit is that the social benefits of staying strictly on the right 
side of a distinction belonging to a certain class are ofen suficient to serve as the sole 
reason in favor of making the distinction for individuals. For groups, demanding such 
adherence is likewise pragmatically motivated, at least at the origin (though societal 
changes may have since shifed the weight of practicality away from the practice); if 
the distinctions are taught as part of education, for instance, they create a very easy 
141 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 24
142 Ibid p. 47; see also Richards (1936) p. 71. 
143 Richards (1936) p. 79
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way of distinguishing between the educated and uneducated144. In all of this, the 
distinctions themselves are simply arbitrary; there need neither be any independent 
fact of the mater, nor any present practical benefit, for a distinction of this kind to 
persist. Richards illustrates his point with examples based on pronunciation, but insists
that the same point applies in the case of meaning145.
The points about word magic and Club Spirit are not proofs. That is, Richards 
does not prove that either or both of these are the source of the Proper Meaning 
Superstition. But although Richards is ofen forceful in his assertions about these 
phenomena, a careful look at the end of Chapter II of The Meaning of Meaning will 
show the order of explanation in a diferent light:
The contextual theory of Signs to which, then, we first proceed, will be 
found to throw light on the primitive idea that Words and Things are 
related by some magic bond; for it is actually through their occurrence 
together with things, their linkage with them in a ‘context’ that Symbols 
come to play that important part in our life which has rendered them not 
only a legitimate object of wonder but the source of all our power over 
the external world.146
This passage suggests a more modest role for the error theory. Instead of the error 
theory wiping out the Proper Meaning Superstition, and the context theorem of 
meaning moving in to fill the vacuum, the idea rather is to start with the context 
theorem. Ultimately, the context theorem and the account of meaning-superstitions 
can be mutually reinforcing; the context theorem provides an alternative account of 
language, while the meaning-superstitions simultaneously help the theorem explain 
144 Ibid p. 79-80
145 Ibid p. 78
146 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 47
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contrary intuitions about the nature and role of meaning and grow in their own 
plausibility from the context theorem removing the explanatory benefits of a friendlier 
position towards Proper Meaning. In particular, the error theories can step in once the 
context theorem has made its claims about language in general; they can be deployed 
to calm any urges to seek something additional for the theory of meaning. 
The result of all this, according to Richards:
Preeminently what the theorem would discourage, is our habit of 
behaving as though, if a passage means one thing it cannot at the same 
time mean another and an incompatible thing. Freud taught us that a 
dream may mean a dozen diferent things; he has persuaded us that 
some symbols are, as he says, 'over-determined' and mean many diferent 
selections from among their causes. This theorem goes further, and 
regards all discourse -outside the technicalities of science -as over-
determined, as having multiplicity of meaning.147
The phrase “multiplicity of meaning” is interesting for what it tells us about the 
147 Richards (1936) pp. 38-39; italics added. The passage here is interesting in part because of what it tells 
us about how we are to apply Richards’ theory at levels other than that of individual words. At certain 
points in Philosophy of Rhetoric, Richards writes as if the Proper Meaning Superstition was a problem 
to do with the analysis of words in particular, and that a proper meaning could be found at a higher 
level-- that of the sentence, or of the entire utterance-- and then leveraged into an account of the 
(singular) meaning of each word in that particular instance. For passages that seem to suggest this sort 
of reading, see e.g. ibid p. 66, p. 50. I do not think, though, that this reading is the one that we should 
prefer, in light of his attention here to entire passages and bodies of discourse. For Richards also writes:
“Often the whole utterance in which the co-operating meanings of the component words hang on one 
another is not itself stable in meaning. It utters not one meaning but a movement among meanings.” 
(ibid p. 48). And then: “in the strictest prose the meanings of the separate words theoretically stay put 
and thought passes from one to another of them. At the other end of the scale the whole meaning of the 
sentence shifts, and with it any meanings we may try to ascribe to the individual words. In the extreme 
case it will go on moving as long as we bring fresh wits to study it.” (ibid p. 48). Richards argues that, 
as a result of the Proper Meaning Superstition and the psycho-social factors promoting it, we tend to 
see the strict case, which is in fact very rare and largely confined to the domain of the hard sciences, as 
far more common than it actually is (ibid p. 120), and to express a preference for using the strict case as
a model when doing so is, in fact, inappropriate (ibid p. 73). Accordingly, even if there is a strict end of
the spectrum on which sentence-level meaning is fixed, there is no counterexample to the multiplicity 
of meaning to be found there, for such cases are neither representative of language as a whole nor to be
given an exalted status in our data-set on account of its simplicity. 
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relationship between the various powers and uses that Richard ascribes to words and 
meaning. If we are to understand Richards-- at least to the extent needed to 
understand Stevenson, which is our goal-- we need to understand how to collect his 
remarks on the complexity and diversity of meaning into a theory on the meaning of 
meaning. Our first step in that regard will be to take stock. 
Richards’ target, particularly in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, is the following view:
that words have definite meanings, that these meanings are in turn the determinants 
of sentence-level meaning148, and that the title of “meaning” should be reserved for 
those powers that are fixed and definite in the case of words, or compositionally 
determined in the case of sentences. His strategy against this target, in very broad 
terms, consists of two parts. The first part of the strategy is to point out the great 
variety and flexibility of the powers of language. The context theorem of language and 
the idea of the interanimation of words are what drive this half of the approach. The 
second part is to atack the idea of taking one particular slice of the powers of a bit of 
language and giving the powers within that slice a special status. This half can itself be 
divided into halves: one set of arguments connected to the context theory of meaning, 
which oppose the idea of a neutral or empty context, and dispute the frequency of rigid
language, and another group of arguments which are meant to call into question the 
intuitions that there must or should be a special slice. Into the later category fall the 
148 “The traditional Usage Doctrine...treated language on the bad analogy of a mosaic, and conceived 
composition and interpretation as if they were a putting together or taking apart of pieces with a fixed 
shape and color, whereas, in fact, the interanimations of the meaning of words is at least as great as in 
any other mode of mental performance.” (Richards (1936) p. 69)
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arguments concerning “word magic” and “Club Spirit.” 
Without some further exploration, though, we could go wrong in how we put 
together these pieces into a theory. Afer all, if we take the whole mess of powers that 
a word could ever have, it would not have multiplicity of meaning; even summing up 
all of the powers possessed in a specific context would be inconsistent with Richards' 
claim of simultaneous incompatible meanings. It's not that each individual power is a 
meaning, either, for that would be inconsistent with the incompatibility part of the 
same claim. It seems, then, that we will have to go beyond the obvious options. 
Help is forthcoming by way of the theory of definitions. While Richards does 
provide us with some hints of this in The Philosophy of Rhetroric149, for further 
elaboration, we will also have to draw upon his 1933 “Multiple Definitions” and his 1932
Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition. First, we should see what we 
get from The Philosophy of Rhetoric, where he writes of the following sense of the word 
“usage”: “’Some specific power which, in a limited range of situations and with a 
limited type of verbal context the world normally exerts.’ (This is ofen called a use or 
sense and is what the Dictionary atempts to record in its definitions, by giving other 
words, phrases and sentences with the same specific power.)”150. Richards claims that 
most words, including those used in philosophy, admit of many such senses, and that 
atempts to diversify our vocabulary in order to have words with only one sense are 
likely to be futile151. A natural question would be how many, or, in other words, how 
149 See in particular his “Note” at the bottom of p. 65
150 ibid
151 Richards (1933) p. 31
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fine-grained a “sense” is. The Philosophy of Rhetoric comment suggests maximally so, 
but this is misleading. Beter is this remark from “Multiple Definitions”:
It is important to keep in view this fact that [in listing diferent senses of 
words] we are not here puting on paper something which is given to us, 
so much as making a machine-- a machine for controlling thought which
will let us do some things and keep us from doing other things. It is a 
good machine if it is of use to us; any changes which will make it of more
use to us will make it beter. They are not able to be tested in any way 
other than this.152
This passage suggests a) that a sense can capture more than one power of a word, and 
b) that the nature of the boundaries of the sense is practical; the inclusion of some 
powers into a sense and the exclusion of others is done in such a way as to be useful, 
rather than to conform to any preexisting fact. Additional support for this reading is 
found a bit further down: 
The atempt to make a machine like this is, in fact, a way (and the best 
way) to the discovery of how our minds do their work. But, as we will see,
our minds do their work in a number of diferent ways. They put the chief
divisions, upon which all the others are dependent, in a number of 
diferent places for diferent purposes. So a number of diferent machines,
diferent “philosophies,” diferent “logics,” are possible and necessary.153
What Richards ofen presents us with, when dealing with philosophical questions, is a 
long list, usually numbered, of diferent senses. “Multiple Definitions” atempts this 
project for central terms in philosophy154; The Meaning of Meaning gives us lists for 
“beauty”155 and “meaning”156; Mencius on the Mind gives us “beautiful”157; “knowledge”158; 
152 Ibid p. 39
153 ibid
154 See ibid for a list
155 Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) pp. 142-143
156 Ibid pp. 186-187
157 Richards (1932) pp. 100-104
158 Ibid pp. 105-109
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“truth”159; “order”160; and “principle”161162. The passages I have quoted above tell us what 
the lists in a multiple definition are; they are slices cut out of the sum of the powers of 
a word, cut not upon the lines of any natural division, but as we see fit to cut for our 
purposes, whatever they may be.
The interpretation above is consistent with the remark from Philosophy of 
Rhetoric that led to its generation. Multiplicity of meaning is achieved, since the causal 
powers of a word can be divided in many diferent ways; simultaneous incompatibility 
is achieved by locating opposed causal powers, which may cancel one another out in 
the current sign-field163, and presenting a meaning that captures only the one, and 
another meaning that captures only the other. 
159 Ibid pp. 111-115
160 Ibid pp. 118-119
161 Ibid p. 122
162 Mencius on the Mind retains the fourfold division of function or meaning from Practical Criticism 
(1929), wherein the “Total Meaning” (the capitalization is Richards') of a passage can be divided into 
“sense” (a state of affairs being pointed to, a proposition, or thoughts to be caused in the listener), 
“feeling” (emotions expressed), “tone” (variations of wording in response to the speaker's attitude 
towards the listener), and “intention” (why the speaker is speaking) (see Richards 1929[1930] pp. 180-
183). For convenience, Mencius combines feeling, tone, and intention together as “gesture” (Richards 
1932 p. 98); both “sense” and “gesture”, on the Mencius view, are important to the project of multiple 
definition, and so we often see (e.g. for beauty) lists divided into sections for “senses” and “gestures”. 
This division is not present in “Multiple Definitions”, most likely because it is itself working with a 
different, more inclusive sense of “sense” (not 8.1, “A general property of a thought by which what the 
thought is about is fixed”, but rather 8.3, “A use of sense which is nearer to the one we are making is 
that in which persons who are wise are said to have sense, that is, to have good sense. Good sense is, at
least in part, a power to keep our thoughts, the senses of our words, in the right places.” (Richards 1933
pp. 47-48)); on the operant sense of “sense”, it seems like “gesture” ought to be included.
Interestingly, in Coleridge on Imagination, “sense”, “feeling”, and “tone” recur (p. 88) as parts
of (no longer capitalized) total meaning. But by then they have acquired an interesting status, for 
Richards claims that “Meanings may be said to have any parts which, for our purposes, we find useful 
as instruments in comparing them” (pp. 87-88), and gives the aforementioned parts as examples. 
Accordingly, whether or not we divide a list of multiple definitions into “sense” (8.1) and “gesture” 
categories will depend on whether or not that axis of division is profitable.  
163 A.k.a. “settings”, per Richards (1938) p. ix; in other words, “contexts” in the non-technical sense. 
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4.2 Richards and “emotive meaning”
Now that we have an understanding of the place of meaning in Richards' theory,
we will turn our atention to the more specific question of his theory of emotive 
meaning. We have already seen a litle of this; of the senses (8.3)164 or meanings of a 
word, some may be characterized in terms of sense (8.1), and others in terms of 
gestures, which, as mentioned, include expressions of feeling165. We have also seen 
various arguments that Richards directs against the idea of choosing one particular 
meaning as the meaning of the word. To the later set, we should now add arguments to
the efect that meanings associated with emotive uses of language have just as much 
right to the name “meaning” as those that are symbolic.
First, gesture, though sometimes derivative of sense, is not always so. Richards 
gives the examples of “Hooray!”166 and “Damn!”167; these words are wholly emotive in 
character. Certain phrases, for instance “Very pleased to meet you!”168, Richards claims, 
can function the same way; while he does not elaborate, the idea seems to be that, 
although the later may look like a report of an emotion rather than an expression of 
one, a bit of introspection will reveal the contrary. If we are to be able to provide 
meanings for such words and phrases, we must be prepared to draw from their 
gestures, since sense is unavailable. 
164 For readers who missed the use of such numbering in a previous footnote, it's derived from Richards' 
(1933) list of senses for philosophical terms, including for “sense” itself; the number indicates which 
sense is being used. Please consult aforementioned footnote for elaboration. 
165 The Meaning of Meaning uses “symbolic” and “emotive” (p. 149) for the sides of this distinction.
166 Ibid 
167 Richards (1932) p.99
168 ibid
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Second, Richards argues169 that understanding sense is not necessarily prior to 
feeling. When reading poetry, for instance, we ofen start to receive feeling from the 
poet before resolving any concrete ideas; the poem may well begin to work on us with 
its first words, before it has given us enough to constitute any proposition. I suppose 
that in extreme cases, such as nonsense poetry, we might never be able to put together 
any sense worth the name. Of course, feeling can be subsequent to or at least 
influenced by sense, but it need not be. 
Third, Richards argues170 that in some cases, although one could assign a sense 
to a passage, doing so results in nonsense. In such cases, claiming the passage to have 
the sense as its meaning would presumably fail to satisfy the purpose of meaning, and 
so our best course of action is to disregard the sense and consider the passage at a 
wholly emotive level. Statements such as “Poetry is a spirit”171 or “Man is a worm”172 fall 
into this category: we could describe them as having such meanings as ascribing the 
property of being a spirit to poetry, or of ascribing the property of being a worm to 
Man, but doing so would (quite plausibly) be nothing more than misunderstanding. 
Now in such cases, the gestures may be derived, either wholly or in part, from the sense
that the passage might otherwise have had; but this need no more imply that the 
passage has the sense in the present use than the fact that “bank” can mean the side of 
a river means that the “bank” in “I went to the bank to withdraw some quarters” carries 
169 See Coleridge on Imagination p. 89
170 This point is presented as distinct from the first in Mencius on the Mind (p. 99), though combined with 
it in The Meaning of Meaning (p. 149). I see no reason to think the difference is particularly 
substantial; I present them separately in my own treatment merely for expository reasons.  




This third argument returns us to the subject of Richards' account of metaphor, 
which is closely linked with his account of emotive meaning. Metaphors, in Richards' 
theory, ofen (though not always) operate by means of the likeness between two 
things173, which he terms “tenor” and “vehicle”174. Richards claims that we should not 
identify the meaning of a metaphor with (a statement about) its tenor; that is, that a 
metaphor is, or at any rate can be, more than a fancy way of making a statement that 
we could just as easily have made straightforwardly175. His argument for this claim is 
that we observe other sorts of cases. For example, we encounter cases where the focus 
of a metaphor is not really on the tenor save, perhaps, to preserve topicality, or 
otherwise justify a statement about something that, were it not used as a metaphor, 
would be irrelevant176. We also, Richards argues, encounter cases where we simply 
cannot seem to come up with any satisfactory non-metaphorical translation of the 
metaphor.177 In such cases, there may be gestures made by the metaphor; being 
173 Richards (1936) p. 118.
174 Ibid. Now “precise” definitions-- though of course Richards would argue that the sort of definition that 
the phrase calls to mind would really be anything of the sort-- for the terms “tenor” and “vehicle” are 
elusive. Richards argues (in Interpretation and Teaching, pp. 120-121) that common candidates, like 
“subject” and “expression”, or “meaning” and “metaphor”, will all add confusion rather than clarity, 
and (in Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 96) that we in fact have no adequate terminology for distinguishing 
the two. If the absence of synonyms, simultaneous with the absence of explicable rules of use, for these
terms is the bad news, then the good news is that the terms seem workable enough without anything of 
the sort.
175 See Richards (1936), p. 100: “the vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment of a tenor which is 
otherwise unchanged by it but that vehicle and tenor in co-operation give a meaning of more varied 
powers than can be ascribed to either. ”
176 Richards (1936) p. 100
177 Richards (1932) p. 114: “Sometimes the metaphorical expression is a convenience only; it is not 
difficult to substitute another non-metaphorical expression in its place. But sometimes the metaphor is 
irreducible-- no literal expression seems to be a satisfactory substitute.”
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(perhaps) expressive rather than declarative in nature, these could account for the 
dificulty of finding a satisfactory translation.178 
Because of the above dificulties, Richards thinks that the idea of understanding
metaphors by de-metaphorizing them-- of puting them into non-metaphorical 
language-- is itself a mistake. Richards argues that we may feel that, in de-
metaphorizing a metaphor, we are gaining clarity, but that feeling is a mistake, one 
driven by an emotional bias in favor of methods that look and feel scientific (even if 
they are not, in fact, using the scientific method)-- this is “scientism”179. In fact, all that 
we are doing in such a process is mangling our subject mater and confusing ourselves. 
And at the same time, our feelings against an alternative approach, wherein we would 
allow metaphorical language to remain metaphorical, are influenced negatively by a 
parallel bias against metaphor. When we look at metaphor without bias, we see that it 
is neither particularly dificult to understand180 nor any more prone to disruptive 
variation than non-metaphorical language181. We also see that there is plenty of scope 
for useful work on metaphor that does not rely on de-metaphorizing it182. What all of 
this amounts to, for Richards, is an argument on the level of meta-theory; the 
conclusion of the argument is that the success or failure of a theory of metaphor does 
not hinge on the theory's ability to translate metaphors out of metaphor. If anything, 
we ought to be suspicious of theories that atempt to do so. 
178 ibid
179 Richards (1948), p. 151
180 Ibid p. 150
181 Ibid p. 151
182 Ibid p. 150
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Richards, in replying to Black's (1948) criticisms of emotive meaning, claims 
that, while there are non-emotive uses of metaphor, and non-metaphorical expressions 
of emotion, the two ofen co-occur, to such an extent that the study of emotive 
meaning is inextricable from the study of metaphor.183  Richards asks us to consider, 
given such, what form it would be reasonable to expect a theory of emotive meaning to 
take. If emotive meaning is ofen associated with metaphor, then any theory of emotive
meaning will ofen be dealing with metaphorical cases, and when doing so, it will have 
to follow the guidelines for a theory of metaphor that we have just finished discussing. 
At the very least, our expectations for a theory of emotive language will have to be 
informed by what we ought (and ought not) to expect from a theory of metaphorical 
language. 
4.3 Stevenson
Stevenson, who is heavily influenced by Richards, presents a theory the 
structure of which answers to the concerns we have been discussing. He gives us an 
account of ethics that is comprised of two diferent “paterns of analysis,” each of which
is “a 'patern' for making definitions”184; these definitions, in turn, are not final or all-
encompassing, and difer from one another. If we understand Stevenson as inheriting a 
substantial amount of meta-philosophy from Richards, we can make sense of this style 
of analysis in a way that does not atribute to it any self-contradiction or back-tracking;
183 Ibid p. 152
184 Stevenson (1944) p. 89
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we can avoid having to think of Stevenson's theory as roundabout, indirect, or 
unsuccessful at achieving greater specificity. Rather, the theory is exactly what it is 
trying to be: an atempt at multiple definition for a term that Stevenson finds to be shot
through with emotive meaning. 
Before we go further, though, I would like to highlight a few of the diferences 
between Stevenson's theory and Richards'. Where the Ogden-Richards theory is causal; 
Stevenson's is dispositional; rather than the actual causal powers of a term in the 
current seting, the fundamental component is the depositional powers of the term185, 
which it possesses across all setings. More precisely:
The meaning of a sign...is...a dispositional property of the sign where the 
response, varying with varying atendant circumstances, consists of 
psychological processes in a hearer, and where the stimulus is his hearing
the sign.186
This formulation maintains both the psychologism of the Ogden-Richards 
theory and its grounding in the efects of a sign. But it does ofer a few 
advantages:
First, Stevenson's theory allows for meaning to remain constant. In fact, 
he saw constancy as necessary for a theory of meaning187. Using dispositions, 
which remain whether they are realized or realizeable in the current seting, 
allows him to achieve this desideratum. 
185 I'm being slightly more specific than necessary when assigning the disposition to the term. In fact, 
Stevenson thinks that it is completely arbitrary whether we choose to assign the dispositions to the 
terms themselves or to people; he declares a choice in favor of attributing the disposition to the term, 
on the basis that we find it more natural to talk about the meanings of the terms, but also that, strictly 
speaking, the other choice would have been equally correct. See ibid pp. 55-56.
186 Ibid p. 54
187 Ibid p. 43
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Second, Stevenson's theory allows him to cite meaning all the way down 
to the level of individual words. Richards was actively opposed to the idea of 
meaning at the word level; he saw our tendency to seek meaning at that level as 
an unfortunate side efect of modern English writers to separate words with 
spaces188, and of the lingering efects of Word Magic. Stevenson has no such 
hostility, and is perfectly willing to talk about the meaning of a word189.
Third, Stevenson's theory achieves an elegant homogeneity, in that 
dispositions on diferent scales are themselves dispositions; a cluster of 
dispositions taken together themselves constitute a disposition, and a subset of 
the input-output relationships that constitute a disposition will itself constitute 
a disposition. And so Stevenson can talk readily at the lower level of the 
dispositions that make up the meanings of a sign, and still say that the meaning 
of a sign is itself a disposition, whereas Richards' theory can only be described in
terms of sets, subsets, “slices”, and other operations upon either individual causal
relationships or the whole mass of causal relationships, which is a bit more 
awkward. 
Of course, we should not make this distinction between Stevenson and 
Richards into more than it is. Afer all, reassigning the label of “meaning” from 
causal powers to the dispositions that undergird them is a terminological 
maneuver; it adds the presence of dispositions to the theory's list of 
188 See e.g. Richards (1936) p. 47
189 See e.g. Stevenson (1944) p. 67
105
commitments, but the overall substantive change involved in this particular 
modification is limited. We should notice, in particular, that Richards' idea of 
“meaning” as to a degree arbitrary, where we are free to pick and choose from 
among the causes of a sign in response to practical concerns, is compatible with 
the dispositional account, though Stevenson chooses to be slightly less flexible in
his own account of meaning. Stevenson distinguishes what is meant from what 
is merely suggested or implied by way of conventional rules-- meaning picking 
out those dispositions, or the parts of the disposition, that are bound and 
propagated by established rules190, but that, for actual language, the rules are 
ofen absent, provisional, temporary, leaving us with a great deal of choice in 
how to pick out the meaning191. Indeed, it is ofen an analyst's own creation of 
rules that distinguishes meaning from suggestion for him.192 Compare the 
following remark from Stevenson to Richards' comment from “Multiple 
Definition”, quoted above, on the idea of making a machine: “We must be 
sensitive, then, to the fact that ethical terms are not predestined to abide by any 
one set of rules, and that analysis cannot “discover” the “real” sense.”193 Despite 
the diferences that I have highlighted, it seems that Stevenson's theory takes 
not only its overall structure and methodology from Richards, but also a 
significant amount of substance. 
190 Ibid p. 86
191 ibid
192 Ibid pp. 86-87
193 Ibid p. 87
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Stevenson's theory also deploys the notion of a disposition in its account 
of atitudes. For Richards, an atitude is “some special direction, bias, or 
accentuation of interest towards [a thing], some personal flavour or coloring of 
feeling”194; for Stevenson, it is “purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences, desires, 
and so on”195, all, ultimately, captured under the heading of disposition.196 
Atitudes, for Stevenson, are made up of, and thus are, dispositions. 
Stevenson provides us with two “paterns of analysis”-- general ideas that are 
each intended to suggest a number of meanings for moral terms, though not forming 
any sort of exhaustive formula for capturing such meanings. The first patern of 
analysis is derived by combining a subjectivist element with a coordinative element. 
This patern is based on, but not identical to, the phrase “I approve of this; do so as 
well”197: the idea of the first patern is to replace the imperative in the phrase with an 
emotive element that maintains a sense of universality (that is, that it is the sort of 
thing about which conflicts should be resolved).198 Alternative paraphrasings are “Oh 
194 Richards (1929[1930) p. 181
195 Stevenson (1944) p. 8
196 e.g. p. 224 of Stevenson (1963): “[A]n attitude is of a dispositional nature, involving a variety of 
responses that may progressively attend a variety of stimuli. Among the responses, in particular, there 
are various differences in feeling between admiration, desire, respect, etc.; and as I need scarcely add, 
these differences have their behavioral correlates.”
197 Stevenson (1944) p. 81
198 Stevenson decides (almost immediately after introducing it) that the imperative component is 
inadequate because what he really wants to capture is not a command, but an emotive effect. He tells us
that the descriptive components “do not evidence the contagion of warmly expressed approval-- the 
interaction of attitudes that makes each man’s favorable evaluation strengthen and invigorate the 
other’s.” (p. 22). His subsequent remark that “This latter effect is highly characteristic of an articulate 
ethical agreement” (ibid) seems to suggest that the prior statement describes an observed datum of 
moral practice for theory to capture.
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that you might approve of this as I do!”199 and “I approve of this, how fine it is!”200; 
these, he claims, may feel a bit closer to correct, but are still incapable of being 
anything other than approximations.201 Stevenson claims that this particular emotive 
meaning is not exactly captured by terms outside the moral realm, and so cannot be 
defined by means of a synonym; he writes, “The term ‘good’ is indefinable...if a 
definition is expected to preserve its customary emotive meaning. It has no exact 
emotive equivalent.”202
The second patern of analysis is laid out by Stevenson as follows:
This is good” has the meaning of “This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z...,”
except that “good has as well as laudatory emotive meaning which 
permits it to express the speaker’s approval, and tends to evoke the 
approval of the hearer.203
A second-patern definition, then, combines an atribution of properties with a 
coordinating positive emotive meaning. Stevenson tells us that there must be 
boundaries as to what properties can be involved, though he declines to specify where 
they lie. He also alerts us to the fact that examples of the second patern are likely to 
be “persuasive definitions”-- definitions with some emotive force of their own that 
comes to bear when they are invoked. 
We might profitably linger for a moment204 on the idea of a persuasive 
199 Ibid p. 81
200 ibid
201 ibid
202 Ibid p. 82
203 Ibid p. 207
204 Since it is only for a moment, we will not delve deeply into the technical workings of persuasive 
definitions. For readers who are interested in such things, a few contemporary papers on the issue that 
one might consult are Macagno and Walton(2008); Burgess-Jackson (1995); Walton (2001). 
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definition, if for no other reason that that the idea serves as an illuminating illustration
of how Stevenson's theory works. To define the phrase more precisely:
A “persuasive definition” is one which gives a new conceptual meaning to 
a familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning, and 
which is used with the conscious or unconscious purpose of changing, by 
this means, the direction of people's interests.205
Recall what we mentioned earlier: that for Stevenson, definition is not (or at 
least not always) a mater of discovering rules that already exist, but as ofen as not is 
part of the creation of such rules. We might do so-- might take the senses of a term and
divide them up through the establishment of rules-- for the sake of improving 
communication and our own clarity of thought; such is the motivation given by 
Richards for his project in “Multiple Definition.”206 But if the process of establishing 
such rules is executed on an interpersonal level-- if we have the power to establish, or 
work towards establishing, rules for more than just ourselves-- then other purposes 
become possible.
According to Stevenson's model of a persuasive definition, there ofen occur 
situations where a term, over time, comes to possess an increasing amount of emotive 
meaning, and at the same time sufers a diminution of its descriptive meaning.207 Once 
enough of the descriptive meaning has fallen away, and the descriptive content of the 
term become suficiently vague, it becomes possible for individuals to change or add to 
the descriptive content without seeming to create a homophone (thanks to the 
205 Stevenson (1938), p. 32.
206 Richards (1933) p. 31
207 Stevenson (1938 [1967]) pp. 33-34
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vagueness), enabling the new term to inherit the emotive meaning of the old.208 
I would like to make a couple of points about persuasive definitions. The first is 
that when Stevenson claims that second-patern definitions are persuasive definitions, 
he is not thereby presenting an argument against them; they are not defective on 
account of being persuasive. This mistake would be easy to make, especially in light of 
the negative emotive meaning that “persuasive” ofen possesses in philosophical 
contexts. But if we employ Richards, we can construct the idea of a persuasive 
definition in a way that does not accuse such definitions of an improper ambiguity. 
Stevenson's picture portrays persuasive definition as involving an existing term being 
given a new definition, while at the same time maintaining its own identity in order to 
keep an emotive meaning. Yet we can portray the same substance in a more emotively 
neutral way if we think of it in terms of interanimation: if we create a new term by 
giving a new descriptive meaning to an old word, and decline to employ the cuting-of 
techniques of making explicit our stipulation, then our new term may well wind up 
strongly interanimated by the old. Of course, such a maneuver-- efectively a joining of 
contexts through the reuse of a sign-- may be confusing, if we are not on the lookout 
for it. But such potential for confusion is, on Richards' view, par for the course. 
The second point that I should like to make about persuasive definitions is that, 
on Stevenson's view, our philosophy (including domains that we might think of as 
“meta-philosophy”) is shot through with persuasive definitions, and thereby with 
emotive questions that we must be careful not to confuse with factual questions. For 
208 Ibid
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instance, “meaning,” Stevenson argues209, possesses a positive emotive meaning; we 
praise forms of discourse by calling them meaningful, and condemn them in calling 
them nonsense. When creating a theory of meaning, we propose a persuasive definition
(not, in itself, a bad thing, per my first point, above); and so will have to consider 
whether the resulting emotive meaning is desirable. The interesting thing about this 
point is that it illuminates the operation of Richards' myths within philosophy. The 
lingering appeal of Word Magic, for instance, can influence outcomes in the theory of 
meaning by causing us to accept certain persuasive definitions and reject others, where
if we had been properly cured of these last vestiges of superstition, we would have 
done otherwise.
4.4 Relationship between Stevenson’s ideas and the Frege-Geach problem
Neither of the paterns of analysis contains any explicit statement for how to 
deal with embedded contexts, but we can at least come up with some suggestions for 
how the theory might deal with them. Stevenson does give us a notion of 
compositionality (albeit a loose one), wherein the meaning of complex sentences is 
yielded by holistically combining the dispositions (according to Stevenson, descriptive 
meaning, like emotive meaning, is roughly or approximately characterizeable as a 
mater of dispositions, in this case “the disposition of a sign to afect cognition”210 that 
constitute the meanings of the parts. He also tells us that words in sentences do 
209 Ibid p. 42
210 Stevenson (1944) p. 67
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maintain their own meanings:
Each word has an independent meaning in the sense that if it is replaced 
by certain others in any context, there will be a typical sort of diference 
in the meaning of the context; but the precise way in which the word’s 
meaning is realized will depend on the other words that accompany it.211
From these ideas, we can begin to reconstruct how embedded contexts ought to work 
on Stevenson’s theory. It would be all too easy to be lured by the forms of the paterns 
of analysis into thinking of the meanings of moral terms as straightforward 
conjunctions of a descriptive content with an emotive expression and/or an imperative. 
It would also be all too easy, given the amount of atention and even praise that both 
Stevenson and Richards devote to linguistic ambiguity, to start characterizing 
meanings disjunctively. Neither of these options, though, captures what Stevenson is 
trying to construct. Rather, the idea of a disposition-- which is also used to categorize 
atitudes themselves-- tells us how to put together the various aspects of a meaning. 
Stevenson wishes us to consider meanings as dispositions to have a psychological 
efect, either on “cognition” or on atitudes (note that, given that atitudes themselves 
are defined in terms of dispositions, and cognition may be so as well, meanings will be 
“second-order dispositions”212). A disposition can possessed even when it is not realized;
if a glass can have a disposition to break when dropped even when it is not dropped, so
too can a term be disposed to have a certain psychological efect even if it occurs in a 




describe unasserted contexts: the dispositions of a term to cause the efects that we 
associate with its assertion are not active in unasserted contexts, but they are still 
present. At the same time, whatever dispositions might be active in unasserted 
contexts (perhaps further cognitive dispositions, including ones that afect how we 
treat the entirety of the sentence in which the unasserted term occurs) will still belong 
to the word in asserted contexts. Thus, we can say that there is no change in meaning 
between asserted and unasserted contexts. 
What we ought to be asking, at this juncture, is how much we really ought to 
be expecting here. I argued above that the change from Richards to Stevenson that 
enables Stevenson to talk about meaning at the level of individual words, though not 
entirely without substantive import, is in large part terminological; in other words, 
there has been relatively litle change from a theory that saw the idea of 
compositionality, or at least the kind of compositionality that we might capture by an 
image of building-blocks, as a myth to be overturned. A rule by which we might take 
“the meaning” of each part of a complex sentence, and composite them into “the 
meaning” of the whole, might well be too much; at the very least, any such rule, it 
seems213, will need either a number of provisions, possibly infinite, that modify it in 
individual cases, or else can remain constant, but at the expense of requiring many 
individual words to contain, within their dispositions, a number of aspects, possibly 
infinite, that activate when the word enters into combination with particular other 
words, and change the resulting meaning. In either case, the required amount of 
213 Following Stevenson, ibid
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flexibility will make it dificult, if not impossible, to distinguish there being a rule from 
there not being one. 
Let us turn our atention, then, to Stevenson's account of arguments, on which 
mater he gives us a few suggestions to work out. Let us begin our reconstruction with 
the idea that we might use the descriptive meaning when arguing:
In general, ethical statements, like all others that have at least some 
descriptive meaning, are amenable to the usual applications of formal 
logic. Care must be taken, of course, that verbally seeming contradictions 
are not merely apparent, due to a change in sense of the particularly 
ambiguous ethical terms; and further care must be taken to avoid 
emotive repercussions of otherwise innocent tautologies. Otherwise, this 
aspect of ethical methodology brings with it no special problems.214
Despite the fact that Stevenson has an account on which the emotive meaning of a 
term can remain unchanged even in embedded contexts, he nonetheless chooses to 
claim that formal logic applies at the descriptive level. The emotive level is ruled out 
because, while he thinks minimal truth is applicable in emotive contexts, he also claims
that minimalism “is not a sense that we shall want to be related to the terms ‘valid’ and 
‘invalid’”215, because validity grounded on minimal truth would simply be too “diferent 
from the more impersonal study in which students of validity in science and logic-- so 
at least they usually insist-- are engaged.”216 So while we might deploy minimalism to 
explain our propensity for applying the labels of “true” and “false” in emotive contexts, 
it will not feature in the account of arguments. 
214 Ibid p. 116
215 Ibid p. 169
216 Ibid p. 171.
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It is worth pausing for a moment to identify the diferences between this aspect 
of Stevenson’s account and Ayer’s, and also to investigate what is meant by 
Stevenson’s warnings above. On the first count, the obvious diference is that 
Stevenson situates his argument on the semantic level, and Ayer the pragmatic-- and 
indeed, we might see some resonance between Stevenson’s distinction between the 
said and the merely suggested on the basis of rules, and the fact that Ayer’s theory 
quickly degenerates into a mass of unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, questions 
if rule-bound procedures for determining what is expressed are insisted upon at all 
stages. 
Likewise, Stevenson is aiming for standard validity (albeit only applied within a 
certain sense of the terms being used), whereas Ayer is not. The two are similar, 
though, in their basic dependence on factual argument alone to explain the use of logic 
in ethics, and therein lies a dificulty: in Ayer’s theory, arguments were translated as 
needed from the moral surface form to the factual argument underlying it, whereas in 
Stevenson’s theory, descriptive meaning is held fast by individual terms. 
Stevenson’s warnings about “emotive reprecussions” seem to hint at, at the 
least, a feeling of unease in the general vicinity of the problem, but awareness is of litle
help. Taking his suggestion of “caution” as a call to simply rule out certain kinds of 
arguments will not solve the problem, because we seem to have no way of capturing all
and only the right arguments to rule out, nor any explanation of what such a ruling out
would entail. Stevenson suggests, by this warning, that we ought somehow to take 
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emotive meaning into account in argument, but we are not provided with a way of 
doing so.
To be fair to Stevenson, his atention with regards to moral arguments is 
focused elsewhere: on arguments where atitudes themselves are contested, through 
persuasive methods (especial atention is given to the providing of reasons). These other
methods are taken to comprise the core of ethical discourse, and we can still engage in 
logical argument on related maters (about, say, the applicability of a reason), so 
perhaps Stevenson does not lose much in failing to fully answer the argument problem.
To further shore up any potential weakness, Stevenson calls our atention to 
certain pragmatic aspects of discussion about “validity” with regards to methods of 
argument. He has the insight that, when compared to that which is “valid,” other 
methods of argument pale; they become “merely”-methods (“merely persuasive,” 
“merely rhetorical,” and so on)-- and so seem inappropriate for ethics. Stevenson puts it
as follows:
A dismissal of validity, even in this partial way, risks opening the way to 
certain misunderstandings in the course of guarding against others. The 
validity of a method stands out as the most conspicuous ground for 
choosing it; hence when certain methods, or aspects of them, are denied 
any connection with validity, one may feel that no ground for choice 
between them remains. Or if such a ground is recognized, it may seem to 
involve only a crude, forensic success. So long as one’s opponent is 
impressed (a hasty critic may suppose), one method is as good as 
another; for the whole purport of ethics is to sway atitudes. Where Plato 
and Kant sought eternal principles of reason, are there merely the empty 
rules of rhetoric? Afer this one is likely to envisage disillusionment and 
chaos, and the many other disturbing “implications” which objective 
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theorists so habitually atribute to their opponents. 217 
We can take from this argument the moral that, when it comes to evaluating how 
implausible it is to deny the validity of moral arguments, and how plausible it is to cite 
other forms of dispute in the place of valid logical arguments, our gut may lead us 
astray. We must be wary of reacting so strongly to the loss of validity that we fail to 
explore the potential of non-rational methods as explanations for arguments in select 
realms of discourse (such as ethics). Such caution will not make ethical arguments any 
less invalid, but it might go a ways towards leting us discover that that’s not as bad as 
we might think. We must also be on guard for a related mistake: that, upon hearing 
that a certain theory does not return the result that moral arguments are valid, we gain
the image of moral discourse (on that theory) being rendered impotent or superficial, 
and in reaction to that image reject the theory. But the image is born of the pragmatics
of validity; calling ethical arguments “invalid” feels like calling them bad arguments, 
and so we picture a theory with an invalidity claim as discounting all of moral 
discourse.  “Invalid”, where validity is expected, carries a strong negative emotive 
meaning (or at least suggestion), and we dispute its applicability to ethical terms much 
as we wind up disputing because of the emotive components of ethical terms. 
This insight is not restricted to Stevenson’s theory in terms of its application. It 
could, perhaps with a few changes in how it is described, be applied by any theory that 
moves the majority of moral arguments beyond the sphere of logic-- or to any theory 
that relies on a non-literal account of moral arguments, such as Ayer’s. It is not, in 
217 Ibid p. 156
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itself, suficient to solve any of our problems, but it does, at least, make the relevant 
positions more plausible, by providing an error theory for a certain kind of supposed 
implausibility. 
4.5 What to learn from Richards and Stevenson
Richards and Stevenson do not have an answer to the Frege-Geach problem. 
Stevenson, as we saw, did ofer some suggestions about compositionality, but nothing 
like a full-fledged theory. Perhaps this is to be expected. I wonder if they would not 
simply argue that Geach's worry is based on an incorrect view of language. Such an 
argument would claim, first of all, that the entire idea of words having a single, 
independent meaning, which they then contribute in some way to a sentence when 
they occur in embedded contexts, is simply mistaken, a holdover of Word Magic that is 
shown to be such by the atomic homogeneity of the Causal (or, for Stevenson, 
Dispositional) Theory of Reference. Nor is it the case that Geach's “Frege Point” is 
required in order to explain the validity of arguments; the study of logic through 
“symbolic procedure”, for Richards in particular, is only an indirect approach, and not 
the exclusive approach, to what is fundamentally a mater of structures of contexts218, 
218 On this point, see Ogden and Richards (1923 [1948]) p. 68. I should point out that I am not being 
wholly faithful to Richards here; for Richards writes, in Richards(1934 [1962]): “But the peculiar 
reference of thoughts to the things-they-are-of gives them modes of interaction with one another which 
are lacking in the case of feelings. And this interplay is studied as their logical compatibility or 
incompatibility, and other relations.” (p. 89), and so might not be congenial to dissolving the puzzle in 
this way. Presumably Stevenson would have to posit a greater complexity of interaction between 
attitudes than Richards was comfortable with; given that one of Stevenson's criticism of Richards is 
that the latter pays insufficient attention to relations between attitudes, particularly agreement and 
disagreement (see Stevenson (1944) pp. 10-11), this would not be much of a burden. 
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and so if we must sometimes discard it, we ought not find ourselves overly troubled. 
In this argument, explanatory power is drawn holistically from Richards' 
arguments; it succeeds if Richards' theory, as a unit, is right, and fails otherwise. In the 
context of that debate, the Geach concern represents a slight liability for Richards' side:
the other side, one might argue, has a clearer and simpler view of arguments, even 
without taking onboard any desire to accommodate emotive meaning. Since the overall
theory of meaning endorsed by Richards and, in somewhat modified form, by 
Stevenson is no longer fashionable, we might regard this reply as similarly 
unsatisfactory. But, though it does not satisfy us philosophically, its availability might 
nonetheless help us understand Stevenson’s choice of focus. 
Although Richards and Stevenson do not have a solution to our central problem,
they can help us in other ways. First of all, even if we do not follow Stevenson in 
defining atitudes in terms of dispositions, we can nonetheless add relations between 
the dispositions associated with atitudes to our understanding of the complexity with 
which atitudes might relate to one another. Secondly, we can make use of the 
observations of Richards and Stevenson even if we do not endorse the theories that 
they derive from those observations. Both of the next two chapters will draw upon such
observations. 
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Chapter 5. Propositional Reflection
The mimicking expressivist seeks the freedom (in how he understands the 
conditional and other sentences with moral terms in embedded contexts) that can be 
obtained when he denies219 that moral arguments have the forms that they seem to 
have. Any theory with such a denial, though, owes us an explanation of what is going 
on when such arguments are used.
Blackburn (1984), (1993), (1998) correctly argues that the right form of 
explanation is based on the idea of an isomorphism between the logical relations of the
surface forms and some other relation between the atitudes expressed. Valid moral 
arguments, on such a view, compel one who accepts the premises to accept the 
conclusion, not on pain of irrationality, but on some other pain instead220. On a good 
theory of the type that we are considering, this alternative pain will be one that, first of
all, is important, and second, matches what we are led to expect by the surface forms. 
Such a theory will have a far easier time arguing that it makes sense (from a practical 
perspective) for some of our expressions of atitudes to take propositional form, since, 
on such a theory, our reasoning does not go astray in the moral realm. We as 
philosophers might be tempted to go astray as to the nature of the enterprise with 
which our reasoning is engaged when we reason in the moral realm. But ordinary 
219 Here we are once again operating under the proviso specified for chapter 2, that is, with quasi-realism 
excluded. As a result, positions will be attributed to Blackburn that will, no doubt, seem highly un-
Blackburnian in character, and which are unlikely to be regarded as acceptable by Blackburn himself. 
220 I expect that Blackburn would find what I am claiming here to be highly objectionable-- on which 
count please see footnote #1. 
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reasoning can proceed without concern. 
My goal is to show how these desiderata can be met. Although Blackburn (1998)
gives us an account that comes close, and a variation upon Blackburn's general theme 
comes closer, the best option takes a diferent approach. The overall theme of the best 
approach is that, while it would make for a very neat theory if there were only one 
relationship between the atitudes that we express in propositional form driving the 
adoption of that form, it is ultimately neither productive nor reasonable to expect any 
such thing. Rather, the matching of the logic of the surface forms is achieved piecemeal
by an assortment of diferent relationships between the atitudes, each of which need 
be nothing more than locally isomorphic to the logic of the surface forms within the 
specific instances where our needs motivate us to track that relationship. 
5.1 Propositional Reflections: The General Idea
If an expressivist chooses to use the mimicking strategy, he will claim that the 
assumption of propositional form by expressions of atitudes occurs for practical 
reasons, and not (barring quasi-realist accomodations) because expressions of atitudes
somehow fit into that form. The later alternative requires a direct solution to Geach's 
(1958), (1960), (1965) famous worry about the non-embeddability of atitude 
expressions, and so we can hardly blame the expressivist for looking for an alternative. 
Blackburn (1984) suggests the idea of taking advantage of propositional form to help 
make the coordination of atitudes orderly and serious. This tactic is all well and good; 
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afer all, puting something in propositional form-- declaring “This. Is. X!”-- feels like 
puting your foot down on the mater in a way that other forms of expression do not. 
We might suppose that, having been conditioned by the logic of ordinary descriptive 
language to have a great aversion to the compresence of X and not-X, we can exploit 
that aversion for rhetorical efect even when we are doing something other than trying
to get our facts straight. 
But practical concerns weigh against one another. The assumption of 
propositional form suggests the applicability of the logic associated with the form. If 
the underlying logic of moral sentences is something diferent, then it would seem that
that form is misleading-- and indeed has misled us, given that we regularly reason with
moral sentences as if they were ordinary descriptive sentences. The use of 
propositional form might well be useful as a rhetorical tool for expressing an atitude 
as serious, and with unwillingness to tolerate the alternative, but if such a use came at 
the cost of causing all of us to go astray in our reasoning very ofen, it would not make
sense for us to have adopted it as a regular feature of our language. 
To address this objection, we must posit that using propositional form as a tool 
for the expression of atitudes is not done merely for the sake of expressing seriousness 
or unwillingness to tolerate the opposite. Rather, we use such form when the atitudes 
in question also bear some relation to one another that we want to use the 
propositional forms to help us track. The idea is that we can appropriate our logical 
skills for other purposes by using propositional form. Thus, far from being deceptive, 
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the fact that propositional form brings with it the tendency to think in accordance 
with certain paterns is simply another part of how propositional form can be of use to 
us.  
But why should we suppose that doing so actually works? This point can be 
illustrated by an example, for the sake of which we will employ a rather broken variant
of Blackburn's higher-order-atitudes picture, once again from his (1984). We will 
suppose, for the moment, that the purpose of our enterprise is to track the happiness 
of sets of commitments. Now the way this broken version of Blackburn's theory works 
is that, unlike in the real version, there are no particular rules as to which atitude gets 
which expression, or even which order of atitude gets which kind of expression. Thus, 
in this picture, “fish are purple” expresses approval of Kona cofee; “if fish are purple, 
then the sky is freedom” expresses approval of Sumatra cofee; and “the sky is 
freedom” expresses both disapproval of Kona cofee and approval of murdering short 
people. 
Now imagine someone trying to use the “instrument of serious, reflective, 
evaluative practice”221 that I have just described. I submit that it would not go very well
for him, especially if he happened to be partial to both Kona and Sumatra cofees. 
Propositional reflection-- a phrase from Blackburn that refers to the idea that we use 
propositional form to help us track relationships between atitudes that are isomorphic
with the apparent logical relations between the expressions of those atitudes222-- 
221 Blackburn (1984) p. 195
222 A note on terminology: the phrase “propositional reflection” can also be used to refer to the sentence 
used to express an attitude in propositional form within a system of expression-attitude isomorphism as
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allows us to explain why this form of expressivism does not work nearly as well as 
Blackburn's. In the parody theory, there is a mismatch between when there exists (if 
you do not mind a play on the emotive sense of validity) a happy combination of 
propositions, and when there exists a happy combination of atitudes. In a beter 
version of the theory, such as, if all goes well for him, Blackburn's own, there would be 
a happy combination of propositions exactly when there is a happy combination of 
atitudes. 
A thought experiment of a diferent sort aims to clarify the same idea. Imagine 
a world in which there exist three lights, named A, B, and C. B is far and away the 
most important; we care greatly (let's say there is some ritual which is considered 
blasphemous unless B is lit when it is performed) about whether or not B is lit. 
Unfortunately, B is far away, and so we cannot see whether it is lit or not. To solve that
problem, we built A, to serve as a kind of B-indicator. Unfortunately, our wizardry was 
not very good at the time, and so A sufers from various problems. For one, it sufers 
from an abundance of false negatives (though, thankfully, not false positives); so many 
so, in fact, that when A is not lit, we should consider that B may be either lit or not lit. 
And A's troubles do not end there. From a mechanical perspective, it is error-prone; 
periodically, it falls out of alignment, causing it to return an abundance of false 
positives. In addition, when A is out of alignment, the rate of false negatives increases 
to 100%: that is, it will always be of if B is on (and so the only time when both lights 
will be on is when B is on and A is in alignment). We can't fix it, but eventually, it will 
described in the preceding definition.  The phrase occurs throughout Blackburn’s work.
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wiggle itself back into the proper alignment, and will once again be free of false 
positives (though it will still have false negatives; when A is working properly, it is 
never on when B is not on, though it may be of when B is on). 
One day, a clever wizard figured out that, although A could not be fixed, it was 
possible to detect when it was in alignment and when it was out of alignment. In order
to display this information, he constructed a third light, which he named C afer a 
departed relative, which shines when (and only when) A is detected to be in its proper 
alignment. C was, indeed, well-designed; had it been installed as the designer 
recommended, it would have been a perfect indicator of when A was in alignment and 
when it was not. Unfortunately, there was something of a mix-up in the installation of 
C, and its wires became crossed with those of A. So long as A was on, there was no 
problem; but when A was turned of, the extra power would flow into C with enough 
energy that C would remain lit regardless of the state of A. 
Nevertheless, we were, in general, quite happy with C. To be sure, when A was 
of, we would still have no idea whether or not B was on; but when A and C were both 
on, we could know that B was on (and thus perform the aforementioned ritual safely). 
And so an oficial declaration of “that'll do” was made by the Wizards' Council, and for 
a while, everything was fine. 
Over time, however, the clever wizard who created C fell into despair, because 
people were not calling C by its proper name. Most people, already confronted with 
the need to keep track of two diferent important lights with single-leter names, 
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balked at the idea of a third such light. Thus, in order to have a diferent kind of name 
for C, they began to call it “if A, then B.” This name, they found, not only helped them 
to keep track of the light and what it did; it also made it possible, once the lights 
received labels proclaiming their names, for them to get new light-watchmen to read 
the lights properly without any actual instruction as to how they worked, so long as 
the light-watchman had passed a course in elementary logic. As wizards willing to 
spend time teaching mere light-watchmen were in short supply, this development was 
most welcome. 
In this story, there exists an interesting isomorphism between the formulae 
afer which the lights are named and the illuminations of the lights themselves. We 
can see the isomorphism on the following tables:
Fig. 5.1 Lights:












The renaming of C to “A->B”, in the story, enables the light-watchmen to make use of 
the isomorphism.  A novice light-watchman who came to the job already familiar with 
the botom table 
would at the very least have a leg up in mastering the top one. How the lights are 
named is relevant here; had the lights had names of a diferent sort, the novice would 
probably not be so invited to atempt the application of the lower table. 
Is this story plausible? Yes, there is a bit of a “jump” that the novice must make. 
But, at the same time, it is not an enormous one; it should not be an obstacle to any 
novice save, perhaps, one who is dense, painfully literal-minded, or willfully obtuse. In 
fact, if the lights were named as I have described, but were able to combine their states
in diferent ways, so as to break the similarity between the two tables, confusion would
ensue. It would then be more dificult for a novice to learn to read the lights than if 
they had been called, say, “horseradish”, “freedom”, and “7032”-- that is, the efect of 
the names is strong enough that an unexpected failure of isomorphism could lead us 
astray. 
The doctrine of propositional reflection holds that a similar relationship exists 
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between the paterns of apparent logical relations between the expressions of atitudes 
and some sort of paterns-- it will be up to the theory to tell us what-- in the atitudes 
themselves, as between the paterns of apparent logical relations between the names of
the lights and the paterns of illumination in the lights themselves. If this doctrine is 
correct, it explains, in part, why the adoption of propositional form for the expression 
of our atitudes can be useful to us. At the same time, the feeling that our expressivist 
theory would have us be doing something somehow illegitimate may be somewhat 
calmed by the idea that we are not just using propositional form for rhetorical efect. 
Rhetorical efect, mind, may still be a significant or even the main motivation behind 
the assumption of propositional form, but, as the example of a broken higher-order 
atitudes theory above shows, rhetorical efect without propositional reflection could 
easily lead to disaster. 
One potential confusion should be addressed at this point, using the example of
the lights. One who was troubled by the worries related to “confusion” or “deception” 
that we have considered might think that mimicking expressivism requires that we 
have some false beliefs about our own language-- that we have to believe that certain 
pieces of language are descriptive when they are, in fact, emotive. In accord with what 
I argued earlier, we could apply quasi-realism here. But the expressivist also has 
another line of reply to explore. For he has never actually claimed that such false 
beliefs are necessary. The case of the lights has, built into it, many diferent reasonable 
options for the “meaning” of A being lit, or of C being lit; I see no reason why a novice 
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who follows any of these would not be able to “get it”. Likewise, he could just as easily 
take C's name-card to be giving him a raw direction as to be making or suggesting any 
fact about lights or the paterns, significances, or purposes thereof. 
5.2 Blackburn's Atempts at Propositional Reflection
Let us turn, then, to the place of propositional reflection in Blackburn's various 
theories. Our objective will be to figure out what, in each theory, is supposed to be on 
the atitude side of the isomorphism relation-- that is, what paterns are supposed to 
match up with the interrelations between the expressions. In both the “Moral Realism” 
(1973 [1993]) theory (if we take a sophisticated reading of the theory, on which his 
claims about the expression of facts about atitudes are themselves to be understood as
made in the spirit of quasi-realism) and the Spreading the Word theory, the interactions
of higher- and lower-order atitudes plays this role. To see how this works, let us 
consider the following argument:
1) If kicking babies is wrong, then kicking toddlers is wrong. 
2) Kicking babies is wrong.
3) Therefore, kicking toddlers is wrong. 
Let us, for the moment, grant Blackburn that what is being expressed in this argument
is actually223:
223 H!(x) expresses approval of x (as in “Hooray, x!”); B!(x) expresses disapproval of x (as in “Boo, x!”); 
T!(x) expresses tolerance of x; vertical lines (“||”) are used to denote reference to rather than expression
of an attitude; the semicolon (“;”) denotes combination of two mental states, along the lines of “having 
the latter upon possessing the former.” 
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4) H!(|B!(kicking babies)|;|B!(kicking toddlers)|)
5) B!(kicking babies)
6) B!(kicking toddlers)







What if we were to make a similar table for 4)-6)? In place of T and F for truth and 
falsity, let us use H and U, for “happily possessable given the other atitudes” and “only 
unhappily possessable given the other atitudes.” If all goes well, the chart should come








The asymmetry on this chart may seem a bit odd, but this can be taken care of by 
nuancing how we read “;”; if we take it as something like “having the later given the 
former” rather than “having the later and the former”, then the chart comes out right. 
All is well, then; isomorphism has been achieved. Or has it? The tables here do 
seem to illustrate how the assumption of propositional form by an expressive language
might help, both rhetorically and practically, in tracking and maintaining happy 
combinations of atitudes; this much of the theory seems to work. But in line with our 
original worry about this theory, we might be concerned about whether H and U 
possess the kind of stability that we need in order to make this kind of chart. For 
example, what if the individual in question also possessed an extremely strong 
disapproval towards having more than three atitudes, this one included? In this case, 







The upper right cell of the chart changes from H to U, since three Hs, plus the dislike 
of having too many atitudes, would make four atitudes, which would be too many. 
Yet the truth charts for the expressions will demonstrate no parallel efect; while there 
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can be facts outside the scope of a given argument that contradict one or more lines of 
the argument, overtly psychologistic efects like this one have no influence. One might 
resort to something like, “there can be at most three moral truths”, but even that does 
not quite work; such a fact would simply obliterate the top row of the table, whereas 
the psychological quirk that we have been discussing could render the top row 
unhappy without any “contradiction”. 
Thus, although the higher-order atitudes approach can-- and probably should--
make use of propositional reflection, at the same time, the idea helps us to see what is 
wrong with the approach. The flaws do not mean that higher-order atitudes are 
completely unsuited to the use of propositional reflection; our tables show that at least
in some circumstances, the device works well enough. What it does not do is work well 
enough to play the role of a driving force in our explanation. While we might see 
propositional reflections of higher-order atitudes arising derivatively, copying the 
maneuver from somewhere else, it seems implausible that we would start the practice 
of using propositional form just for a result of this quality. 
Let us turn our atention, then, to our next candidate: Blackburn's later theory, 
from Ruling Passions (1998).
Blackburn initiates his discussion by introducing the idea of “emotional ascent”. 
The concept is as follows: atitudes come in a wide variety of types, which can be 
placed on a continuum by the degree of involvement they carry for the one who has 
them, ranging from simple throwaway preferences on one hand, to full-blooded 
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commitments on the other, atitudes that we not only have, but promote, defend, etc. 
Increasing complexity in a sequence of reactions drives progress along the continuum. 
In the simplest atitudes, the reaction chain has a length of 1: one is presented with a 
stimulus and reacts to it, and that’s all there is to it. For many reactions, though, others
see fit to react to the reaction; in which case, one might end the chain with a reaction 
about the appropriateness of the second reaction: or, the chain might continue, with 
further dispute, or concurrence, even, in some cases, leading to one encouraging others 
to share in one of the earlier reactions, to react negatively to those who do not, even to 
one becoming hostile to those who do not conform. At the far end, there are atitudes 
where, unless one is so numbed by exhaustion that one has become completely 
unreactive, one will continue the chain indefinitely with every available conversant, 
should the subject come up (or even without). These tend to be the clear, trademark 
moral cases. The longer the reaction chain, the greater the degree of emotional ascent 
involved in the atitude. 
Blackburn tries emotional ascent as a means of placing, within our psychology, 
a system of interconnections reflected by the apparent logical relations between our 
atitude-expressions. The view is that we have commitments as described by the theory
of emotional ascent; the makeup of these commitments leaves them not independent, 
but rather capable of some combinations and incapable of others. Blackburn claims 
that we may find ourselves “’tied to a tree’: only able to endorse some combination of 
atitude and belief”224; what this means is that an atitude, for as long as we have it, can
224 Blackburn (1998) p. 71
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restrict what other atitudes we are able to have. The key, though, is that Blackburn 
does not naively assert that, as a brute fact, that we cannot have clashing atitudes. 
Rather, the restrictions are built into the very atribution conditions of the atitudes in 
question.
In this view, the relevant atitudes are defined in part in terms of their 
inferential role. The theory of emotional ascent explains how such entities could come 
about: an atitude without the inferential role expected of its propositional reflection 
would not be the atitude expressed by that sentence, since the two would difer in 
their degree of emotional ascent. The isomorphism tables are forced to come out the 
right way, in that making them come out the right way is baked into the account of the
complex sentences that the expressivist gives in terms of the atitudes expressed by 
those sentences.  For example, suppose that “if murdering humans is wrong, then 
training your cat to murder humans is wrong” is not just H!(|B!(mh)|;|B!(cmh)|), but 
rather, that it is expressing a similar but emotionally ascended atitude. Because the 
atitude is emotionally ascended, it commits us, as part of its atribution conditions, to 
accepting that training your cat to murder humans is wrong upon accepting that 
murdering humans is wrong. One who fails to accept the later upon accepting the 
former cannot have the emotionally ascended atitude; if it was previously possessed, it
must be withdrawn from. 
 And so, rather than 4)-6), we get, using “^^” and square brackets to indicate 
emotionally ascended atitudes:
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7) ^^[H!(|B!(kicking babies)|;|B!(kicking toddlers)|)]
8) ^^[B!(kicking babies)]
9) ^^[B!(kicking toddlers)]







We switch from using “H” and “U” to using “P” and “I”: “P” indicates that an atitude is 
possible when  other possible atitudes on the row are possessed without the violation 
of any other commitment, while “I” indicates that it is not. Now in our new chart, the 
upper right hand cell is stable; there is no chance for the value of the cell to be 
“overridden” without some contradiction. So, for now, it seems we have done beter 
than we did with the higher-order atitudes view. 
Another advantage of Blackburn's later view is that it integrates some of the 
rhetorical advantages of propositional form into the account of propositional 
reflection. The seriousness and unwillingness to brook divergence that atend to 
propositional form at the rhetorical level are the hallmarks of emotional ascent. And 
they are exactly what we expect from morality. Whether or not I am merely expressing 
an atitude when I say that “pushing unwary philosophers onto the subway tracks is 
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wrong,” I certainly do not want to present it as merely an expression of an atitude, nor 
to tolerate the presence of any other atitude on the mater anywhere in my vicinity. 
And thus I express my atitude-- my commitment-- as “pushing unwary philosophers 
onto the subway tracks is wrong” and not merely as “boo for pushing unwary 
philosophers onto the subway tracks.”
Unfortunately, this view will not sufice. Sonderholm (2005) raises a serious 
problem: a commitment is active, in a way that the expressions of moral atitudes 
seems not to reflect. For example, take Blackburn’s explanation for disjunction, as “a 
state in which if one side is closed of to me, I am to switch to the other-- or withdraw 
the commitment”225: holding a disjunction is explained as a readiness to do one thing or
another. Now there is a reading of Sonderholm’s problem which is fixable; he argues 
that the commitment structure cannot capture cases such as (p n q) v (p n r) implying 
p, which is a red herring, since it focuses on Blackburn’s specific example for 
disjunction. The structure of relevant commitments can be made more complex to 
capture what is desired; indeed, Elstein (2007) atempts to do just that. There is, 
however, a deeper reading of the problem from which the view cannot so easily 
recover:  on the active-commitment model, something always has to happen; we must 
fulfill our commitment, or lose it. But any action requires some processing time; there 
is no incoherence in not having followed through quite yet, even though there would be
incoherence in never following through (which would mean that you did not have the 
commitment) and yet having the commitment. The (supposed) propositional 
225  Blackburn (1998) p. 71
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reflections, though, are typically treated as having no such delay; indeed, logic is not 
something that has a time in any non-metaphorical sense. To use the metaphor of a 
gap, it seems that the Ruling Passions view atempts to close it altogether, where what 
we desire is for it to be bridged. 
This disanalogy threatens to weaken the view's atempt to draw plausibility 
from its isomorphism claim. While it is built into the Ruling Passions view that, as we 
saw on our chart, the overall paterns of our ascended atitudes will match up with the 
apparent logic of their propositional reflections, we are still in danger of being misled 
by the surface forms. We know, or think we know, that it is possible to believe A and A-
>B but not (yet) believe B, or even be in any way disposed to believe B (this is easy 
enough; all that it requires is that the person not happen to think about A and A->B at 
the same time). Yet, on this view, someone who believed 1) and 2) would have to believe
3); if he did not, then we would have no grounds on which to atribute to him the 
emotionally ascended atitudes expressed in 1) and 2). 
As with the previous view, perhaps the analogy is close enough; if a good-
enough case can be made for expressivism on other grounds, even an imperfect 
analogy could be deployed to explain away apparent counterexamples from our 
practice, so long as the strain on one’s credulity imposed by the analogy is less than 
the plausibility of expressivism earned for it by other arguments. That said, if we can 
come up with a theory with a closer analogy, our quasi-realism will be of more help to 
the expressivist. For the sake of exploration, we will assume the need for a resemblance
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that is as useful as possible. 
5.3 Another Propositional Reflection
An alternative theory aims to combine some of Blackburn's insights with a 
diferent theoretical structure, one where the relationship between atitudes that we 
are tracking with the use of propositional reflections is not a relationship between the 
atitudes themselves but something else226, in this case a further mental state 
definitionally dependent on our atitudes. 
Suppose that, in addition to beliefs and atitudes, we have another kind of 
mental state—“commitments.” Commitments relate beliefs and atitudes to actions; 
having a commitment to a belief or an atitude is to stand ready to act on it. A 
commitment, in this sense, is not itself a plan, but rather, the intermediary between 
other mental states and plans. The relation between commitments and plans is a close 
one; it is commitment that determines how our atitudes, hypothetical and otherwise, 
determine our plans. And like plans, commitments are restricted in how they combine 
by what is and is not compossible in the world. But commiting is not, in itself, to make
a plan; we are commited prior to (in both the temporal and explanatory senses) 
planning, and are all too ofen in the unfortunate situation of having to express our 
commited atitudes (in action) without any particular plan to see us through. We 
might find it useful to use plans as an explanatory tool in describing particular 
226 The view of Gibbard (2003) shares this structural attribute, though it builds out of rather different 
materials. I don't seek to address Gibbard's position here, though I see no reason why some of its 
elements could not be incorporated into the pluralistic view that I ultimately endorse. 
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commitments, insofar as listing some of the plans that might result from the 
commitment in question might help our interlocutors to grasp the import of the 
commitment, and the interactions between the imports of diferent commitments; but 
of course an expository technique should not be confused with an exhaustive 
characterization. 
A commitment in this sense is not meant to be an alien technical artifact. There
is a natural sense of commitment that is, at the very least, in the vicinity of the one 
used here. We ofen speak of commitment to principles: an individual who is 
commited to a principle allows that principle to direct his actions, while the 
endorsement of a principle without commitment ofen comes to nothing. The sense in 
which I am using “commitment” is either identical to or a close relative of the sense in 
which it is used in these thoughts. 
What we express, in this view, is still our atitudes. In order to be consistent 
about what we are expressing, let us allow that this is the case for both simple and 
complex sentences. Let us borrow Blackburn's higher-order atitudes for the purpose. 
Puting an atitude into propositional form expresses that the atitude is held in a 
commited fashion. Acting on a higher-order atitude is done by resolving one's other 
atitudes into accord with it. 
Could some notion of involvement, where having one means having another, 
hold between diferent commitments? It would seem, given that one course of action 
can relate back to many diferent atitudes, overlap between commitments is to be 
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expected. Take, for example, a pro-atitude towards all cofee, and a pro-atitude 
towards Kona cofee in particular: atitudes that we might express as “All cofee is 
good” and “Kona cofee is good”, respectively. What is the relationship between these 
atitudes? Well, one might have the first without having any inkling that cofee is 
grown in Kona; one who has never heard of Kona cofee would never even consider the 
second atitude, even while possessing the first. At the same time, one who is selective 
about his cofee not only could possess the more specific example without the more 
general one, but is, in fact, quite likely to be in such a state. The two atitudes, then, are
independent. But what of commitments to these atitudes? One who endorses any 
cofee that he comes across will endorse Kona cofee, should he encounter it; the 
actions that endorse and promote the consumption of Kona cofee are actions of 
endorsing and promoting cofee (note that we are talking about the kind of action that 
endorsing Kona falls under, not whether or not its promotion is good for the cofee 
industry as a whole—it is possible to carry out a pro-cofee action that, in fact, fails to 
promote cofee). A commitment to endorsing all cofee, then, includes a commitment to
endorsing Kona cofee; the narrower commitment is a subset of the wider one. Even 
though the atitudes themselves are independent, their commitments are not. The 
propositional reflection of the relationship between the commitments is that “All cofee
is good” implies that “Kona cofee is good.”
To make the point further, consider a disjunctive example:
10) Either this cofee is organically grown, or it’s no good. 
11) This cofee isn’t organically grown. 
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12) It’s no good. 
Here we have a disjunction 10); since we are trying to be expressivists as 
straightforwardly as possible, let us consider it as expressing an atitude, in particular 
one concerning the relationship between believing that the cofee is organically grown, 
and disapproving of it-- perhaps something like approval of having at least one of the 
mental states expressed by the disjuncts. Commiting to the atitude in 10) tells us to 
make plans based either on a belief that the cofee is organic or on a con-atitude 
towards it. At the same time, though, we have 11) expressing rejection of the belief that
the cofee is organically grown. If we commit to 10), we will plan based on the belief 
that the cofee is not organic; once we do so, though, the only ways remaining that our 
commitment to 10) can be fulfilled are through plans based on a con-atitude towards 
the cofee. To plan based on a con-atitude towards cofee, in turn, is to commit to that 
atitude: in other words, to commit to 12). Thus, a commitment to both 10) and 11) is a 
commitment to 12). The propositional reflection of that fact is that 10) and 11) jointly 
imply 12). 
This kind of theory holds that inferential import is a mater of “commitments”. 
Commitments can involve one another; a Venn diagram could illustrate how multiple 
commitments intersect to commit us to further atitudes and rule out commitment to 
others227. This theory is unlike either of Blackburn's in that it, on one hand, allows 
acceptance of the premises of a valid argument without acceptance (yet) of the 
227   Gibbard (2003) also uses the metaphor of the Venn diagram to illustrate the operation of a 
(quasi-)inferential structure.
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conclusion, while at the same time allowing our expressions of atitudes to reflect a 
structure that is constantly present and immune to the kind of capricious atitude-
targeting atitudes that plagued the higher-order atitudes view. We can be commited 
to an atitude in advance of when we actually come to possess that atitude, as in the 
case of the commited endorser of all cofee being commited to endorsing Kona cofee,
even before he knows that such a thing exists; there is nothing in the theory to make it
impossible to accept the premises of a valid argument and not yet accept the 
conclusion. Yet being commited to a conclusion is not an empty atribute; if one is 
commited, when the time of decision is at hand, what atitude will guide one’s actions
is already set, unless one withdraws from the commitment. 
If we had to pick just one relationship to be what we track with the logic of our 
propositionalized expressions of atitudes, the relationships between the atendant 
commitments of the atitudes seems promising; it seems like the right sort of 
relationship for us to track in this way. Since it is possible to have a commitment 
without (yet) having the associated atitude, the view does not sufer from the same 
problem as the ascended atitudes view. At the same time, there are plain facts about 
the relationships between commitments, and so, unlike the older of Blackburn's views, 
the commitment-tracking view is not dependent on a relationship that is subject to 
psychological caprice. Isomorphism is achieved thanks to the appropriate acts of 
inference being built into the commitments associated with higher-order atitudes.  
This view, then, seems to be the best of those we have thus far considered. 
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On the other hand, what the commitment-tracking theory gains in terms of the
ability to avoid the pitfalls that claimed its predecessors, it loses in elegance. Adding 
commitments to the theory efectively doubles its count of moving parts. Moreover, it 
claims that the fundamental concern behind the logic of moral arguments is keeping 
track of which atitudes we might simultaneously place in charge of our action-
producing mechanisms and which we cannot. This concern is important, but is it really
so important as to be ever-present in the consideration of moral arguments?228 
Whether our combinations of atitudes are happy or unhappy (as in the higher-order 
atitudes view) is something that can and does always concern us, inner disharmony 
being, afer all, a miserable state. The ascended atitudes view also passes this test, 
since by hypothesis we are always working with such atitudes in moral discourse (and
when we are not, propositional form, and the atendant logical appearances, are not 
used), and serious concern is built into emotional ascent. 
In other words, the simpler views, despite their failings, have more basic 
plausibility. They resonate with our everyday concerns in a way that the commitment-
tracking view does not, or at least does not do as well. There is a way we can save the 
parts of the simpler views that we liked despite the mismatch, but it requires a 
diferent sort of theory. 
5.4 The Pluralistic View
Let us call the “diferent sort of theory” the “pluralistic view” (the somewhat 
228 Remember that importance was one of our original desiderata. 
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awkward “pluralistic” is used because the more natural term “pluralism” refers to an 
unrelated view in first-order ethics). The pluralistic view starts with the realization that
the kinds of concerns that the mimicking expressivist appeals to are ones that 
overgenerate: if it is useful for us to appropriate propositional form to track and make 
serious one form of relationship between atitudes, why should we suppose ourselves 
to have lef it there? Couldn't we do the same thing again with a diferent relationship?
There seems to be no reason to suppose that there is exactly one relationship at the 
heart of propositional reflection. Not even theoretical simplicity favors such a view, 
since a one-relationship view would need to answer the question of what stops us from
taking advantage of propositional form more than once.
The pluralistic view claims that there is no one relationship that is tracked by 
the logic of moral arguments. Rather, we use propositional form for our atitudes when
there is some relationship that we are interested in tracking and making serious 
through the use of propositional form. On such a theory, we might also use 
propositional form when we feel like taking advantage of the general practice to try 
and further a particular conclusion even in the absence of any such relationship (just 
because we want the assumption of propositional form to be generally non-deceptive 
does not mean that we cannot or should not allow that we could sometimes, 
derivatively, use it in such a deceptive way). At the same time, there might be cases 
where a number of diferent relationships simultaneously contribute motivation for 
bringing our atitudes into conformity with a patern isomorphic to the logic of their 
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expressions. Here, no one relationship would sufice to motivate propositional 
reflection. But since there is nothing to preclude using the tool of propositional 
reflection in cases of joint suficiency between a number of relationships, and good 
practical reasons for us to do so, there is no reason to think that we would not do so. 
The theme of the pluralistic view is that propositional reflection is a tool that we 
possess. We do not restrict our use of this tool to the satisfaction of any one primary 
purpose; rather, we use it whenever we want, and can think of many diferent 
situations when it might be beneficial for us to do so. 
The pluralistic strategy for embracing the doctrine of propositional reflection is 
to proceed by examples. Its explanations of the suitability of the surface form will 
proceed on a case-by-case basis, appealing to whichever sub-theories seem applicable. 
This might seem like cheating-- since the theory is essentially helping itself to the 
luxury of always having an explanation that works-- but, in fact, an explanation of this
style can be argued against in the same ways as any other. If no explanation is 
forthcoming for an argument that seems sound, or if the only explanation on ofer fails
to deliver the intensity or strictness that we expect for the argument, our confidence in
the theory could be compromised, just as with any of the non-pluralistic alternatives. 
There are diferences, of course. The pluralistic theory has the option of 
continuing to search for alternatives, rather than simply taking the blow directly. If one
explanation fails, it can be claimed that it was the wrong explanation, rather than 
admit a problem with the entire picture. In addition, if an argument fails to be 
145
amenable to any of many options, we might begin to wonder if there is not something 
wrong with the form or a premise of the argument (especially if a conditional premise 
is present). Nonetheless, the possibility for failure still exists; the theory has not 
rendered itself tautologous. It simply has an easier task facing it than its non-
pluralistic competition.
What the pluralistic theory cannot do is ofer a single blanket explanation, to 
handle not only all of the cases at hand but also any others that might be encountered.
It does not present a global account capable of setling, once and for all, the question 
of propriety for the transmutation of atitude-expressions into propositions. This might
seem like a weakness, but, once again, the overgeneration argument is relevant. A 
single, global account does not make for a beter theory when we have reason to 
believe that no such thing exists. It would be quite odd-- and require explanation-- if, 
having come up with the useful, powerful device of propositional reflection, we 
decided to pick one of the possible applications of the technique, use it, and then stop 
forever. And even if we did stop, and are using propositional reflection in only one case,
there does not seem to be anything limiting it to that. In such a case, we might well 
come up with a story that can be told across all instances of atitude-expressions 
taking propositional form, only for it to start failing later on. Even if there were a true 
one-relationship view, it would only be true accidentally, while the pluralistic view 
faithfully tracks what is necessary and possible. The pluralistic view gives us no way of 
identifying the relevant relationship for every possible moral argument because there 
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is no way of doing so; thus, this aspect of the view is a strength, not a weakness. 
5.5 The pluralistic view and Richards
The pluralistic view can be bolstered by some of Richards' rhetorical 
considerations. We needn't accept his philosophical views to benefit from his 
observations as to the various mechanisms which afect the expressive content of terms
or phrases; we might be reluctant to call every bit of expressive content a “meaning” as 
freely as Richards does, but how we label a particular rhetorical efect does not afect 
whether or not that efect exists229. Furthermore, if a rhetorical efect exists, it has the 
potential to influence the outcome of a practice-- such an efect can have philosophical
relevance for theories that cite practice as part of an explanation. Mimicking 
expressivism is just such a theory; it cites practical benefits for the adoption of 
propositional form in the expression of atitudes. Thus, we need not accept that the 
kinds of efects examined by Richards are to have any standing in the theory of 
meaning in order for them to be of relevance to mimicking expressivism. 
The pluralistic view holds that atitudes can relate to one another in a number 
of diferent ways suitable for the motivation of propositional form. If we introduce 
observations from Richards, we can bolster this view by noting that multiple uses of 
229 This is not to say, of course, that how we name same something cannot have a rhetorical effect of its 
own, or that this further rhetorical effect cannot bolster or undermine the effect which it names-- 
because these are certainly possible. Nonetheless, in our soon-to-be-cruelly-terminated state of pre-
quasi-realistic innocence, we can permit ourselves some expressive inaccuracy in exchange for 
descriptive accuracy. We will see, in the next chapter, that such a maneuver is not half as innocuous as 
it appears; our considerations there will, I think, vindicate Richards' terminology, though not the theory 
of language by which he himself justifies it. 
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propositional reflection are not independent, but are mutually supporting. That is to 
say, our various employments of propositional form for the expression of atitudes 
interanimate one another. We can apply propositional form to the expression of 
atitudes to import the serious and steadfast nature of description to that expression; 
having done so, we can then use propositional form to import some of the serious and 
steadfast nature of the previous expression of an atitude to another expression of an 
atitude. Each use of propositional form reminds us, perhaps not consciously, but 
emotionally, of the others. 
Furthermore, given the intensity, and perhaps emotional ascendance, of many 
of the atitudes involved with morality (think about, for instance, our disapproval of 
seting small children on fire for entertainment), it seems to stand to reason that the 
use of moral language should have unusual power as a form of expression.  Expressive 
content is stubborn even in the face of changing (descriptive meaning); it seems that at
least some expressive content can atach to a word rather than to the word’s 
descriptive content. Stevenson’s persuasive definitions rely on this efect; when a term 
receives a persuasive definition, its descriptive meaning is changed, but the expressive 
content, having become atached to the word itself, remains, and thus becomes 
associated with the new descriptive meaning. We will return to the recalcitrance of 
expressive content, with examples, in the next chapter;  for now, let us note that a 
pluralistic theory can exploit this efect. 
Our atitudes, on a pluralistic theory, can relate to one another in many 
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diferent ways; you can, on such a theory, have two moral modus ponens arguments 
where the relationships between the atitudes expressed in the premises and those 
expressed in the conclusions are not the same. For example, consider: 
1) If kicking babies is wrong, then kicking toddlers is wrong. 
2) Kicking babies is wrong.
3) Therefore, kicking toddlers is wrong.
4) If kicking babies is wrong, then kicking premature babies is wrong.
5) Kicking babies is wrong.
6) Therefore, kicking premature babies is wrong.
An advantage of a pluralistic theory is that it can admit that the atitudes expressed in 
1) and 2) do not relate to that of 3) in the same way as those of 4) and 5) relate to that 
of 6). 1)-3) seems like a good candidate for analysis by the ascended-atitudes approach
of Ruling Passions. 4), on the other hand, seems like an inferior candidate for emotional
ascent; it needn’t be the same kind of serious, conformity-forcing atitude as 1). The 
pluralistic theory can admit that 4) is unlike 1), and yet claim that 4)-6) works as an 
argument nonetheless. The similarity in expression is justified by the functional 
similarity, even though the mechanism underlying the function-- emotional ascent in 
the first case, and possibly commitment involvement in the second-- is diferent. 
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We might wonder how it is that on a pluralistic theory, complete seamlessness 
in functional role can be maintained, and why we do not see moral arguments, 
especially those which are reflections of interactions between atitudes that are less 
perfect in their isomorphism, begin to diverge away from the paterns of reasoning 
suggested by their expressions. The recalcitrance of expressive content can answer this 
worry. We should expect, given the persistence of expressive content in the face of 
changes in descriptive meaning, that valid forms of moral argument will establish 
paterns of atitude-acceptance that are themselves resistant to change. An expressive 
force becomes atached to the role of being the premise or conclusion of a moral 
argument by the various forms of atitude-interaction that we track, and, once thus 
atached, it is sustained by the common presence of moral language. We need not have
any pre-philosophical access to the tracked relationships at all; we become 
conditioned, when we are enculturated into moral practice, to have atitudes in 
accordance with the correct paterns, and that is all there is to it. 
One strength of the pluralistic theory is that there needn’t always be an 
underlying relationship between the atitudes in question. Once the practice of moral 
argument has been established, there is nothing to stop individuals from co-opting 
moral language for their own rhetorical purposes. If no appropriate relationship can be 
identified between the atitudes expressed by the lines of a moral argument, it may be 
that there simply is not one; the pluralistic theory is able to accept, and even expect, 
that possibility. The stubbornness of expressive content is suficient to sustain such 
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parasitic cases. 
Continuing in the spirit of the fast track, we can extend this solution 
downwards to cover embeddings. Our various models, drawn from Ayer and Stevenson
and various generations of Blackburn, with the addition of the commitment-
involvement view, demonstrate the need for and legitimacy of moral sentences that 
play the functional roles illustrated by their propositional forms. Once propositional 
form has been adopted, any form of embedding is available, even if no analysis in 
terms of atitudes is possible. In such cases, we use the sentence for its functional 
purpose, and there is nothing more to it than that it is an assemblage of words that 
performs that purpose. Its ability to perform that purpose is, in turn, sustained by the 
general practice of ordering our atitudes by their propositional form, which continues 
to sustain itself according to the uses outlined by the models, as well as the more 
general forms of rhetorical efect that we have already noted. The stubbornness of 
expressive content binds the efectiveness of the proper and defective cases together. 
It would be convenient if no such sentences existed-- that is, if a satisfactory 
secondary explanation could be found for all the constructions of moral language-- but
the universe is under no obligation to refrain from containing occurrences which 
ofend our sense of theoretical beauty. The pluralistic approach is compatible with such
raw, functional sentences, and can make explanatory resort to them if necessary. In 
this manner, it achieves the fast-track’s goal of avoiding the Ptolemaic drudgery that 
Blackburn (1988 [1993]) feared; the expressive theory can be established without 
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having to have an account of every possible embedding. 
The stubbornness of expressive content is important. So far, we have not 
examined it in much depth, but have, rather, focused on its efects. The next chapter, in
dealing with quasi-realism, will provide us with an opportunity to return to the 
question of expressive stubbornness, allowing us to examine the ways in which 
expressive content resists various forms of verbal manipulation in more detail. 
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Chapter 6. Qasi-Realism
“Qasi-realism” is the practice of adopting, afer some kind of manipulation to 
ensure compatibility, realist meta-ethical claims into an expressivist theory. Varieties of
quasi-realism can be distinguished by what sort of manipulation they use. 
Let us call “simple quasi-realism” the use of minimalism in pursuit of quasi-
realism. The simple quasi-realist will thus claim, for instance, that truth is minimal, and
so expressions of atitudes can be true or false230; that being a proposition or a property 
or an atribution of a property is also minimal, and so a moral sentence can very well 
assert a proposition atributing a moral property to some object; and so forth. We can 
see the atraction of quasi-realism in that it lets us say such things; we can be an 
expressivist, the quasi-realist contends, and still vindicate such ordinary practices as 
calling a moral statement true, or a fact. “Nuanced quasi-realism”, by contrast, is quasi-
realism that proceeds by means of expressivism-- that is, it seeks to render at least 
some of the distinctive claims of the realist position in meta-ethics compatible with 
expressivism by ofering expressivist analyses of those claims. 
Before proceeding, we must disambiguate. Minimalism, as I mentioned, permits
many variations, but there is one particular distinction that we need to keep track of 
here. Some writers on minimalism, both for and against, conceive of it as a way of 
230 Truth minimalism, or deflationism about truth, comes in many forms; for our purposes, we needn't 
focus on any one in particular. Let us, instead, take as an example the disquotational account-- “s” is 
true just in case s, and that's all there is to it-- and couple it with the proviso that similar ideas, so long 
as they remain metaphysically lightweight, should be permitted to use the same label. 
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characterizing the concepts in question; a concept can be either minimal or robust231, 
but not both. Others see minimalism as ofering a sense of the relevant terms, but also 
that they may also take robust senses232. Let us call the former category hard 
minimalism, and the later sof minimalism. 
The central idea of this paper is that simple quasi-realism faces a dilemma. 
Either it must endorse sof minimalism, which seems untenable, or endorse hard 
minimalism and pay a substantial cost. I will argue that nuanced quasi-realism, on the 
other hand, is a stronger position. True, nuanced quasi-realism must make a similar 
choice-- between, on one hand, an approach that parallels hard minimalism by chooses
a certain number of realist-sounding claims to analyze as always expressive and accept 
without qualification, and denies the rest, and on the other hand, an approach that 
parallels sof minimalism by positing that many or even all of the realist's claims can 
take distinct expressive and descriptive senses, where they are to be accepted in the 
former but denied in the later. My goal in the later part of this paper will be to show 
that the expressive equivalent of sof minimalism can defend itself against the kinds of 
objections that are brought against sof minimalism itself, and can therefore provide us
with a useful and workable form of quasi-realism. 
231 This sort of thinking is found in e.g. Dreier (1996, 2004), Boghossian (1990), Wright (1987, 1992), and
Sinclair (2007). 
232 e.g. Stoljar (1993), Lenman (2003), and considered (though not accepted) in Holton (2000), Dreier 
(2004), Sinclair (2007), Jackson, Oppy, and Smith (1994), and Asay (2013). Interestingly, this also 
seems to be the position adopted by Ayer in his (1954, p. 231), though he had earlier, in his (1936 
[1952]), considered and rejected applying an early form of minimalism to moderate his position. Such 
a move is in keeping with the presence of other advanced features in Ayer's later works, such as the 
application of expressivism at the meta-ethical level in his (1954, p. 248) and his (1984, p. 34), a move 
that mirrors Blackburn's position on mind-independence in his e.g. (1988a [1993]), (1984), (1998), and 
which will be involved in nuanced quasi-realism. 
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6.1. Some dificulties for quasi-realism
Let us start our examination with a study of the problems that a successful 
quasi-realism must overcome. First, all quasi-realist versions of expressivism face the 
question of how they are to distinguish themselves from realism. We can see the 
problem most clearly for a simple quasi-realist who employs hard minimalism. Such a 
theory works by dividing the realist's claims into two groups. One group of claims are 
to be analyzed in accordance with hard minimalism and thereby agreed with. The 
other group are not to be so analyzed, and are instead to be denied. Puting more 
claims into the first category will help the theory to more closely copy realism, and 
thereby answer the charge of implausibility. Puting claims into the second category 
allows the theory to diferentiate itself from realism.233 A theory that puts all of the 
realist's claims into the first category is itself realist, though also minimalist. An 
expressivist theory that puts all of the realist's claims into the second category is still 
expressivist, but not quasi-realist. One way for the realist to collapse the expressivist's 
position, then, is to argue that the expressivist is commited to minimalism on the 
claims in the second category, and that his theory is consistent with those claims when
they are interpreted minimally. The second half of this procedure is generally easy, so 
233 For an example of a hard theory in action, consider the “ecumenical expressivism” of Ridge e.g. 
(2006a, b).  Ridge suggests that the quasi-realist should accept that the sentences of moral discourse 
express representational states, but should claim that these states are such that they do not necessarily 
bequeath the truth value of their representation upon their expressions. The initial acceptance makes the
position palatable, or at any rate less unpalatable than it would have been had it denied what does 
appear to be a feature of moral discourse. The subsequent qualification locates the difference between 
realism and quasi-realism. 
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we will focus on the first. 
 We can distinguish two ways of collapsing the simple quasi-realist theory that 
uses hard minimalism. One is to argue that minimalism is the correct theory of the 
concepts that the quasi-realist placed in the second category. Call this the aggressive 
collapse strategy234.The other is to argue that, whether or not minimalism is the true 
theory of the concepts in the second category, minimalism on those concepts follows 
from the quasi-realist's other commitments, typically his commitment to the 
minimalism of the concepts in the first category, Call this the creeping collapse 
strategy235.
My focus here is on the creeping collapse strategy. While I think that the sort of
considerations that I will present make the aggressive collapse strategy less appealing, 
it is not my aim to rule out every possible aggressive collapse argument. That, afer all, 
would involve creating a blanket ban on all unwanted minimalisms, which is too 
ambitious of a task for me to atempt here. Insofar as the theory I aim to construct 
proves atractive, it might count against the sort of considerations that the aggressive 
collapse strategist presents, simply by virtue of ofering an alternative theory with its 
own advantages. But I cannot, within the scope of this project, address every possible 
argument that an aggressive minimalist might deploy against the position. I can only 
hope to defeat the more modest creeping minimalism, which does not rely on pressure 
from outside arguments.
234 e.g. Wright (1996), Divers and Miller (1994, 1995)
235 e.g. Dreier (2004)
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If we are aiming to defuse the worry from creeping minimalism, we should look 
more closely at how the objection is supposed to work. Developing the problem, as it 
turns out, takes a bit of interpretive finesse. Dreier (2004) presents it as, first of all, not 
being a problem for expressivism, but for philosophers to solve in pursuit of reducing 
their own confusions236. He also presents it not as a logical consequence of theories, but
as a result of historical trends237 that have encouraged expressivists, in the name of 
plausibility, to keep applying more and more quasi-realism, which we have ofen done 
in the form of simple quasi-realism. As expressivists go minimal on more and more 
claims, the story goes, it has become harder and harder to see them as having a 
distinct view. Formulated thusly, though, the argument is only a dilemma for the 
expressivist insofar as he is compelled to apply too much quasi-realism on pain of 
implausibility resulting from whatever claim he denies. If he does not mind denying 
some of our ordinary claims, or can make the point that the claims are not, in fact, 
ordinary (and how ofen do members of the folk who are not real estate agents talk 
about properties, let alone moral ones?), then he can escape. 
That said, the problem can be sharpened into a genuine objection. Doing so 
requires adding a component from Divers and Miller (1994), Sinclair (2007), and 
Chrisman (2008). This component is the idea that minimalisms are not independent; 
the expressivist is not free to pick and choose as he pleases. Rather, the minimalisms 
are interconnected, and to other notions besides. For instance, as the aforementioned 
236 Ibid p. 31
237 Ibid p. 25
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point out, if the expressivist uses minimalism as a way of rendering moral statements 
truth-apt, and to assert is to make a truth-apt statement, then the expressivist is 
commited to the view that moral statements are assertions. If to assert is to express a 
belief, then moral statements express beliefs. And thus, the above authors argue, the 
expressivist must either allow his view to collapse, or else extend his minimalism to 
these other concepts as well. Thus can Dreier's statement that “Once Minimalism gets 
creeping, it's hard to see how to stop it”238 be converted into an argument: the simple 
quasi-realist who uses hard minimalism needs to divide claims into ones where he 
applies minimalism and ones where he does not, so that his view will be both plausible 
and distinct, but it seems like there is enough interdefinition between the relevant 
concepts that the quasi-realist cannot keep things that he would like to place on the 
“denial” side of the divide from migrating to the other list. 
It should be noted that those who consider this argument, such as Dreier (2004) 
and Asay (2013), have not seen the dificulty as only targeting simple quasi-realism 
that uses hard minimalism. They also wish to close of sof minimalism, of which they 
both choose Timmons (1999) to be the representative, though in doing so they continue
a debate which previously involved Boghossian (1990) and Stoljar (1993). Sof 
minimalism is not subject to the creeping minimalism worry without further argument,
because it is not an either/or proposition; the simple quasi-realist using sof 
minimalism may put every claim of the realist's in his list of claims to accept, and at 
the same time put as many of them as he pleases in his list of claims to deny, so long 
238 Dreier (2004) p. 29
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as he accepts them in the minimal sense and denies them in the substantial. The lists 
can be stable so long as the minimal claims are only interdefined with other minimal 
claims, and the robust claims are only interdefined with other robust claims. 
Plausibility can be maintained so long as it can be argued that practice needs no more 
than the ordinary sense to avoid error. Distinctness can be maintained so long as it can
be argued that the realist is commited to the relevant claims in the robust sense. 
Of the arguments that have been deployed against sof minimalism, some are 
beter than others. Boghossian (1990) and Asay (2013), for instance, both claim that 
terms like “truth” present a clear appearance of univocality, rendering sof minimalism 
implausible. But I see no reason whatsoever to agree with them about how truth and 
its compatriots seem. On the contrary; it seems to me like it is a concept that is used in 
many ways, and if there is a univocal core meaning underlying some or all of those 
uses, we shall have to do work before we can see it. For instance, one might respond to 
the claim that obelisks look best in obsidian with “that’s true”, while simultaneously 
believing, apparently without irrationality, that the coloring of obelisks is a mater of 
mere preference and thus not something where there is a “truth of the mater.” Now 
“true,” “belief”, etc. might not look particularly ambiguous, but that does not mater. 
Some of the early figures of relevance to the expressivist tradition, such as Stevenson 
(1944), and his influence Richards (e.g. 1936) saw ambiguity everywhere, and wondered
whether single, determinate meanings, outside of parts of the hard sciences, were even 
worth looking for. For present purposes, we needn't worry about whether or not we 
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agree with them; the mere fact that their views exist, without being entirely ignorant 
or insane, is enough to show that a concept appearing ordinary is not the same as it 
appearing univocal (though it may well be). So, whether we are ultimately sof 
minimalists or not, the univocality of “true” and the other concepts that are on the line 
will have to be setled by theory, not by appearances. 
The answer given by Dreier (2004) and Holton (2000) is beter. For the sof 
minimalist to have a position, he must be able to diferentiate minimal and robust 
senses of the relevant terms. There are various diferent forms of minimalism on ofer, 
but specifying the robust sense can be more dificult, especially if the expessivist is an 
expressivist because he does not find realism to make sense in the first place. Not only 
that, but the robust sense must be something which the expressivist can deny but to 
which the realist is commited, and the realist himself might not put any efort into 
proclaiming his robustness239. Dreier (2004) and Asay (2013) both discuss this issue 
using Timmons' (1999) notation of terms in all-caps to denote robust senses; hence 
assertion and ASSERTION, belief and BELIEF, properties and PROPERTIES, etc. The 
question then becomes how the sof minimalist can distinguish ASSERTION from 
assertion, BELIEF from belief, and so forth, without violating the provision that the all-
caps term must be something that the realist is commited to and the expressivist can 
deny. 
Sof minimalists have, of course, had things to say by way of elaboration. 
239 Indeed, he might even go so far as to follow Wright in endorsing minimalism, and thereby attempt an 
aggressive strategy against the expressivist. 
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Lenman (2003), for instance, distinguishes minimal and robust senses of truth-aptitude 
by recourse to whether or not the sentence could be transformed into a non-truth-apt 
form. What we have here is, afer all, a challenge, not a ban. In this regard, it is similar 
to the argument from creeping minimalism against the hard minimalist: the hard 
minimalist faces the challenge of identifying a place for minimalism to stop. There, too,
we see atempted solutions; Asay (2013), for instance, thinks that the idea of 
“truthmakers” allows us to identify a reasonable endpoint. In neither case is the 
expressivist required to give up without a fight. 
Nor, though, is the challenge trivial240. The proponent of the collapse objection 
might, for instance, reply that Lenman does not try hard enough to find non-truth-apt 
transformations of straightforward descriptive sentences (compare “treedog!” upon 
seeing a dog in a tree). Alternatively, he might point out that achieving reducibility in 
Lenman's sense commits the expressivist to a very simple view of the atitudes involved
in morality, one from which even Ayer (1936 [1952]) and Stevenson (1944) both took 
pains to distance themselves. If the expressivist wishes to hold, with Ayer, that moral 
atitudes are distinctive241, or, with Stevenson, that there is no precise emotive 
reduction of moral sentences242, or, with the later Blackburn, that the atitudes 
expressed in moral practice difer from simple exclamations by virtue of emotional 
240 The replies given here, I should note, are not meant as anything more than tentative sketches. 
Ultimately, I think that nuanced quasi-realism's advantages will be enough to render it a superior reply 
to the creeping minimalism challenge even if the minimalist is still able to offer an alternative. Thus, I 
do not mind if the simple quasi-realist is able to win here; in fact, it might be convenient for the 
expressivist to have a live minimalist option as a potential fallback. 
241 Ayer (1936 [1952]) p. 113
242 Stevenson (1944) p. 82
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ascent, and therefore permit no strict reduction243, then the only way to accomplish 
Lenman's reduction is to take Ayer's strategy of appeal to magical punctuation marks, 
such as a special ! 244; but if we allow ! the power to transform whatever we feed it into 
clearly non-truth-apt form, without the need for equivalence between what comes out 
aside from the ! and what went in, then we will be able to feed it any straightforward 
descriptive sentence as well. So I am not sure that Lenman is able to make the kind of 
distinction that he wants to make. 
To summarize this section: versions of quasi-realist expressivism using either 
hard or sof minimalism face the task of preserving the distinctness of their view from 
realism. The hard minimalist straightforwardly denies some of the realist's claims, 
while giving a minimalist analysis to others. The realist can respond by trying to show 
that the quasi-realist's chosen applications of minimalism commit him to minimalism 
on those claims that he wishes to deny, and that once those claims have been analyzed
minimalistically it is no longer plausible for the quasi-realist to deny them. The sof 
minimalist, on the other hand, distinguishes minimal and robust senses of the relevant 
claims, accepting them in the minimal sense while denying them in the robust sense. 
The realist can respond by trying to collapse the distinction between the two senses. 
6.2. More dificulties for quasi-realism
If we were to limit our considerations to the concern raised in the previous 
243 Blackburn (1998) pp. 12-14
244 Ayer (1936 [1952]) p. 107
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section, it would most likely seem like hard minimalism is the most promising option. 
What the hard minimalist needs to defend against the objection from creeping 
minimalism is a way of drawing a line in the sand, so to speak: he must be able to 
come up with a rule or principle to separate realist-seeming metaethical claims that 
should be understood minimally from those that should be understood robustly and 
while I am uncertain as to how he might do so, at the same time, the idea that there is 
so much interdefinition between the relevant concepts that dividing the minimal from 
the minimal is impossible needs more support before we can consider it proven. 
Unfortunately for the hard minimalist, there is another kind of objection that gives us 
strong reason to search for an alternative.
 Let us introduce this second concern by means of an illustration. Suppose we 
follow Asay (2013) and allow the quasi-realist to difer from the realist in his account of
the truthmaking relation. Asay's view, in our taxonomy, is classified as a form of hard 
minimalism; the quasi-realist, on this view, achieves distinctness when he denies that 
which the realist (presumably) would like to say about what makes (true) moral 
judgments true. Faced with such a view, the realist might challenge whether the quasi-
realist's alternative is adequate-- that is, if the quasi-realist can deny that there is a 
mind-independent truthmaking relation between the moral truths and reality without 
making us wonder if he isn't taking away an important contributor to the seriousness 
of morality. Contrast Asay's position on truthmaking with Blackburn's position on 
mind-independence: surely, speaking in the spirit of Blackburn, we cannot accept, for 
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instance (using Asay's example), that “kicking dogs is wrong” is only made true by the 
fact that it causes them pain because of our atitudes and the projection of atitudes 
onto the world. That would be to allow our atitudes to play about with our reason-
relations on a whim, which we cannot, plausibly, countenance. The recourse to 
truthmakers pushes the undesirable mind-dependence back by one level of 
explanation, but that is all; it does not eliminate it, and thus also does not allow the 
expressivist to take onboard his necessary burden of realism while not sinking into 
realism himself. 
The basic problem that faces Asay's view-- and all other quasi-realisms-- is that 
achieving the quasi-realist's goal seems to be an all or nothing proposition. In order 
that we might understand why that is so, we must first remind ourselves of the reason 
why an expressivist might choose to become a quasi-realist. The reason, quite simply, is
that realism seems right, at least before we think too much about it. For example, we 
react negatively to claims that moral arguments are not really capable of validity, or 
that there are no moral properties that really exist in the world; we take our negative 
reaction to such claims to be an intuition telling us that those claims are mistaken, and
that there really are logically valid moral arguments and moral properties that exist in 
the world. We also want consistency in our picture of language; moral sentences look 
like ordinary descriptive sentences, and moral arguments like ordinary arguments, and 
so it ofends our sense of neatness to have to say that moral language works in a 
fundamentally diferent way. To an extent, the later concern can be assuaged by a 
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story, told at the practical level, of why we might want to use moral language to 
express our atitudes as if we were describing the world. But even then we might 
wonder as to whether such a practice would be able to persist while relying on our 
continuing to misunderstand the nature of our own language. The purpose of quasi-
realism is to allow the expressivist to bring his view into conformity with the realist 
appearance of moral language, rather than having to accept the considerable burden 
inherent in arguing against the veracity of that appearance. 
Right away, we can see one area where we might worry about hard minimalism.
Hard minimalist quasi-realism encourages the expressivist to preserve his identity by 
denying some of the realist's claims. Yet, insofar as he does so, he will be going against 
the appearance of realism. Whatever distinctness his view possesses takes away from 
the extent to which it is able to be quasi-realist, and whatever extent to which it is 
quasi-realist takes away from its ability to remain distinct. Qasi-realism might not 
have to be perfectly faithful to the appearance of realism, but it would be nice if it 
could, since each denial comes at a cost of plausibility. Our unease with Asay's view is 
an example: in disagreeing with the realist about truthmakers for moral claims, that 
view seems to give us an incorrect answer to the question of mind-dependence. For an 
ambitious quasi-realist who seeks to render his view as plausible as possible, then, it 
might make sense to look into alternatives to hard minimalism.
Another, potentially more serious problem for hard minimalism presents itself 
when we consider a variation on the creeping minimalism argument, which we will call 
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“creeping boldness” (since the expressivist must be bold to deny openly that which the 
realist asserts). The danger of creeping minimalism is that quasi-realist expressivism 
will collapse into realism. But there is also the worry that hard minimalist quasi-realist 
expressivism will collapse into plain expressivism. This worry exists because of the 
same connections between the various components of realism as motivated the 
creeping minimalism worry; where there exists an inconsistent triad between a claim 
the quasi-realist accepts (though analysis), one that the quasi-realist denies, and a 
definitionally motivated biconditional between the two, resolution may be achieved by 
the expressivist coming to accept that which he denied (creeping minimalism) or by his
coming to deny that which he accepted (creeping boldness). Avoiding both creeping 
minimalism and creeping boldness requires taking a third path: denying the 
biconditional to form a break point between those claims that the quasi-realist 
analyzes and accepts and those that he denies. But it is dificult to see how this could 
be done. 
Examples can help us understand this argument. Dreier (2004) divides the 
continuum of positions between the boldest expressivism and full-blooded realism into 
four kinds of positions245: “old emotivism”, which denies the existence of moral truths, 
facts, and propositions, also denies that moral statements are assertions or expressiosn 
of beliefs, and further denies that moral statements describe or express 
representational states246; “new expressivism”, which accepts moral 
245 The chart on page 28 of Dreier's article is helpful in keeping track of the various positions, though, as 
that article is readily available, I will not reproduce the chart here. 
246 Dreier bases this position off of the 1930s version of Ayer's emotivism. 
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truths/facts/propositions but maintains the other denials of old emotivism247, 
“cognitivist expressivism”, which is similar to new expressivism except that it now 
accepts, rather than denies, that moral statements are assertions and express beliefs248, 
and “raving realism”, which accepts all of the claims that old emotivism denies. Dreier's
worry is that it seems like cognitivist expressivism will have a hard time distinguishing 
itself from raving realism. But there is a similar worry in the other direction. As Dreier 
(2004) tells the story, cognitivist expressivism emerges out of new expressivism via the 
denial of the idea that assertion and belief are conceptually linked to description-- thus
does the cognitivist expressivist atempt to earn the right to claim that the sentences of
moral discourse are assertions and express beliefs, even though they are neither 
247 Dreier sees this position as modeled after those of Gibbard and Blackburn, though I think those 
positions work much better if read as employing soft nuanced quasi-realism, for reasons that will 
occupy much of the remainder of this chapter. A word of warning, however: for reasons that we will 
not get around to discussing until later in this chapter, a soft nuanced quasi-realist will often sound like 
a hard nuanced quasi-realist, to the extent that all but the most careful reading is likely to confuse them.
For example, in his 1988b paper “How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist,” Blackburn addresses 
an objection from Cassam (1986), who alleges that Blackburn’s quasi-realist response to the question 
of mind-dependence improperly disregards the “external” reading of the question. Blackburn, in 
response, seems to deny that there is an external reading (he writes: “there would be an external reading
if realism were true”; Blackburn 1988b [1993] p. 173) at all. But we must be more careful in how we 
read him. His response to the charge of willful deafness is that “there is only one proper way to take the
question” (ibid); in the next paragraph, he writes:
This is not, of course, to deny that ‘external’ questions make sense-- the projectivist 
plus quasi-realist package is an external philosophical theory about the nature of 
morality. But external questions must be conducted in a different key once this 
package is brought in. (ibid)
This quote suggests that we should not dismiss the “proper” in Blackburn’s answer as a disposable 
word for taking care of trivial responses, but that we should treat it as something more substantial. The 
suggestion that we must proceed in a “different key” favors an interpretation on which Blackburn sees 
only a single reading as being available not because he endorses hard quasi-realism but because there is
some kind of other consideration that can, at least sometimes, rule out the external reading from even 
being part of a debate. Unfortunately, Blackburn does not tell us what kind of other consideration can 
do that. A significant portion of the remainder of this chapter will go towards rectifying that omission. 
248 Dreier models this position off of Timmons (1999). The later Horgan and Timmons (2008) is also a 
good read. 
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descripti--ons nor expressions of representational states. This strategy is the right way 
of going about drawing a line between what the quasi-realist should accept and what 
he should deny-- that is, it resolves the inconsistent triad by denying the definitionally 
motivated biconditional. But it's also easier said than done. Majors (2008) argues that 
any supposed non-descriptive belief is not, in fact, a belief at all, since there are no 
other grounds-- and in particular no phenomenological grounds-- by which it might be 
justifiably categorized as such. For my part, I find it hard to understand the notion of a 
non-descriptive belief because both minimalism and boldness can creep so easily. If it is
given that such a thing is not descriptive or representational, it seems tempting to 
want to call it something other than a belief. At the same time, if it is given that a state
is a belief, it is tempting to allow whatever is believed by someone in that state to 
count, at least minimally, as the descriptive or representational content of that belief. 
As much as the cognitive expressivist might want to argue against the connection 
between belief and representation, doing so seems to be, at best, an uphill batle. 
So far we have looked at the problems that boldness and creeping boldness 
create for the hard minimalist. These sorts of worries are not exclusive to hard 
minimalist expressivism, though; a similar problem faces sof minimalism. Like hard 
minimalism, sof minimalism seems to risk, first of all, implausibility from when it does
robust meta-ethics and disagrees with the realist, and secondly, a collapse into either 
realism or plain expressivism. We considered the later earlier, as a branch of the 
creeping minimalism problem; unless the quasi-realist can make the diference 
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between minimal and robust senses clear, he is in danger of becoming a realist (if the 
only coherent sense is the minimal) or a straightforward expressivist (if the only 
coherent sense is the robust). Let us now consider the way in which it stands to fail at 
achieving its goal of satisfying our realist intuitions.
Sof minimalism tend to be vulnerable to an atack by stipulation. There is 
nothing to stop the realist from simply stipulating that he is speaking in the robust 
rather than minimal sense, and when he does so, he does not seem to diminish thereby
the realist appearance of moral discourse. Adding the proviso “in the robust sense” does
nothing to take the sting out of losing moral properties or the validity of moral 
arguments; our intuitions seem to remain steadfastly in favor of realism even when we 
make explicit that we are talking about robust realism (whatever that winds up being). 
Qasi-realism that uses sof minimalism, then, is in danger of being useless; the quasi-
realist expressivist gains nothing by endorsing realist claims in the minimal sense if his 
denials of those claims in the robust sense constitute just as much of an afront to our 
intuitions as did the original unqualified denials of the plain expressivist. 
All in all, it seems that both forms of minimalist quasi-realism fall short of 
achieving what the quasi-realist wants. Neither hard nor sof minimalism seems 
successful in relieving the expressivist of the burden of plausibility that he carries from 
denying initially atractive realist claims. Furthermore, we can create a variation on the
problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of creeping boldness, which threatens 
the quasi-realist's ability to be anything more than a plain expressivist. Given these 
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problems, it seems reasonable to investigate the alternative to simple quasi-realism. 
6.3. Nuanced quasi-realism
Nuanced quasi-realism-- for which Blackburn (1984, 1993, 1998) is the primary 
source-- difers from simple quasi-realism in using expressivist, rather than minimalist, 
analyses to adopt realist claims. Like simple quasi-realism, it can come in hard or sof 
forms; hard nuanced quasi-realism chooses some realist claims to analyze 
expressivistically and accept, and others to simply deny, while sof nuanced quasi-
realism posits that many or all of the realist's claims admit of both expressive and 
descriptive readings, and are to be accepted on the former but denied on the later. My 
eventual goal in this paper is to defend sof nuanced quasi-realism. 
At first, nuanced quasi-realism might seem less promising than simple quasi-
realism. This is so because it requires more work-- the nuanced quasi-realist must come
up with plausible expressivist understandings of realist meta-ethical claims-- while 
seeming to sufer from parallel problems. In this section, we will, first, outline how 
nuanced quasi-realism is meant to work, and then examine the problems that it faces.
Coming up with expressivist analyses of realist meta-ethical claims is more of 
an art than a science. Simple quasi-realism can draw upon the minimalist formula, but 
nuanced quasi-realism has no such rigid procedure. Instead, the nuanced quasi-realist 
proceeds by thinking about what it is that motivates us to defend realist metaethics, 
and in particular what we want for or fear happening to the practice of moral discourse
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and the exercise of morality in general. By means of these considerations, he hopes to 
generate expressivist analyses of the realist's claims which are plausible by virtue of 
their connection to concerns that we already recognize as present in meta-ethical 
theorizing. 
We can understand the approach beter if we consider some examples. Take, as 
our first case, that of a nuanced quasi-realist who would like to claim that there exist 
moral properties. He might find it fruitful to look at the sort of emotional upset that is 
generated by the denial of moral properties-- that we worry that a morality without 
properties would not “count” or be good enough, that there would be nothing to make 
us take it seriously or treat it as mind-independent. The idea is that the meta-ethical 
claim that such properties actually exist is a reflection of exactly those concerns; it 
expresses our atitude of disapproval towards un-serious or ofensively mind-dependent
treatment of moral issues. 
Blackburn's (1984) and (1988a [1993]) argument against moral relativism is also 
a useful example. Blackburn sees the denial of the relativist thesis as an expression of 
the limits of our tolerance: we do not condone an unlimited variability in the atitudes 
of others, though their circumstances and individual propensities might vary quite 
extensively. Rather, there are many cases where we not only disapprove of a type of 
action, but also disapprove of anyone's approving of such actions, regardless of the 
other person's other atitudes or whatever social or cultural factors might encourage 
the approval. Our discomfort with the relativist thesis is a result of these disapprovals, 
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and our rejection of the thesis is an expression of them. Given that we do feel such 
discomfort, and that it seems well-placed to motivate us in our denial of relativism, the 
expressivist analysis of the relativism issue seems to be a good match for the 
phenomenology of the debate. 
Nuanced quasi-realism is subject to problems that parallel those threatening 
simple quasi-realism. Like simple quasi-realist expressivism, nuanced quasi-realist 
expressivism must be prepared to defend its distinctness against potential collapses 
into either straightforward expressivism or realism. Hard nuanced quasi-realism 
depends on there being enough independence between the various claims of realism 
that it is coherent to analyze and accept some of them, but not all; if this proves 
impossible, it will have to either accept or deny the entire set. At the same time, hard 
nuanced quasi-realism sufers from the same inadequacy as hard simple quasi-realism; 
it only partially resolves the awkwardness that comes to threaten the expressivist when
he denies seemingly plausible realist claims, since it cannot accommodate all such 
claims without becoming indistinguishable from realism. 
Sof nuanced quasi-realism seems to face even worse problems; since it uses 
expressive analyses, but at the same time acknowledges a non-expressive reading, it 
needs to justify the relevance of the expressive analysis in answering philosophical 
questions. For example, if the quasi-realist wishes, as Blackburn does, to claim that the 
question of mind-dependence should be understood as a moral question, he will have 
to defend himself against the realist’s insistence that there is a perfectly viable 
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understanding of mind-dependence available which is primarily descriptive, that 
expressivism is commited to mind-dependence in the descriptive sense, and that being
commited to mind-dependence in the descriptive sense is a cost. Given that the realist 
objector was not intending to make a moral claim, but rather a metaphysical one, 
presumption is not on the quasi-realist’s side. And yet the sof nuanced quasi-realist 
seems to give up his greatest tool-- the ability to say that there is only one 
interpretation of the claims about mind-dependence, and if the realist objector insists 
that he does not mean the claims in that way, then he is simply speaking gibberish-- 
for dealing with the situation. 
For that mater, there seems to be nothing to stop the realist objector from 
simply stipulating that he intends the external reading. Such an objector might state: 
“On a purely metaphysical level, expressivism is commited to the mind-dependence of 
moral facts. Yet moral facts are mind-independent. Therefore, expressivism is false.” 
This argument is dangerous for sof nuanced quasi-realists because our faith in the 
mind-independence of moral facts is not shaken in the slightest by the stipulation that 
we are talking purely metaphysically. The realist objector does not even need an idea 
for what the puerly mind-independence thesis would be; he need only specify that he 
is using whatever external reading the sof nuanced quasi-realist is willing to 
countenance.
Nuanced quasi-realism, then, does not initially seem to represent much of an 
improvement over simple quasi-realism. I will argue, however, that we have a way of 
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saving sof nuanced quasi-realism. If the arguments I present in the following sections 
are compelling, they will show that the move made by the realist objector in 
atempting to insist on an external reading is unsuccessful; try as he might, the 
objector does not succeed in escaping from the moral domain. Once we understand the
dificulties in atempting to work with external readings, we will, I think, be able to 
defend the legitimacy of the quasi-realist’s focus on internal, that is, expressive ways of
understanding typically realist meta-ethical claims. 
6.4. Richards and Stevenson again
As enlightened moderns, we may not feel particularly inclined to accept many 
of Richards' positions. Nonetheless, there are lessons to be learned from him, some of 
which are relevant to the topic of quasi-realism. These are:
First, returning to the motivation for the project of multiple definition in 
Richards (1933), stipulation has its limits249, and if it is weak anywhere, it is weak on 
249 Richards writes:
Every word in every philosopher’s abstract vocabulary has, I take it, a number of 
different senses to mislead his readers (and, alas, too often, himself). A remedy for this 
would seem to be to have more words; and to put “one word, one sense; one sense, one 
word” before us as a slogan. But, as we all know, the new words tend to take over the 
ambiguities of the old, and the result is only more words which need still more careful 
watching. (Richards (1933) p. 31)
Richards worries that we might attempt to disambiguate philosophical terminology through 
stipulation-- to create new words for each sense, and thereby have one sense per word. He thinks that 
this approach is likely to be unsuccessful, because the new words, having inherited their meanings 
(here I use the term in his sense) from particular senses of older words, will become associated with 
those older words, and that that, in turn, will cause shades of meaning to leach over into the new terms. 
We needn’t be as extreme as Richards in this regard. To go so far as to ban new terminology 
seems excessive. Likewise, we needn’t insist that whatever theory of meaning we might otherwise 
favor bequeath the title of “meaning” to any effect on the use or causal effects of a word brought about 
174
emotive meaning250. Atempting to stipulate a term that is like another term but 
without inheriting its emotive meaning, or with a new emotive meaning, typically fails.
As a demonstration, let us now invent a new form of poetry. In this form of poetry, 
which we will call stipu-poetry, rather than exploiting traditional poetic devices, we 
make use of new terms, which are stipulated to carry the emotive meaning that would 
have been created by those devices. In that vein, I present a stipu-poem entitled “Bob.” 
It goes as follows:
-Begin-
Let “xvf” carry the same descriptive meaning as “sad”, but let it be extremely evocative; 
let it express extreme sorrow. 
Bob was xvf. 
-End-
Somehow, I doubt this form of poetry will catch on.  
We should note that, per Richards' comments on the mater, the weakness can 
be either positive or negative. Our example above demonstrates that emotive meaning 
is dificult to generate.
by this leaching. Yet there is certainly some truth to his comment, as we will see from various 
examples. 
250 As per my earlier notes on Richards’ terminology, keep in mind that the label of “meaning” is optional, 
and not intended as a claim that such functions satisfy the criteria for meaning endorsed by any theory 
of meaning save Richards' own. Feel free to substitute “expressive content,” if that phrase is more 
comfortable. As a reminder, I will do so occasionally. 
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Richards' argument against the introduction of new terms claims that it is also 
hard to prevent. Likewise, I see no reason to suppose that stipulating emotive meaning 
out, of, for example a poem, will go any beter than stipulating it in. We can motivate 
this idea by means of another demonstration.251 For reasons of propriety, this 
demonstration will be stated as a procedure rather than an example. To start with, 
choose an ethnic slur. Next, imagine a new term, which we construct by taking the 
ethnic slur and adding an asterisk. Stipulate that this new term is defined as having 
the same descriptive content as the previous term, but none of the expressive content. 
Now consider the new term. Such consideration will reveal that the stipulation-out of 
the expressive content has (most likely) failed. 
Furthermore, even if we do succeed in removing expressive content through the 
creation of a new term, it may return in short order. Take, for example, the replacement
of “mentally retarded” with “mentally challenged”; it seemingly took no time 
whatsoever for the new term to become usable as a pejorative, despite the new term 
having been introduced specifically for the purposes of avoiding pejorative 
connotations. In fact, it seems that we sometimes struggle to create non-pejorative 
terms for certain groups, such as those referred to by the above phrases; names for 
them acquire negative expressive content faster than we can come up with new ones. 
That we can find ourselves in such a struggle against our own language, and 
potentially lose, says interesting things about our ability to control expressive content, 
or lack thereof.
251 With thanks to Josh Dever for the case. 
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We needn't take all that much from Richards to learn this lesson from him. His 
theory could explain why stipulation is weak-- the new term not having participated in
the right sorts of contexts, nor possessing the interanimative links of the original, while
at the same time possessing its own links in virtue of being its own word-- but we do 
not need to keep his reasons. What we need is the weakness itself, which, our atention
having been called to it by Richards, we can observe on our own. 
An interesting consequence of these observations is that if an area of discourse 
is shot through with emotive meaning, de-emotivising it is no simple task. Introducing 
new terminology will not do the job. Accordingly, when working in such an area, there 
may be times when it is dificult to avoid making a statement with emotive meaning. If
we also take a moral from Richards-- though once again we may disagree with him as 
to the source if necessary-- that the seting exercises a great deal of control over the 
meaning (broadly construed) of language, even ordinary language without explicit 
openings for context, and we combine this idea with the intractability of emotive 
meaning, we wind up with a picture on which, potentially, there can exist areas of 
discourse where the control of the speaker over his emotive meaning, at least if he 
proceeds by purely prosaic techniques, will be quite low. And at the same time, if we 
follow Richards, we will regard the emotive meaning as worthy of taking seriously, 
despite its non-descriptiveness, and will do so whether it is inherent or derived, alone 
or accompanied by other kinds of meaning-- to do otherwise is just to be misled by the 
various Myths to which Richards calls our atention. 
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The next moral that seems worth taking from Richards is the pervasiveness of 
complexity. Of course, once again, we may have to adjust some terminology, and we 
may disagree about the lower-level mechanisms that explain all of this, but we cannot 
easily disregard his observations about the subtle influences on the overall efect of bits
of language. Very simple language-- what we might call “purely descriptive and 
univocal”-- is, for Richards, confined to parts of the hard sciences; everywhere else, 
there exists-- and we embrace-- complexity. 
The thing to note on this point is that philosophy is part of the everywhere else. 
Of course, if we want to be expressivists, we must have some sympathy for that idea 
already; afer all, to be an expressivist is in part to take a branch of philosophy-- 
namely ethics-- and conceive of it primarily in terms of emotive meaning. But what of 
other areas? Stevenson, following Richards, argues that “meaning” is itself rich in 
(positive) emotive meaning252. Likewise, he argues that “validity” is quite strongly 
emotive. As we discussed in Chapter 4, he has the insight that, when compared to that 
which is “valid,” other methods of argument pale; they become “merely”-methods 
(“merely persuasive,” “merely rhetorical,” and so on)-- and so seem inappropriate for 
ethics. 
We cannot simply assume that there is a non-derivative expressive content to 
these terms. It may well be that denying the validity of moral arguments, for instance, 
upsets us not because it expresses a cavalier atitude towards moral reasoning, but 
252 Stevenson (1944) p. 42. My reluctance to discard the outdated phrase “emotive meaning” is due to this 
effect. We shall see shortly why it is that the effect must be respected. 
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because it is descriptively false. Distinguishing independent expressive content from 
descriptive content that provokes a reaction is a dificult question, and one that we will
not fully answer even when we return to it in section 6 of this chapter. For the time 
being, however, let us grant the claim-- drawing not only on the insights of Richards 
and Stevenson but also on the nature of the expressivist project itself-- that expressions
of atitudes can not only be the object of philosophical study, but can, in fact, 
participate in philosophical theories. 
Put so bluntly, the claim seems surprising, but it is nothing that the expressivist 
has not been saying all along. Afer all, the expressivist does not suddenly turn realist 
when the scope of a moral claim increases. If bits of small-scale moralizing-- such as 
“using the blender to liquefy your pet hamster is wrong”-- are to be understood as 
expressions of atitudes (“boo for liquefying your hamster in the blender!”, perhaps), 
then so too are bits of large-scale moralizing, like “it is wrong to treat others as mere 
means to one’s own end”. Such large-scale moralizations are the building blocks  of 
first-order ethical theories. Thus, expressions of atitudes are part of the composition of
such theories. 
Nuanced quasi-realism claims that at least part of meta-ethics is also composed
of expressions of atitudes. At the same time, it also adds a complication by granting, as
all forms of quasi-realism do, that expressions of atitudes may be true or false. Truth-
aptitude tends to be a high priority for quasi-realists. It is rare to find an expressivist 
with so much boldness as to deny that moral statements may be legitimately 
179
regarded as true or false; as we saw in Chapter 3, even Ayer, by the mid 1950s, was 
willing to countenance some employment of truth and falsity within the moral realm. 
This maneuver will extend to those expressions of atitudes that constitute parts of 
philosophical theories, including those that participate in meta-ethics. Understanding 
the sof nuanced quasi-realist answer to the challenge facing it requires that we 
understand how to treat theories with truth-apt expressions of atitudes as 
components. 
6.5. Dialectical constraints
We are now in a position to establish, making use of the expressivist's 
inheritance, certain constraints for the dialectic process when expressions of atitudes 
participate in theory. 
Emotive Accuracy:  The emotive accuracy constraint is derived from the premise that 
emotive meaning is common, even in philosophy (which is itself derived from the 
combination of Stevenson's observations about the likes of “meaning” and “validity”, 
Richards' observations on the ubiquity of emotive meaning in general, and the 
expressivist's willingness to see emotive meaning in ethics) and the premise that 
emotive meaning is important (derived from the elimination of Richards' myths and 
the quasi-realist's desire to, somehow or other, enable emotive statements to be true or 
false). It claims that, just as a theoretician should not make descriptive claims with 
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which he disagrees, so too he should not make emotive claims with which he 
disagrees-- and, thanks to the ubiquity of emotive meaning, this is a real danger in 
philosophy. If our quasi-realist plans to apply his quasi-realism to the subject of truth, 
he must be prepared to place himself in a situation where he can say something false-- 
and no less so than in the ordinary case-- if it expresses the wrong atitude. 
Accordingly, when theorizing, he must be just as careful about his emotive meaning as 
his descriptive meaning.
The point here bears repeating, because it is important. The expressivist must 
accept that expressions of emotion can themselves be part of a philosophical theory, 
unless he wishes to abolish theorizing in ethics altogether-- which goes against the 
quasi-realist's goal of modesty. If he atains truth-aptitude for such expressions in his 
pursuit of modesty, then those parts of his theory, like all the others, will be capable of 
truth or falsity. If he gets those parts of his theory wrong, he is in the same sort of 
situation-- that of having false claims in his theory-- as if he had goten any other parts
of his theory wrong. The application of quasi-realism to the subject of truth, combined 
with the fact that an expression of an atitude may be a genuine part of a theory, 
rather than a mere consequence, creates a parity between descriptive and expressive 
error. 
Emotive Subtlety: The emotive subtlety constraint is the result of the fact that emotive 
meaning is dificult to control (which we derived above from observation and the 
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concerns of Richards) and the emotive accuracy constraint. The expessivist must 
recognize the emotive meaning that his claims will carry in a particular seting and, if 
he is also following the emotive accuracy constraint, adapt accordingly. This constraint 
is of particular relevance when emotive meaning and descriptive meaning are both 
present in a claim. Not only may the expressivist not miss either one, but there may 
not be an easy and straightforward way of separating the two, or at any rate not one 
that can be done through definition, stipulation, or perhaps even, more generally, the 
kinds of techniques that would allow you to convey exactly what you want to convey 
whenever you want to convey it. 
Although we have already talked about this dificulty, it is worth lingering on 
the mater a while longer to explore the workings of the emotive subtlety constraint.  
The expressivist must maintain emotive accuracy over expressive content that he 
cannot easily control. Accordingly, the proper statement of an expressivist view might 
be indirect, and require some unpacking to understand. I must confess that I have not 
always given this constraint the respect that it deserves. In particular, when discussing 
mimicking expressivism, I have made claims that are, in their expressive import, false; 
my aim was to be more straightforward in my description of the fundamentals of 
expressivism, but, due to the intractability of expressive content, the fact that I was 
only interested in the descriptive level of my presentation does not eliminate the 
expressive. Blackburn, on the other hand, is far more careful, though less descriptively 
direct as a result; my presentation ofen diverges from his due to this diference. 
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Emotive Primacy: An expressivist subject to the prior constraints will ofen find himself 
in a dificult situation. He will face questions that seem to have no right answer: where 
there is a descriptive content with which he disagrees, but an emotive content (or 
suggestion or implication) with which he agrees, or visa versa. Realists needn't be 
concerned about such situations; they do not elevate expressions of atitudes to the 
level of participating in theory, afer all, so they are not subject to the emotive accuracy
constraint. For the expressivist, on the other hand, it seems that there is a problem. 
Resolving such cases is complicated by the other constraints. According to the 
emotive accuracy constraint, there is no significant diference in the situations of a 
theory that includes a false descriptive claim and one that includes a false (or 
unacceptable) emotive claim; the same kind and magnitude of error is commited in 
both cases. At the same time, the emotive subtlety constraint bars any quick and easy 
way of disentangling the descriptive and emotive. We cannot make the emotive efect 
of a term appear or disappear through stipulation. Even creating new terms will not 
help, because, as Richards writes, “[A]s we all know, the new words tend to take over 
the ambiguities of the old, and the result is only more words which need still more 
careful watching.”253 That there is no efortless way to get exactly the mixture of 
descriptive meaning and emotive efect that one desires would, no doubt, seem a 
trivially obvious observation to any student of rhetoric, literature, or poetry; 
philosophers, too, could benefit from keeping that fact in mind. 
253 Richards (1933) p. 31
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Owing to the emotive subtlety constraint, a philosopher who seeks to challenge 
a theory comprised of both descriptive and emotive claims, some of which use the 
same words as one another, does not possess full ownership of his challenge. What I 
mean when I say that he does not possess full ownership of the challenge is that he has
no way, short of employing artful rhetoric, control over the context, and masterful self-
discipline, to control whether he uses, reacts to, or even thinks with the expressive 
rather than descriptive sense of a claim that permits both expressive and descriptive 
readings. Enquiry is required to discover whether an intuition that a certain 
metaethical claim is required, or on the other hand implausible, stems from the 
descriptive or emotive reading of the claim-- and such enquiry will require deep 
humanistic thinking owing to the unavailability of the fast and easy methods typically 
employed by philosophers. 
It stands to reason, then, that anything like coming up with a definitive rule for 
identifying when an objector has slipped into thinking in the internal (expressive) sense
would be a far more massive undertaking than we have the liberty to atempt here. 
Instead, in the next section I will aim for the more humble goal of providing some 
reasons to think that many of the objections that might be posed against expressivism 
hinge on the expressive rather than descriptive content of meta-ethical claims. Before 
then, though, we need to work out how the expressivist is to treat mixed cases.
The emotive primacy constraint states that the asymmetry in intractability 
between descriptive and expressive content requires that we give first priority to the 
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expressive content in answering meta-ethical questions. That is, when asked to accept 
or deny a particular meta-ethical claim, where that claim takes both expressive and 
descriptive readings, the expressivist must answer based on the expressive reading. The 
reason why expressive content must be given priority is that doing so is the only way 
to achieve clarity. We cannot easily consider the descriptive content on its own, thanks 
to the intractability of expressive content; descriptive content, on the other hand, is 
amenable to the usual philosophical manipulations. That is not to say that we must 
endorse quietism in large areas of descriptive meta-ethics. Emotive meaning is 
stubborn, but not entirely uncontrollable. But unless we can be sure we have 
undertaken the proper rhetorical and contextual manipulations to engage solely with 
the descriptive sense, discussion must be constrained to the expressive. 
The emotive primacy constraint is useful to the quasi-realist. The sof nuanced 
quasi-realist can use the emotive primacy constraint to address worries such as those 
of Cassam (1986), who alleges that the quasi-realist is willfully blind to the purely 
descriptive sense of the mind-dependence objection. Blackburn's response to Cassam 
(see footnote #247) is that there is only one “proper” way to understand the question of 
mind-dependence. The emotive primacy constraint gives us a way of making sense of 
Blackburn's response: there is, indeed, an external sense of mind-dependence, but that 
sense is barred from being part of the debate by emotive primacy. By exploiting the 
constraint of emotive primacy, the sof nuanced quasi-realism can be whole-hearted in 
his adoption of realist claims in spite of his sofness; there is, for him, only one answer 
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to the relevant meta-ethical questions-- only, this answer is subject to supplementation
by an external explanation, and revision in certain, peculiarly cold contexts. 
The quasi-realist can exploit the emotive primacy constraint in another way as 
well. When a question is posed with both expressive and descriptive content, the 
expressivist must answer in accordance with the expressive content. Only if the 
expressive content is stripped away can the descriptive content be debated. According 
to emotive subtlety, it is dificult to know when this has occurred; the objector cannot 
bring it about by stipulation. The expressivist may thus make the following argument: 
by default, the meta-ethical debate proceeds according to the expressive sense (emotive
primacy). We do not know for sure that we have moved on to the purely descriptive 
sense so long as any significant expressive efect is present. Yet, any cases where there 
is no significant expressive efects will be ones in which any intuitions to suggest that 
the expressivist's (descriptive) position is costly are no longer present. So long as the 
expressivist's non-expressive description of his position feels wrong, it is possible that 
we have not really escaped from the expressive discourse forced upon us by emotive 
primacy, in which case the expressivist may answer by presenting his internal position. 
This argument answers the primary concern that we had with sof nuanced 
quasi-realism: that the objector may stipulate a purely descriptive reading of his 
objection to the expressivist's descriptive position, and the stipulation does not take the
force out of the objection. According to the reply I have just ofered, so long as the 
expression has its force, we cannot know that we are actually arguing in the descriptive
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sense, and so it would be premature to conclude that the problem can really survive the
shif to purely descriptive language. 
6.6 Some signs that meta-ethics is itself expressive
In the previous section, I introduced the constraints of emotive accuracy, 
emotive subtlety, and emotive primacy. The emotive accuracy constraint applies 
whenever a theory contains truth-apt expressions of atitudes, the emotive subtlety 
constraint applies to all expressive content, and the emotive primacy constraint applies
to those cases where a claim that is part of a theory possesses both descriptive and 
truth-apt expressive content and the theory wishes to agree with only one of the two 
meanings. Sof nuanced quasi-realism will want to claim that all three constraints 
apply to meta-ethics, because many or all realist meta-ethical claims can be 
understood both as robust, metaphysical claims, and as expressive claims. The sof 
nuanced strategy is to apply the emotive primacy constraint in order to argue that the 
meta-ethical debate is actually about the claims in their expressive senses. Were it not, 
quasi-realism would be irrelevant, since it would not have accepted the realist claims in
the senses in which we are interested in preserving them; but if it is about the 
expressive senses, then the expressivist can gain plausibility while continuing to remain
distinct from realism. 
In order to make the sof nuanced position compelling, the quasi-realist must 
give us some reasons to think that his expressive analyses are correct. In giving such 
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reasons, the goal is not to prove that meta-ethical discourse is necessarily expressive-- 
that would lead us into hard quasi-realism, which cannot ofer a complete capture of 
realism while maintaining distinctness. Nor is it to show that in practice all meta-
ethical discourse up to this point has been expressive, for there are other possibilities, 
such as the rare properly descriptive case and the case of the theorist who talks 
nonsense, which are not ruled out. At any rate, either of these two goals would require 
much stronger reasons than those that are actually available to the quasi-realist. 
Rather, the quasi-realist’s strategy will be to try and give us reasons that suggest key 
meta-ethical claims have expressive readings, and then lean on the principle of emotive
primacy to show that insofar as our discourse in meta-ethics is not hopelessly garbled, 
it must use those expressive readings. 
Finding expressive content within meta-ethics is not a new project. As we have 
already seen, Richards, Stevenson, and even Ayer had insights that will help the quasi-
realist here. For example, consider Stevenson’s observation about validity. As a 
mimicking expressivist, when I claim that moral arguments are amenable to validity, I 
am applying quasi-realism; what I mean is that the arguments can have forms that I 
endorse, and think we ought to regard as compelling, in the same was as we do valid 
descriptive arguments. Now suppose that a realist claims that this is not the kind of 
validity that we are interested in when we debate metaethics. He might claim, for 
instance, that our intuitions tell us that moral arguments are potentially valid, and that
the “validity” that he is talking about when he makes such a claim is simply a mater of
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having one of the logical forms that we recognize as valid for descriptive arguments. 
Whom should we trust about the subject of the debate?
Before continuing, I should point out that the quasi-realist needn’t, and perhaps
shouldn’t, fight this particular batle, thanks to the recursive nature of the quasi-realist 
tactic. Perhaps he might say that moral arguments really do have their apparent forms,
where this claim is to be understood as a moral claim-- that is, as a claim about how 
moral arguments are to be treated. According to emotive primacy, the quasi-realist 
may be compelled to answer in this way; indeed, there may well be dialectical 
situations where an external claim never becomes available. But let us cheat a litle bit 
for the sake of the example; we will suppose, for the time being, that the dialectical 
situation allows for suficient control of expressive content that the quasi-realist may 
make his external claim without thereby violating the emotive accuracy constraint. 
Allow me to suggest, though it is understandable if the reasons for this suggestion do 
not yet seem clear, that if the quasi-realist’s stance in the following discussion seems 
uterly bizarre, it is because our atempt at dialectical cheating has been caught, rather 
than because of an actual problem with the quasi-realist’s position. 
The quasi-realist answer to the question with which we ended the paragraph 
before last comes in two parts. First, he must ofer reasons to suppose that there is an 
expressive sense of “valid”, and not simply an emotional reaction to the descriptive 
content. Second, he will deploy the emotive primacy constraint to block any atempt by
the realist to make the debate about anything but the expressive sense. Let us consider 
189
these parts in turn. 
With regards to the expressive notion of validity, Stevenson’s insight is 
important, but it is not the only evidence available. We can also observe the use of 
“valid” amongst the folk, most of whom have no training in logic and thus no inkling of
any technical sense of “valid”. The folk, if my observations are representative, use 
“valid” to praise pieces of reasoning, statements used in arguments, and conclusions. 
We should also make some observations about the intuition to which the realist wishes
to appeal. First, the strength of the intuition seems to vary in proportion to the extent 
to which the mimicking position is phrased in such a way as to seem to take something
away from morality. “Moral arguments are not really capable of validity” strikes us as 
less ofensive than “moral arguments are all invalid”, which is less ofensive than “moral
arguments are all just rhetoric.”  Second, calling a moral argument invalid seems to 
trouble us without having a particular notion of validity in mind; it even (and perhaps 
especially) seems to do so on the senses of “validity” used by members of the folk who 
are wholly unschooled in the terminology of logic. Thirdly, we should be aware of the 
feeling of the intuition itself. When thinking about meta-ethical issues, our experience 
of contemplation is somewhat diferent from in other areas of philosophy. We ofen feel
worried, or troubled-- like a meta-ethical theory is bad, not just mistaken. Suggestions 
of taking something away from ethics disturb us, rather than seeming absurd or silly. 
Qestions about validity are anything but an exception to this trend. All of these 
observations suggest that our intuition is responding to an expressive rather than a 
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descriptive claim. 
The second half of the quasi-realist argument is to deploy emotive primacy. The 
realist will want to argue that the quasi-realist’s talk of an expressive sense of validity 
is irrelevant, because we can simply stipulate that we are using the technical, purely 
descriptive sense. But the constraints suggest that the expressive sense is inescapable; 
the realist atempts to talk in a purely descriptive sense, but he does not succeed. So 
long as the expressive sense, which resists the realist’s atempt to stipulate it away, is 
present, it is, according to the emotive primacy constraint, the sense that we are 
talking about. Were this not the case, we would be unable to control what we are 
talking about; we would thus be unable to know what to make of the results of the 
debate, and would be forced to discard them. Only the results of the expressive 
debate-- in which the quasi-realist’s claim accords with our intuition-- can be counted. 
This is not to say that we cannot ever use the descriptive sense. If we are certain
that the expressive content, for all of its stubbornness, has been removed, then we can 
speak externally. Yet it is very dificult to be sure that we have created an environment 
where descriptive philosophical debate can proceed without confusion from expressive 
content so long as we observe emotive efects, which we do so long as the intuition to 
which the realist appeals remains. Perhaps, when our knowledge of emotive meaning is
more advanced than it is now, we will be able to identify other conditions under which 
non-derivative expressive content has been eradicated, in which case we would have to 
revisit the case of validity. But, given the evidence to suggest that the intuition tracks 
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the expressive sense of validity, and the lack of evidence to suggest that this intuition is
ever replaced by a diferent one, one dependent on the descriptive meaning alone, at 
any stage of the debate, I see no no reason to believe that such future research will 
change our verdict. 
The quasi-realist will want to make similar arguments for other realist claims. 
Similar evidence for independent expressive content can be found for other meta-
ethical issues. For example, the quasi-realist may wish to adopt the idea that there are 
moral properties. This is done by understanding the claim about properties 
expressivistically, as a claim about how we are to treat moral maters as serious and 
mind-independent. Note that many of our arguments for the intuition in the case of 
validity tracking expressive content also apply in the case of properties. For instance, 
our intuitions about denying the existence moral properties vary in strength based on 
the extent to which the denial is phrased so as to suggest taking away from the serious
and steadfast nature of morality. “There are no moral properties” is ofensive, but less 
ofensive than “moral properties aren't real,” which is less ofensive than “moral 
properties are nothing more than illusions created by the form of our language.” We 
also treat questions of moral properties without first having an account of what a 
property is-- and it doesn't seem to mater. And the phenomenological argument can 
apply as well here as in the case of validity. 
These cases give the quasi-realist license for optimism. This license can be 
reinforced with a general thought. It seems that we want realism to be true. Insofar as 
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we can understand why we desire for realism to be the case, we can bolster quasi-
realism; each aspect of realism that we choose to adopt, we can understand 
expressively as voicing the part of our desire for moral practice that stands to be 
satisfied by that part of realism being true. I do not know whether any intuitive 
support for realism will remain once these expressive aspects have been 
accommodated, but, given the conformity of our meta-ethical intuitions to the paterns
examined in the two cases above, I see no reason to believe that there will. 
6.7 Future
Qasi-realism is of great help to the mimicking theorist, since he no longer has 
to worry that he is flying too much in the face of our intuitions. The kind of quasi-
realism that I have specified will allow him to accommodate those intuitions, while 
keeping his view distinct. I take the combination of positions that I have specified-- 
mimicking, pluralistic, and sofly nuanced quasi-realist-- to constitute the strongest 
option available to the expressivist. 
We might proceed from this point in several ways. First of all, we need to give 
more atention to emotive meaning, how to detect it, and how to control it. Lef 
uncontrolled, and combined with expressivism, it presents a large opportunity for 
confusion; if expressions of atitudes are to be part of our considerations, we will need 
to be more careful in keeping charge of when we make them. 
Secondly, if we are sympathetic at all to Richards, we might wish to re-examine 
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some of the notions that we use in evaluating theories, in order that we might do so in 
a way that is not led astray by emotional efects. Let me present a suggestion-- not 
even a claim, but a posit to consider. The suggestion is that we need to be wary of 
brutalism masquerading as rigor. By “brutalism”, I refer to the architectural style 
renowned for its simplicity and ugliness. Its counterpart in philosophy is the feeling 
that the plainer a theory is-- and the more it lends itself to a presentation that is 
“technical” in the sense of being filled with lots of symbols and other arcana, such that
the work obtains a visual appearance and “feel” akin to mathematics and the hard 
sciences-- the more we understand it, the more specific it is, and the more careful its 
reasoning. But I see no reason to suppose that these desiderata are fundamentally 
aesthetic in nature; quite the opposite: surely rigor and clarity are not a mater of 
appearing serious. Likewise, a work that appropriates the aesthetics of mathematics 
and the sciences does not thereby inherit their rigor or usefulness. 
If we are to avoid such problems, we will need to avoid making assumptions as 
to what is clear, and what form a piece of information has to be transformed into for 
us to count as understanding it. We will need not only to approach these issues 
critically, but to first study all of our potential biases in this regard-- that is, to 
continue the work that Ogden and Richards began-- so that we can keep watch for 
them, and compensate appropriately, in our reexamination. This would be a significant 
endeavor, and one with a significant empirical component, but if it opens the door to 
changes or alternatives in methodology, and thereby helps us to solve ongoing 
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problems, it could prove worthwhile. 
Thirdly and finally, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the idea of expressions
of atitudes participating in philosophical theories. As soon as we permit expressivism, 
we permit expressions of atitudes to participate in our theories; even if we reject 
expressivism in meta-ethics, there are still other areas, such as aesthetics (or meta-
aesthetics) and meta-epistemology, which we have not considered.  If we are 
expressivists in our analysis of any subject within which there exist philosophical 
theories, then we will allow atitude-expression participation. If we allow those 
expressions to be truth-apt, and thereby activate the emotive accuracy constraint, then
those expressions will have to be taken seriously as part of our theories. 
The situation described in the previous paragraph is likely to seem bizarre to us.
But before I discuss the potential advantages to allowing it, I would like to question 
whether it really is as bizarre as it seems. If we have any sympathy for Richards’ 
observations, we might wonder to what extent our aversion to the participation of 
expressive content in our theories is justified, and to what extent, on the other hand, it 
is a symptom of scientism. Science, afer all, is descriptive, and insofar as philosophy is
not, it is not like science. It may be upseting to learn, afer thinking oneself engaged in
the lofy enterprise of describing the world, that one is doing nothing of the sort. We 
must beware the potential for bias created by this efect. 
Whether or not we consider theories made up of expressions of emotions to be 
bizarre, the view does have certain advantages, which we will only sketch rather than 
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examine fully (at least for the time being). For one, if a theory is emotive in nature, it 
becomes un-mysterious how intuitions can play the role of evidence for or against that
theory.254 We might wonder how intuitions come to be reliable indicators of whatever 
properties a purely descriptive theory concerns-- which we can understand for 
intuitions that are formed as a result of empirical experience, but harder to explain in 
other cases. On the other hand, for a theory comprised of expressive claims, there is no
gap between the intuition and the subject mater. For example, we learn about right 
and wrong, in part, by using thought experiments to reveal our atitudes. Now this is 
not to say that what we learn are facts about our atitudes-- a view where that was the 
case would be subjectivist rather than expressivist. The fact that we learn about 
rightness and wrongness through learning about our atitudes does not make those 
atitudes what we are learning about, because subjectivism is false. As quasi-realist 
expressivists, we can comfortably say that what we learn about are the properties of 
rightness and wrongness; quasi-realism allows us to reconcile this claim with the claim 
that there is nothing more, either metaphysically or epistemically, to a moral intuition 
than a feeling, and nothing more to a moral thought experiment than a story that we 
hear and react to. 
As this work is fast drawing to a close, permit me the luxury of some 
speculative remarks. In philosophy, we use intuitions in most, if not all, of our sub-
fields, and though we may wonder as to their operation, it is dificult to imagine how 
254 For a primer on the issue, one might consult Joel Pust’s Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on
intuitions. 
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we could do without them. It would, at any rate, be interesting to see what results 
could be achieved if, drawing upon the considerations of the previous paragraph, and 
consider that intuitions are uniquely ubiquitous in our field, we defined philosophy as 
the discipline of crafing theories using expressive language. If nothing else, such a 
definition would vindicate philosophy’s position within the humanities. Where 
literature allows us to express our emotions in prose, art in image, or poetry in verse, 
philosophy allows us to do so in theory. Propositional reflection enables theory to 
work as a useful mode of expression.
This consideration brings us, at long last, back to Ayer (1936 [1952]), who 
considers the position, which he atributes to C. A. Mace, that metaphysics is to be 
understood as art:
Among those who recognize that if philosophy is to be accounted a 
genuine branch of knowledge it must be defined in such a way as to 
distinguish it from metaphysics, it is fashionable to speak of the 
metaphysician as a kind of misplaced poet. As his statements have no 
literal meaning, they are not subject to any criteria of truth or falsehood: 
but they may still serve to express, or arouse, emotion, and thus be 
subject to ethical or aesthetic standards. And it is suggested that they 
may have considerable value, as means of moral inspiration, or even as 
works of art.255
Ayer objects to this account. He sees the metaphysician’s “art” as lacking worth, 
having been produced by accident by someone intending to describe, rather than an 
artist who knows what he is doing. The metaphysician, for Ayer, stumbles around in 
the dark, and while some small beauty may be produced as a result, it will not compare
to that which is produced by a master crafsman. If I am right, the combination of 
255 Ayer (1936 [1952]) p. 44
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quasi-realism and propositional reflection can rescue something like the Mace view. 
For on my view, there is nothing accidental about what the ethicist, or the philosopher 
of any other type whose stock in trade is emotive in nature, does. In an emotive field, 
the descriptive is expressive-- and this is not a mater of consequence, but of identity. 
The sentences of ethics describe and express, and when they do these things, they do 
one thing, not two. For the question of whether or not a sentence of ethical language 
describes is itself to be treated expressivistically, as specified by quasi-realism; and, 
expressivistically speaking, the answer to the question is yes. If all of philosophy is 
emotive, it needn’t be any less descriptive for it, at least so long as we permit the 
expressive understanding of being descriptive. If we do not permit it-- if we reach the 
rare situation, as specified by our three constraints, where purely external talk is 
possible; and though I doubt we are in such a situation here, once again, I will cheat a 
bit for the sake of explanation-- then it will not be so, and on this external reflection, 
we will note the absence of mysterious properties and mysterious intuitive knowledge. 
But this external case is, as far as most of our philosophical deliberations are 
concerned, neither here nor there; it arises only once our concern as to the answer has 
vanished. As such, it de-mystifies philosophy, but it does not derail it. 
If such a state could be achieved for our discipline, it would be a significant 
accomplishment. Much work, in the direction that I have indicated, will have to be 
done before this result can be secured. Furthermore, as the present remarks are purely 
speculative, I cannot guarantee that such a result will be achieved at all. But, at the 
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very least, the mater seems worth further thought. 
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